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Abstract

Through mixed-methods research, this dissertation details the regionally variegated and
place-specific software production processes in three second-tier US software regions.
I focus on the relationship between different industrial, firm, and worker production
configurations and broad-based economic development, prosperity, and inequality. I
develop four main empirical findings.
First, I argue for a periodization of software production that tracks with changes in
software laboring activity, software technologies, and wage-employment relationships.
Through a GIS-based method, I use the IPUMS-USA to extensively measure the amount
and type of software labor in industries across the US between 1970 and 2015. I map the
uneven geography of software labor that produces different clusters of various software
occupations. Second, I argue that between each software period, locational windows
provide an opportunity for second-tier software regions to challenge Silicon Valley. I
combine the IPUMS-USA dataset with interviews of software workers to analyze forms
of regionally specific modes of production in Seattle, Washington, Portland, Oregon, and
Austin, Texas. I trace how software production in these three cities evolves between each
software period, taking on different spatial configurations, firm strategies, labor practices,
and technological characteristics. Third, I argue that software labor is hyper-sensitive
to deskilling because of software production activity produces software. I combine
occupation classifications and interviews with software workers to interrogate the everpresent need for software workers to learn the newest development practices and software
i

languages as firms seek to automate software production. I define five key moments since
the 1970s that exemplify software labor market dualization and segmentation.
Using interviews, and conference observations, I find that community-based organizations and labor market intermediaries locally mitigate the structural tendencies toward
labor market dualization and segmentation. I argue that without intervention, the layered
and bifurcated labor market for software production reproduces existing inequalities.
Further, the organizational, technological, and spatial changes in software production
reduce the potential for equitable wealth production. Ultimately, this dissertation argues
for the importance of labor organizing in software, contributing empirical and theoretical
work in a lineage of regional-based industrial restructuring literature. The regional and
industrial geographies produced by and out of software production are significant forces
in the economy at regional and national scales. I connect this process to the feminization
of other industries, noting how the technical nature of software production structurally
genders and racializes the labor force. Leveraging a labor feminization framework highlights the flexibilization of labor and the rift between the pace of software skill building
and technological development.
Both software production and regional economies are necessary entry points to
understand new capitalist relations. Understanding these new relations thus requires
examining how configurations of software production differ across regions, how they
impact industry and regional economic development outcomes, and how they weaken or
strengthen actions of local workers, local organizations, and local firms. These processes
offer a glimpse into how the contemporary moment of production differs from other
moments of production. Armed with this understanding, this research will be able to
connect industry and regional economic-development outcomes to regionally specific
modes of production, answering relevant software-based economic-development policy
questions.
ii
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1 Introduction

Learning these skills [software programming] isn’t just
important for your future. It’s important for our country’s
future. If we want America to stay on the cutting edge, we need
young Americans like you to master the tools and technology
that will change the way we do just about everything.
President Barack Obama on YouTube for Code.org 2014

Software is everywhere and seemingly in everything. Software is part of every tech
gadget that we use both inside and outside of work. Software is even core to new products
and core to the evolution of established products: even our cars are now receiving regular
software updates. The growth of software from obscure military and business venture to
near ubiquity in daily life means that software production is a fundamental part of the
economy. Firms that employ large numbers of software workers like Google, Microsoft,
Apple, and Amazon dominate the news headlines. Investors cling to reports of their
earnings and make predictions on the global economy based on the health of these “tech”
companies even though, by industrial classification, they are classified as a search engine
firm, a software publisher, a computer manufacturer, and a wholesale distributor.
To keep pace with the demand of software workers, a new set of trade schools has
promulgated “code schools” into our vocabulary and even liberal arts colleges provide
computer science degrees. Veteran workers and new workers clamor to learn software
development skills and new software languages in a frantic frenzy to both develop software
and stay relevant in the ever-changing software landscape. Even politicians have jumped
1

on the software development bandwagon. During a computer programming media
event in December 2014, President Barack Obama became the first US President to
“code”. Afterward, the White House released a YouTube video in which President Obama
addressed Americans highlighting the importance of learning software programming
(chapter epigraph).
President Obama’s focus on software programming skills and the competitive nature
of the US economy underscores the rapid growth of software production as a whole.
Since software was first produced in the private sector in the 1950s, the number of laborers
that produce software, the number firms that develop software for in-house purposes, and
the number of firms that produce software has grown faster than analysts’ expectations.
Future predictions anticipate firms, governments, and individuals to spend $2.4 trillion
on technology in 2017, including about $1 trillion in North America alone. These tech
expenditure figures include hardware, like computers and printers, alongside software.
However, by 2020 analysts expect the software portion of technology expenditures to
surpass the hardware portion, accounting for more than $1.2 trillion on software alone
(Sharwood 2017).
Thus, with a focus on programming skills, workers are the intended audience of
President Obama’s message. The message is intended to serve two related purposes. First,
to ensure American workers have the skills necessary so that American firms are the
beneficiary of increased software expenditures. Second, to provide a source of jobs for
American workers. Yet, the focus on software skills treats the software production as
a simple supply and demand function. The relationship between labor markets, firms,
technology, and the location of software production is more complicated than solving an
equilibrium equation between labor supply and speculative labor demand.
Understanding software and software production has always been a moving mark,
difficult to pinpoint, and thus difficult to prescribe relevant and contemporary economic
2

development policy. One contribution of this dissertation is to track the changing nature
of software as it relates to the form of the software itself, the form of software labor,
and the form of software as a commodity. These aspects of software are molded by new
developments in hardware, new advances in software languages and libraries, new forms
of software development, changing firm strategies, and the changing spatial organization
of production.
Early software workers flipped binary switches on machines to enter instructions and
now software workers type code and have software libraries or machine learning develop
code based on constraints. During this transformation, software has gone from being
tightly coupled with the computing machines in the form of switches, to almost universal
applications that share platforms. Software’s form as a commodity evolved alongside these
changes from custom one-off construction like developments, to continuous development
models based on beta code or proof-of-concept developments. Physically, the places
software operates has evolved from enormous mechanical binary switches, to punch
cards, to tape, to optical disks, to minuscule flash memory – from binary switches, to
3D NAND switches. Software workers have had to stay abreast of the changes, reacting
to new developments to retain their skilled status. In doing so, workers themselves seek
to improve their own efficiency, competing with other workers, and even producing
software which deskills or automates the work of other workers.
Perhaps one of the most confusing and difficult parts of researching and understanding
software labor comes methodologically. Is software production an industry? Certainly.
But software production is also more than an industry – as I show in the dissertation,
there are zero industries (using either NAICS of SIC methods of industry classification)
that do not have software workers. That software workers have permeated into all areas
of production, unlike, as an example, logging or restaurant server which are found almost
exclusively in natural resource industries and eating and drinking places respectively.
3

Thus, software production is more akin to management and administration than industryspecific occupations, forcing scholars to examine software production as a cross-industry
laboring activity. The free access to open-source software also confuses traditional
examinations of software production because the product, or output, of large portions of
software labor is given away freely, only then to sell access to complementary software
services, supplementary software products, or licensed access to free software running on
advanced computers. Cloud computing and advanced internet infrastructure make this
possible in ways previously thought unimaginable.
Regional variation and divergence only exacerbate our ability to understand software
production. “Modes” of software production, characterized by the configuration of a
region’s software industrial district, undergo periods of divergence and normalization.
Silicon Valley’s concentration of software production continues to be an industry- and
production-setting region, setting standards and practices that other firms and workers
mimic. Silicon Valley is unique and other regions have differing industrial district formations that result in different modes of software production. Software production in
second-tier regions – regions competing with Silicon Valley and contributing to standards
and practices in their own right – diverge from dominant forms of software production
in each software period.
Second-tier regions like Seattle, Portland, Austin, Boston, and Research Triangle all
have large agglomerations of software production activity, and produce software under
varying social relations, varying institutional relations, and varying forces of production.
Regional divergence results from regional firms competing and experimenting with
new commodities, technologies, organization, and labor practices. The needs of global
capital, technological infrastructure, and chance determine which software technologies
become dominant in the next software period, producing regional winners and losers.
The resulting variegation – the variation of the state of regional production in both
4

outward appearance and internal structure – provide opportunity between each software
commodity period for a new region to emerge as dominant trend-setter. The high-tech
production and specialization literature classically describes Boston as the almost Silicon
Valley; highlighting the importance of the evolutionary nature of regions and their
industrial districts, Boston is by far a loser. Yet, to date, the evolutionary nature and
industrial district formations of software production remain understudied.
Software production is widely perceived to be a source of good quality jobs and
a pathway of opportunity underscored by President Obama’s media stint. Yet, the
industrial district formations of regionally specific modes of production yield significant
variation in wage distributions. These variations are particularly evident along lines
of gender and race/ethnicity, calling into question the relationship between regionallyspecific modes of software production and the ability to produce wealth for traditionally
marginalized groups like women and persons of color. Further, these variations suggest
that the changing nature of software production must tracked to understand the structural
pressures on firms and software workers which hinder the ability of regions to produce
wealth and for traditionally marginalized workers to find jobs that lead to successful
careers. As I show, software workers, perceived to have highly sought after and safe
jobs, are hyper sensitive to deskilling. Further, the occupational bifurcation of software
jobs leads to dualized, segmented labor markets of high-skilled software developers and
low-skilled software producers-users characterized by repetitive tasks.
The structural forces of deskilling and segmentation take on local variations because
of the regional modes of production. As part of the regional modes of production,
local institutions and labor groups seek mediate and mitigate the structural forces so
that software production can both produce wealth and increase equity. The power
and success of local institutions connect to the changing nature of software and the
industrial district formation. That is, the priorities of local institutions are evident by
5

the structure of software in the region. In Portland and Austin, as I show, workers are
hypersensitive to automation and deskilling and thus workers seek to organize to combat
the inequitable impacts of these forces. In Portland, workers leverage their inter-firm, interindustry connections while in Austin, workers seek to embolden a startup community
by encouraging diversity in programming education and access. These examples stress
that labor organizing, whether formally as a union or informally in events or initiatives,
is vital for the generation wealth for workers.
The purpose of this mixed-methods dissertation is to understand the dynamics of
software production in regional economies. The first set of research questions, addressed
in Chapter 4, focuses on understanding the extent of software production and cataloging
the changing nature of software since 1970. Combining historical research, a large dataset
of software occupations across the US, and interview data, Chapter 4 uses four periods of
software commodities to look at the changing nature of software labor while software
technologies are actively developed.
Chapter 5 then builds on the findings from the Chapter 4. Chapter 4 argues, among
other things, that software must be measured by looking at software occupations. This
ambitious chapter catalogs regional changes in software production since 1970 and examines software production in three case study cities of Austin, Texas, Portland, Oregon, and
Seattle, Washington. Lastly, Chapter 5 connects the local form of software production to
the variations in income distributions and occupational structure within software work
itself.
Finally, Chapter 6 examines the structural pressures on software labor markets produces inequity along lines of gender and race/ethnicity. This chapter groups occupations
into labor market tiers, then looks at incomes and inclusion rates for women and minorities. Lastly, Chapter 6 uses interviews to examine ways the adverse pressures on
software labor markets are mediated, mitigated, and challenged by local communities and
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institutions.
One core argument of this research is that software fundamentally is misunderstood
as a laboring activity. More precisely, software is unique in that the output of laboring
software workers is software – which may potentially automate the software worker
that created it. I argue, throughout the three substantive chapters, that this necessitates
greater expediency in prioritizing collective action and addressing equity issues in software
production.
In Chapter 2, I review the necessary literature, documenting examples of high-tech
regional production, labor market dynamics, and a conceptual framework for understanding software production. Chapter 3 then documents my research design and research
method. Chapters 4 through 6 I outlined above. In Chapter 7, I review my findings
and provide some concluding thoughts. Appendix A documents the method used to
measure software labor at the metropolitan level, a contribution to the literature by itself.
Appendix B contains supplementary data which are too numerous to include in the main
part of the dissertation.
Theoretically, this research offers insight into how this current moment of software
production differs from other moments of production (Fordist, post-Fordist/flexible accumulation) and the importance of certain kinds of regionally specific modes of production
that might yield more desirable industry and regional economic development outcomes.
To capture these desirable economic development outcomes, this research provides relevant economic development policy directions. These understandings engage in providing
new empirical case studies and expand existing theoretical understandings regarding
capitalist production under the new relationships of cognitive-cultural capitalism.
Let’s begin.
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2 Literature Review

2.1

Framework for Regional Analysis of Software Production

Understanding the contemporary landscape of software production requires us to grapple
with both the enduring and changing character of technology under capitalism itself.
Thus, this research speaks to a cross-disciplinary interest between economic development,
industrial geography, and labor market scholars. This fruitful line of inquiry continues to
generate theories of regional evolution and high-tech production. Addressing the specifics
of software production and the changing nature of software production, I incorporate
a theoretical approach with four main dimensions: profit cycles, capitalist variants,
industrial districts typologies, and software periods.
Fortunately, Campbell-Kelly (2004) periodizes software production between 1950
and 1995, introducing three software periods that span about 15 years each. Contract
software starting in the mid 1950s, corporate software starting in the mid 1960s, and
mass-market software starting in 1980. Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz (2015) later
adds a fourth period starting in 1995 called the internet software period. This useful
periodization characterizes dominant technologies and forms of software since computing
and software’s development. A problem with this particular form of periodization lies
in the choice of transition years, suggesting two changes. First, the US military was
leveraging software contracting as computing services prior to 1956, as documented in
the book. Second, the transition years after the initial period mark the first time that
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technologies were developed – technologies that then went on to characterize the period.
History is read by the winners, and if we applied this method, we would lose sight of
the fact that there were many competing technologies fighting to characterize the next
period. For example, the mass-market period could have been the artificial intelligence
period had developments in fifth generation languages taken off. This is also true of
the fourth period added later, called the internet, which starts in 1995. The internet
still exhibited evidence of mass-market software, as the internet was still a platform
for purchasing to run locally. Instead, considering transition periods, or declines in
technologies, scholars might look at when different forms of software became popular
and acknowledge the decline of other forms of software. For example, how do we think
about the fact that Apple’s App Store allows Mac users to purchase software? In the
mass-market software period (third), software did connect over the internet, but in the
cloud and mobile period (a revised fourth), software runs over the internet and requires
connection. An example of this is Google Docs or Gmail. What we’ve seen as the internet
since roughly 2004 when Google released GMail: a web 2.0 period where websites are
interactive.
A form of periodization that may prove useful is that of the five profit cycles.
Markusen contributes a theory of how industry restructures in unison with changes
in the profit cycle starting first from zero profit, to monopoly profit, normal profit,
declining profit, and finally negative profit. In each of the product stages, competition
changes the nature of the industry. At first, historical accident best describes the spatial
configuration, but upon innovation, these firms tend to co-locate. Upon standardization,
industry undergoes cost-cutting firm consolidation, avoids unionized regions, and seek
other features to cut costs in production (Markusen 1986). Markusen (1986) explained
the complexity of locational choices based on profit cycle, noting that the importance
of research and development, suppliers, standardization, and labor costs changed as the
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product matured between five different profit cycles.
Regions dominated by high technology, innovative firms, such as California’s Silicon Valley, will have relatively bifurcated labor force with large
proportions of professional and technical workers and relatively unskilled
assembly workers. Regions dominated by mature oligopolistic industrial
sectors will have large proportions of unionized, skilled blue-collar workers. Profit-squeezed sectors, oligopolized or not, will migrate to areas with
low-cost, unorganized labor. (Markusen 1986, 10)
The pursuit of low-cost unorganized labor is in part what drives industries to seek
“locational windows” termed by (Storper and Walker 1989b) to describe the move to a
new region that may provide the reconfiguration necessary for the industry to begin a
new profit cycle. Markusen, DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee (1999) demonstrates that different
regional modes of production yield lasting differential and broad-based regional economic
development outcomes and that regional modes of production can analyzed by uncovering
each regions software industrial district. A succinct typology of the industrial districts –
spatial configurations of these sectors – are outlined in later work: Marshallian districts
consist of large numbers of locally networked smaller firms; hub and spoke districts
revolve around a single large firm and many smaller firms; and satellite platform districts
are unconnected satellite offices of large firms connected to their respective headquarters
and other satellite offices (Markusen 1996).
The relocation of semiconductor and computer manufacturing to Silicon Valley is an
example of a capitalized locational window. The relocation and success of Silicon Valley’s
semiconductor and computer manufacturing depended on the cost cutting measures
afforded by the region’s strong relationship between university and industry. Silicon
Valley was a Marshallian industrial district of semiconductor and computer manufacturing
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that benefited from the knowledge spillover of the university, the flexible and specialized
labor of the region, industrial capacity, and informal networking (Saxenian 1996). Later
work also advocates for examining “second-tier regions” which challenge the primacy
of places like Silicon Valley. Here the notion of locational window proves useful as
second-tier regions may provide locational windows during shifts in the profit cycle. I
expand on the districts later, but compile characteristics on each industrial district in
Table 2.1, Table 2.2, and Table 2.3, and include reproductions of the visuals in Figure 2.1,
Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3, and Figure 2.4.
A different periodization seeks to understand broad shifts in capitalist industrial logics,
declaring the oncoming of global capitalism and the decline of monopoly capitalism (J.
Graham et al. 1988). A summary table is provided later in Figure 4.2. The framework is
Marxian in nature and focuses on inter- and intra-class relationships. Each period – or
capitalist variant – describes relationships thus describes sets of factors that describe each
set of relationships. For capital-labor (inter-class), these metrics are the use of technology,
the logic of the labor process, and the form of the reserve army. For capital-capital
(intra-class), these metrics are the form of centralization, the degree of concentration,
and the form of international capital circuits. Global capital is marked by shifts toward
increased computerization, small-batch specialty production, non-unionized labor, capital
diversification, increased capital concentration, and international finance capital. This
describes an economy-wide crisis of production rather than an industry-wide logics,
contrasting with Markusen (1986). Notably, J. Graham et al. (1988) gives us a method for
analyzing regions – by examining new forms of technology, existing labor practices, and
firm organization.
During each software period, software takes on a new commodity form. Thus,
the production of software undergoes each of the five profit cycles associated with a
product cycle. As a new commodity form gains prominence, the share of the market
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share of the commodity form decreases. In software, this is typically the case because
new product form of software also grows the entire size of the market. During each of
software’s historical commodity periods, software production has taken on characteristics
of the larger economy-wide changes in the economy. For example, the contracting
software (from software periods) product cycle (from profit cycles) had capital-capital and
capital-labor relationships mimicking the economy-wide class relationships of competitive
capitalism (capitalist variants). Each of these sets of periods has particular sets urban
spatial arrangements (from industrial districts) which maximizes software period, product
cycle, and capitalist variant relationships.
2.2

Labor Markets and the Labor Process
2.2.1

Structure and wage distributions

Labor market theorists attempt to understand how skills, job matching, and career
development impact regional economies. Further, they seek to understand the points
for market intervention, acknowledging the problems with describing labor as a market.
This section builds from the work of Braverman (1998), Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly
(1997), and Benner, Leete, and Pastor (2007).
Braverman (1998) claims that the general law of capitalist division of labor is to reduce
the necessary specialized knowledge and training of laborers so that the majority of
laborers perform simple, often repetitive laboring tasks. The result is an ever decreasing
number of specialized occupations and large number of occupations which require minimal training. The labor process is then structured around this occupational bifurcation,
as dictated by the needs of capitalist production.
This labor process structure produces significant disparity in wage distributions. The
work of Mincer (1992) characterizes general themes of labor economics as the study of
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wage profiles and distributions, labor mobility, and the relationship between technology
and labor. The human capital model serves as a more expansive lens for viewing labor
economics compared to traditional views, which ignore the skills and training investments
that return back into the system.
If the current growth of demand for human capital is based on skill-biased
technology, and skills acquired at school and on the job are a function of the
quality of learning and not merely of the time spent in it, a bottleneck in
the expansion of human capital supplies may lie in the inadequate quality
of learning absorbed by the work force, especially at the elementary and
secondary levels of schooling. (Mincer 1992, 135)
Mincer (1992) finds, first, that greater amounts of education obtained by a worker
correlates to a greater wage, and that education reduces risk of unemployment. Second,
younger workers tend to be more geographically mobile since the payoff becomes higher
over time. Third, while some human capital is transferable between firms, some human
capital is firm-specific. This can be both a deterrent and an impetus for inter-firm labor
mobility. Fourth, technology tends to steepen wage profiles of labor. These broad themes
are impacted by the supply and demand curves of labor and human capital. Shifts in the
demand curve can be caused by changes in public policies, public levels of education, and
overall family income levels.
Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly (1997) expand and formalize the ideas of Mincer in
their articulation of institutionalism, a framework of thought that directs labor markets
to look at social context. Social norms and transactions between actors form the base
of this framework, creating a network and hierarchy of labor market actors. Labor
markets exhibit combinations of incentive, contract, and embeddedness forms of labor
mechanisms. These labor mechanisms exert, and control, power. Workers, employers,
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and institutions navigate these labor mechanisms to pursue their own objectives, often
navigating the social, technological, and government constraints placed on labor markets.
These objectives are multi-fold, but the contract between these actors can include various
aspects of the incentive labor mechanism. These contracts between actors can be brokered
through social interactions in labor hierarchies, coalitions, and markets. The state plays a
role in labor markets, but the involvement of the state can be different since government
objectives are often changing with social norms. Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly (1997)
describe the commodification of everyday life (proletarianization) in US history, noting
the change in labor from work in households to work that adds exchange value.
Social relations, as well as economic conditions, channel history’s impact on
technological choices. This is visible in the innovation process itself. ... More
broadly, social relations, power, and culture in the workforce ... set the frame
for efficiency. (Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly 1997, 107)
Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly (1997) assert that this can be observed by examining
cultural history. Labor markets, and the relationship between actors in the market, have
changed as a result of the interests of capital, which are often but not always, expressed
through employers and firms.
2.2.2

Employer and firm dynamics

This change is cataloged by Osterman (1999), asserting that the institutions of the labor
market in the US post-war period have been undermined to shift and manage risk.
The wage structure has been shattered, and market forces have much greater
impact on compensation than they have had in the past. (Osterman 1999, 68)
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Existing views of the labor market share an underlying premise of a long-term contract
between worker and employer. This model does not allow for the natural ebbs and flows
of the economy, limiting the contract to adapt to changing economic conditions. Corporate governance, the government’s role as an intermediary, and relationships between
industrial labor actors helped shape these constraints. Firms’ ever present profit motive
combined with increased global competition, new technological advancements, and firm
reorganization the underlying long-term contract commitment that undergird secure
employment structures are dissipating. Osterman provides several longitudinal studies to
document this dissipation, measured in layoffs, quits, and tenure, among other criteria.
As Kalleberg (2009) shows, temporary work is one way in which both employers and
workers have shifted risk to deal with economic tides. Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly also
introduce bounded rationality into the labor market and job market. Chris Tilly and
Charles Tilly suggest that the classical markets are less important than economists may
suggest, pointing to the fact that most work is found through networks. This further
muddles the supply and demand curves in labor markets and continues to add to their
divergences in distributions. History, race, class, and gender are all part of networks that
circumvent traditional methods of employment.
Benner (2003) asserts three factors – heightened global competition, firm reorganization, and technological advancement – have changed the relationship between worker and
employer. Labor markets have been adapting to these factors in part with institutions
that act as labor-market intermediaries between both ends of the labor contract. This
ultimately reduces transactions costs, building networks and managing risk. These private,
public, and membership-based intermediaries increase the reflexivity of labor markets
to match the reflexivity of firms, both spatially located, which contributes to regional
economic development Benner (2003) and Benner, Leete, and Pastor (2007).
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During the 1990s it was common for observers to see in the rapidly growing
information technology sector a paradigm for the future economy. The
eventual (and in fact entirely predictable) failure of the sector to sustain its
growth path, and indeed its partial collapse in the early twenty-first century,
makes it possible to view the changes it introduced in a more balanced
perspective. (Crouch 2005, 111)
Crouch (2005) asserts that skills are a collective good, not just an individual characteristic, since it is the employers that use the skills. Crouch also surveys the techniques
from which skills can be built: the government, the labor market (experience), corporate
hierarchies, associations, communities, and networks. Each of these techniques is not a
system for building skills, instead they are individual sources that make up part of a larger
system of skill formation. The institutions and systems have encountered change from
concentrations of skilled labor and the globalizing labor market.
2.2.3

Skill-building

Technology improvements have required firms to adapt to both specialization and globalization, which may be the source of the changes in skill-formation institutions. Job
training is an important part of the labor market since job training is a form of a career
ladder or pathway and an investment in human capital.
Operationally, the trend over the past three decades has been to devolve
authority for [workforce development] program design and service delivery
from the federal government to the states or localities. ... policymakers
generally agree that workforce development programs and policies should
allow flexibility to respond to local economic needs and business cycles.
(Barnow and Nightingale 2007, 36)
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The sources of job training and the responsibility of job training are in flux. Scholars
cite nuanced reasons for the ineffectiveness of job training, acknowledging the hardships
of disadvantaged populations and the general lack of effective policy. Each argument
is framed in the larger context of a changing labor market – in which politicians are
cutting funding for workforce development programs and labor institutions are emerging
to fill the vacuum left behind by retreating corporations and programs (Barnow and
Nightingale 2007).
Labor markets exhibit queuing behaviors. Thurow (1975) asserts that there is a queue
of jobs within the labor market, both from within and between primary and secondary
markets. Thurow further asserts that skills are acquired on the job, which means the
labor market is not a market for trained labor; rather, it is a labor market for trainable
labor. Trained labor supply depends on the trained labor demand, thus the supply and
demand are not independent of one another. Education acquisition is a leading method
for workers to demonstrate their trainability – or background characteristics that show
ability to observe professional group norms. The labor market can be viewed as both a
job queue and a distribution of job opportunities to grab a holistic view of the market.
Reskin and Roos (1990) expand on Thurow’s labor queue model, providing clarity in
the distribution of job opportunities and incomes by describing a job queue. Where the
labor queue models workers in rank of attractiveness, the job queue models jobs in rank
of attractiveness.
Often technological changes that elaborated the division of labor, deskilled
work, or altered working conditions set the stage for occupational decline.
Normally, jobs change because employers transform the technology of production or reorganize the work. ... as the computer workforce grew, managers
sought to contain labor costs by separating from programming two new oc-

17

cupations: systems analysts, who designed information systems; and coders,
who translated programs into computer codes and entered data. (Reskin and
Roos 1990, 43)
Both queues generate the uneven distribution of jobs, resulting in the best jobs being
taken by best workers and the worst jobs being taken by bottom-ranked workers. This
also means some bottom-ranked workers are unemployed.
2.2.4

Gender and workforce development

Historically, positions of men and women with the same background characteristics have
not been even in the labor queue due to the customs of sex-based hiring. Ignoring sex in
the labor queue undermines the high rankings of male employers and managers.
... occupational sex segregation has been more resistant to change than race
segregation. (Reskin and Roos 1990, 6)
There are many conditions that allow in-roads for women into male-dominated positions, generally involving reranking positions by males and females alike or a reranking of
the position by the employer around gender-based stereotypes. Most feminizing positions
have involved emotional labor, requiring the generation or suppression of emotions. However, all in-roads adhere to both a labor queue and a job queue – ranking of both workers
and jobs.Reskin and Roos also importantly document various industries that undergo
feminization and the different nature and structure of feminization. The feminization of a
labor market, characterized by the growth of women’s share of production, may produce
meaningful careers for women. Some forms of feminization reinforce broader gender
and racial dynamics by allowing women and minorities at only the bottom of the labor
market.
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Firms are not necessarily vested in workforce development when there are other
ways of finding or maintaining labor. But the effects of a globalizing workforce (labor
market) are scarcely touched upon. For example, Barnow and Nightingale (2007) claim
that firms cannot find enough skilled labor. The crux of their argument relies on this
assumption. They assert that maintaining a skilled workforce involves educating, training,
and adapting existing workforces. Due to severe public-funding cuts, most of these training efforts are privately funded. Thus, in order to meet the skill-requirement demands of
firms, policy must seek to maintain or improve worker productivity through increasing
skills, improving worker security and safety, improving employment opportunities, and
rewarding strong work ethic. Barnow and Nightingale survey six policy categories, each
of which sees the worker as a customer which must be served. Barnow and Nightingale
(2007) close with the thought that the Bush administration is shifting away from programs and institutions to individuals, and instead focusing on incentivizing businesses to
train workers. Even this still sees the worker as the customer, but simply transfers the
responsibility to the firm. Barnow and Nightingale (2007) additionally acknowledge the
importance of local policy to supplement federal- or state-level policy gaps.
Promoting advancement in the labor market for low-wage workers requires
changes in firms and in workforce delivery systems. (Giloth 2000, 346)
Giloth, however, notes that the failures of some workforce development training
programs are due to disengaged employers. Giloth insists on substantial employer engagement, deep community connections, career advancement, integrative human service
supports, contextual and industry-driven education and training, reformed community
colleges, and the connective tissue of networks. No matter the labor market, regions (not
arbitrary municipalities) and people (e.g., race matters) are the right levels at which to
affect change. Giloth finally notes the important role of the labor-market intermediary.
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Holzer and Poverty (2008) attempts to understand the failures of workforce development
policy. Holzer and Poverty note that skills are determinants of labor market earnings, the
US continues to cut workforce development programs. Workforce development programs,
when done right, are cost-effective. Additionally, workforce development programs for
disadvantaged populations have decreased due to a lack of voice for the rights of the poor,
which means these cuts are largely political. Workforce development practitioners and
scholars see career pathways and ladders as important forms of workforce development.
2.2.5

Labor market intermediaries

There are two other aspects that must be considered, namely the context in which the
intermediary emerges. Career pathways are well established in Boston hospitals, for
example, which explains their high employee-retention rates in comparison to those that
don’t participate in career pathway programs (Fitzgerald 2006). Benner (2003) documents
types of service roles that intermediaries can take to shape labor markets. Using three
different broad categories of roles – meeting, molding, and making – Benner (2003)
describes how a labor market intermediary (or specifically a workforce development
intermediary) might use these roles to impact the labor market.
Workforce development, career ladders, working with LMIs, and other forms of
labor involvement are all high-road relationships between industries, firms, and labor.
Yet, industry pressures can result in disinvestments in labor. Here, Bernhardt, Dresser,
and Rogers (2001) describes the cycles and incentives of firms and industries to pursue
labor relationships outside the high-road relationships examined earlier. In the absence
of a partnership between labor and capital, low-road relationships may more broadly
occur. The success of instituting government-sponsored partnerships to take a “German”
approach to promoting high-road paths for corporations. Bernhardt, Dresser, and Rogers
also clearly described the risks that capital incurs when choosing the high-road in the
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absence of an agreement or partnership. Bernhardt, Dresser, and Rogers assert that the
successful implementation of partnerships in Milwaukie’s manufacturing sector could be
taken to any region seeking economic development through workforce development. In
fact, three items are suggested and outlined for practitioners.
Changing technology, global competition, and a host of other factors have
led to stagnant wages on the lower rungs of the economic ladder and limited
opportunities for skill building and advancement. The sectoral approach
to workforce development offers strategies to improve outcomes for lowincome workers that are based on understanding the labor market system
within a particular industry and region and developing tactics that both
benefit workers and make economic sense in today’s business environment.
(Conway, Dworak-Muñoz, and Blair 2004, 2)
This fundamental understanding helped to frame the descriptions and plans set forth
by other scholars. Conway, Dworak-Muñoz, and Blair (2004), Conway (2007), and
Schrock (2011) discuss labor relationships made through these kinds of partnerships,
both formal and informal. This work supports high-road firm behavior while providing
incentives external outside of the aims of economic development. This work promotes
firm vitality by creating firms networks and forging collaborative relationships between
capital and labor. Comparing Schrock’s analysis from Chicago to Bernhardt, Dresser,
and Rogers’s analysis in Milwaukie reveals striking similarities. “Demand-driven” and
“identifying a sector with the most immediate payoff” are two sides of one coin – they
aim to find the sector that demands aid through lackluster performance. This leads to
“sector-focused” interventions, which focus efforts on one industry. System-integration is
the core of Bernhardt, Dresser, and Rogers’s industrious partnerships that bring capital
and labor together.
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Previous empirical research on the impact of business assistance living wage
laws has detected significant decreases in employment.43 Yet experts have
questioned this past research on the grounds that the data sources could
not detect urban level impacts and that they did not adequately control for
whether cities actually enforce their business assistance provisions. (Lester
and Jacobs 2010, 28)
Outside of knowledge workers, the demand for the sustainability of wages is expanded
by Bartik (2004)’s description of local living wages. This framing is useful to shine a light
on the both the differences between local and federal living-wage laws and the components
necessary to create successful local living-wage requirements. Lester and Jacobs (2010)
asserts that wage minimums have no negative effect on city-wide employment levels and
do not harm low-wage workers. Lester and Jacobs (2010) claim to provide one of the
most methodologically sound studies to date for quantifying the impacts of minimumand living-wage laws. While it is unclear how different cities might change based on the
outcomes of Lester and Jacobs, this is strong evidence that counters observations of other
scholars, notably Adams and Neumark (2004). Lastly, Bartik laid out the argument for
federal minimum-wage standards, even if it wasn’t intended.
2.3

Regional Development and Industrial Restructuring
2.3.1

Restructuring spurs research

Understanding regional economies and regional development outcomes has always been
closely linked to firms’ organizational and technological innovations. After the post-war
growth period, the increased fungibility of both capital and labor as part of broad political
economy transformations became tightly linked to a decline in US manufacturing jobs.
Under new international pressures, firms sought organizational efficiency through out22

sourcing and offshoring and sought production efficiency through technological advances
(Bluestone and Harrison 1982). While manufacturing industries underwent a restructuring that unevenly impacted regional economies, new high-tech industries brought
promise for regional development (Piore and Sabel 1986). The resurgent importance of
understanding regional economies required an understanding of the uneven decline of
American manufacturing industries, the growth of new industrial production in Asia,
the regional topology of new high-tech industries, and the tendency for some regions to
incorporate high-tech industries into their economic base (Storper 1997).
Paradigms from traditional economics, evolutionary economics, and geography attempted to address the changing spatial nature of capital, labor, and innovation. Traditional economists, like Losch (1954), Isard (1960), and Christaller (1966), incorporated
space into equilibrium models to develop input-output models based on location theory.
Evolutionary economists, like Nelson and Winter (1985) and Antonelli (2003), incorporated technological path-dependence into regional models. In doing so, they considered
technological change as endogenous to economic systems, showing empirically that technological spillover takes a spatial pattern and is directly linked to regional innovations by
firms. Heterodox scholars, like Massey and Meegan (1978) and Bluestone and Harrison
(1982), examined regions as “relatively passive subjects of translocal industries” (Markusen,
DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee 1999, 43). Insights from research on Third Italy led yet another
wave of research on business milieu and cooperative production networks by scholars,
like Piore and Sabel (1986) and later Saxenian (1996).
2.3.2

Heterodox paradigms: regional forms of accumulation and production

Amid economic geographers, a heterodox paradigm emerged from numerous works (Hall,
Markusen, et al. 1983; Hall and Markusen 1985; Markusen 1986; Storper and Walker
1989b; Markusen, Hall, Campbell, et al. 1991; Sayer and Walker 1992; Scott and Storper
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1992; Amin 1994; Saxenian 1996). The heterodox paradigm rests on two foundational
components. The first component is what Storper calls the “holy trinity” of organizations,
territories, and technology, and the relationships between them. In this trinity, organizations primarily include firms but are also defined by the institutions and groups that link
firms together. Technologies, or more specifically new technologies, involve production
innovations. Territories are the places in which local interactions between actors happen
and the spillovers of technologies and organizational patterns are shared. And yet changes
in the “overall nature of ... capitalism” requires that understandings about regions and
their economies consider the economy as a set of relations, the economic processes as
conversation and coordination, and the subjects as reflexive. Accumulation then can be
understood not as material accumulation but instead as relational accumulation. Regions
house accumulations of relationships in which firms compete and cooperate (Storper
1997).
This notion of relational accumulation, competition, and cooperation lends itself to
the second foundational component: that of disequilibrium, rather than equilibrium,
growth. The spatial heterogeneity of labor markets and the increased mobility of capital
and capital stock exacerbate regional and labor competition, producing uneven regional
and industrial development (Walker 1978). This uneven regional and industrial development undergirds a tendency toward capital accumulation through disequilibrium: “thus,
territorial extension, differentiation, and instability are not afflictions visited on industrialization but conditions upon which capitalist development operates.” New industrial
territories and new industrial complexes, based on organizational and technological innovations in production, generate higher rates of profit. These new territories and complexes
attract labor and capital that generate regional growth – reifying the uneven regional
and industrial development from which they arose. This model relies on the need to
realize profits quickly (cyclically: investment, production, realization, new investment)
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because of hyper competition and shrinking profits from organizational and technological innovations. Temporary geographic breaks in industrial barriers to entry present
opportunities for innovative firms and industries to territorially expand in pursuit of
higher profit returns. In summary, geographical industrialization, alongside organizational and technological innovations, can be a form of territorial capitalism resting on
place-specific regimes of accumulation and production, or industrial districts. The firms
in these industrial districts are protective of their territory, technological innovations, and
labor markets, relying on cultural, social, and political institutions to create boundaries
(Storper and Walker 1989a).
2.3.3

Studying regions: Firms, labor markets, place and space

As the crisis of fordism deepened over the 1970s, geographers and regional
scientists began to produce deeply pessimistic accounts of the corresponding
quandaries that were then proliferating in the principal cities and regions of
that period. (Scott 2011a)
The heterodox paradigm of regional economic development was employed to study both
declining manufacturing regions and rising high-tech silicon manufacturing regions by
examining firms and the labor markets that workers constituted.
Capitalist firms constitute the major actors and decision makers in industrial districts.
Non-firm actors, government institutions, social organizations, and place-specific histories
and cultures condition the terms of the firm and labor behaviors. And while “regional
performance is often inferred as a function of the behavior and dynamics of certain key
firms or industries ... [however] Studying industrial structure with secondary data can
guard against concentrating overly much on faddish industries” (Markusen 1986, 46).
Industries can be selected by observing the primary contributors to regional economies.
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As we know from Saxenian, the success of Silicon Valley in the 1980s can be attributed to
the electronics industry’s production flexibility, overseas relationships with manufacturers,
and linkages to university R&D. However, other key regional industries were connected
to the electronics industry, including the aerospace industry (Saxenian 1983; Saxenian
Fall 1990; Saxenian 1996). Organizational and technological innovations came not just
from firm flexibility, firm networks, and university R&D, but also came from the human
capital cross-over from other industries and the capacity for these innovations to spread
from one firm to another.
A major contribution of this research is that while the geographic strategies of firms
shape the character and vigor of regional economies (Markusen, DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee
1999), so too does human capital, the place-specific history (from uneven development),
and the space-specific urban form and built environment. I provide a more explicit
framework in the next section. While firms are protective of the labor and technological
boundaries, firms also take advantage of these boundaries and their heterogeneity to
exert control. Firms can use their power within regions through threats of departure or
replacement (Storper and Harrison 1991). In the case of labor boundaries, firms view
labor as “purchased” on future performance and its reproducibility rather than on current
output. Within the corporation, firms can use the threat of switching plants to minimize
the chance of labor organizing. High-skilled workers may also take advantage of this
spatial heterogeneity by placing demands for their spatially rare or in-demand skill-set.
These insights only further stress the importance of understanding regional labor markets
and the spaces and places where labor and firms interact as shaping regional economies.
2.3.4

From post-Fordism to cognitive-cultural capitalism

The industrial district literature is most well known for studying the rapid rise of darling
Silicon Valley exemplified by Saxenian. The basis of this work, and the immense literature
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it spawned, is manufacturing-based production. The work of (Saxenian 1983) focuses explicitly on silicon-chip production. This work spurred scholars’ interest in the emergence
of “new successful forms of production” that were regionally specific (Storper 1997, 3),
and yet, even this new literature focused on manufacturing-based industries, like biotech
(Cortright and Mayer 2002; Feser 1998; Malizia and Feser 1999), the military-industrial
complex (Markusen, Hall, Campbell, et al. 1991), or other high-tech hardware production
(Chapple et al. 2004; Cortright and Mayer 2001; Mayer 2012). A key finding common
to all this research was that technological innovation was not necessarily physically and
geographically located in the same places as production and that vertical and horizontal
disintegration had a spatial component. This contributed to the capacity for firms and
industries to have greater organizational flexibility, leaving room for new organizational
new innovation in the production process. These findings were emblematic of broader
changes in the nature of capitalism, which scholars attributed to a renegotiation of capitalist production relationships. This broad shift was sometimes called post-Fordism
(MacDonald 1991), flexible specialization (Piore and Sabel 1986), and flexible accumulation (Harvey 1987). At risk of oversimplifying the nuances between these authors’
frameworks, at their core they all a technologically-based economic paradigm supported
by social and institutional frameworks for spatial ordering (Amin 1994). For simplicity, I
will refer to these overarching political economy changes in capitalism as post-Fordism
and in firm-level strategies as flexible specialization.
With the exception of Hall, Markusen, et al. (1983) and Colclough and Tolbert
(1992), software production remains largely under-researched. Storper and Walker (1989b)
refer to a burgeoning “information industry” yet their imaginations are limited to the
manufacturing-based production of information-processing equipment that may replace
silicon – similar, perhaps, to the now-defunct textile industry. Contrary to this gap,
software’s importance has only increased.
27

In very schematic terms, we might recognize three broad historical phases of
capitalist development, based ... on their characteristic technologies, leading
sectors, labor market relations and competitive dynamics. Equally schematically, we can also distinguish three corresponding waves of urbanization.
(Scott 2011b)
This quote helps illustrate the importance of studying software and regions together;
software is a leading production activity and regions are critical parts of third-wave
urbanization. And yet, as employment in software production grows alongside software
employment in non-software firms, we still do not know the specificities of the various
regionally specific modes of software production. In fact, just information-technologyrelated industries comprise 10% or more of 15 metropolitan areas with total populations
over 1 million people. More importantly, other industries and other types of production
are beginning to look a lot more like software. Recent research shows the number of
non-software industries with software workers is rapidly growing including finance, oil &
gas, and manufacturing (Mahmoudi and Schrock, in progress).
Another major contribution of this work is to assert that while existing forms of
industrial production exhibit characteristics of post-Fordism, software and software-based
production exhibit characteristics of cognitive-cultural capitalism. The fact that other
industries continue to look more like software production only stresses the importance.
The framework of cognitive-cultural capitalism (CCC) builds off of the academic heritage
of post-Fordism but employs updated observations of the nature of capital. CCC can be
defined as having three primary relationships:
(1) the new forces of production that reside in digital technologies of computing and communication; (2) the new divisions of labor that are appearing
in the detailed organization of production and in related processes of social
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re-stratification, and (3) the intensifying role of mental and affective human
assets (alternatively, cognition and culture) in the commodity production
system at large. (Scott 2011a)
Software fits closely into this paradigm as an inherently digital form of production and
enmeshed politics of class and education, almost exclusively resting on cognition as its
form of production.
Of particular importance in software is, of course, the mode and process of production. Software requires high skill-levels and its reliance on cognition as labor software
programming means that software process production are nearly entirely changes in
spatial orientation or changes in the labor process. As is well established in manufacturing, additional workers generally translate into additional productivity. In software,
because the production process is cognitive, the way in which additional workers interact – or collaborate – dictates the level of productivity rather than the presence of
capital machinery. Thus, many innovations happen during the process of production
and the type of network, whether informal or formal, becomes objects of interest for
firms (Camagni 1991; Chesbrough and Appleyard 2007; Mayer 2012; Bessant et al. 2012).
The role of the city or region as a paradigm for network production processes is also of
interest, particularly in the configuration of space to maximize interaction, innovation,
and productivity (Camagni 1991; Camagni 1993; Howells 2002; Simmie 2003) and their
impacts on the region as a whole in incomes and the capacity to recover from economic
shock (Simmie 2003; Lester and Jacobs 2010). The production and innovation overlap
suggests that the regional innovation systems are intertwined with regional modes of
production as industrial districts (B. T. Asheim 2000; B. Asheim 2007). With these
changes in production and innovation, the idea that industries have spatial and social
characteristics that affect regional development outcomes seems to gain new importance.
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After all, Storper and Walker claimed that industries produce regions (Storper and Walker
1989a) and Harvey noted that “the history of urbanization of capital is at least in part a
history of its evolving labor market geography” (Harvey 1987, 19).
2.4

Existing Research on Regional High-Tech Production

Several important cases examining the relationship between high-tech industries and
regions are of key importance. Of most importance, partly due to its popularity and the
archetypal status of Silicon Valley, is the work of Saxenian.
Route 128’s independent-firm-based system had provided economic scale and
organizational stability that were valuable in an earlier era, by the 1980s they
served primarily to discourage adaptation. The commitment of local companies to vertical integration meant that technical capabilities and know-how . . .
remained locked up within large firms. The paucity of horizontal communications stifled opportunities for experimentation and learning while traditional
corporate structures limited the development of managerial initiative and skill
. . . This may have imposed a minor inconvenience to large firms, it became
a significant disadvantage for start-ups and small firms that were unable to
learn about or acquire state-of-the art components or services as rapidly as
their West Coast counterparts. (Saxenian 1996, 115)
Saxenian (1996) compared the explosive growth of the electronics and semiconductor
industries in California’s Silicon Valley with the decline of similar industries along
Route 128 in Massachusetts. Saxenian’s in-depth analysis, put simply, found that the rate
of innovation in Silicon Valley was higher than that of Route 128. This competitive
advantage came from the dense communications networks and the transfer of ideas across
firm boundaries.
30

The flexible milieu of Silicon Valley demonstrates the importance of flexible specialization and informal networks that Piore and Sabel (1986) borrow from Marshall. In Silicon
Valley’s relatively flat, or networked, structure, firms and their employees collaborated,
developed alliances, and shared information in informal and formal ways. By contrast,
the Route 128 firms had a traditional bureaucratic, or hierarchical, structure that did not
afford collaboration. Relatively secretive and self-contained, firms and employees in Route
128 considered the act of sharing information as disloyal. Silicon Valley’s Hewlett-Packard
both welcomed new firms into the region and helped incorporate them into larger firm
networks. Venture-capitalists were responsible for creating capacity for knowledge and
facilitated the transfer of skills between Silicon Valley companies. Route 128 firms, however, fought hard to protect and contain firm knowledge and intellectual property. Part of
the contribution of this comparative case study is to show how networked configurations
of labor, firms, and thus, skills and knowledge, generated more skills and knowledge at a
pace that exceeded that of Route 128.
The firm structure of Silicon Valley was markedly fluid and had capacity to learn from
and adapt to adversity. Network-based organizations and startups helped to facilitate the
reemergence and revitalization of the region after the crisis of the 1980s. By contrast,
Route 128 firms returned to their autarkic form of organization and were unable to
keep pace with the innovation of Silicon Valley. Large firms eventually folded, and
skilled laborers either moved or made horizontal movements into different industries. Of
course, key to the success of Silicon Valley as Saxenian explains, was the participation
of universities (including Stanford University, University of California Berkeley, and
San Jose State University) in industry and the knowledge spillovers associated with
large amounts of R&D. Additionally, firms had strong connections with foreign firms,
providing a capacity to reliably outsource and offshore some components of their work.
As Saxenian details, this is related to the high number of both immigrants with technology
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backgrounds and immigrants with the desire to be entrepreneurs. While the region
exhibited a fluid network of labor and the exchange of ideas, it was also connected to both
universities and global labor and ideas, which helped solidify the region’s dominance.
Cortright and Mayer (2001) and Cortright and Mayer (2002) and Feser and Luger
(2003) with Feser and Landwehr (2006) present another case of regional development.
The geographic distribution of research activities and the contrasting distribution of private investment and new-firm formation illustrate how both
these ingredients need to be combined in order to generate a thriving industry
cluster. (Cortright and Mayer 2002, 16)
Both sets of authors have overlapping interests in the biotechnology clusters of the
Research Triangle area of North Carolina. While not comparative in the same sense
of Saxenian’s work, the biotech industry is equally important to glean insights because
of its rate of rapid innovation. Like their high-tech counterparts, biotech firms rely on
venture-capital and research to generate and maintain start-up firms. Cortright and Mayer
(2001) and Cortright and Mayer (2002) examine the biotech industry and single out the
biotech centers in Boston, San Francisco, San Diego, Seattle, and Raleigh-Durham. These
centers had a history or presence of research combined with the continued capacity for
investment without immediate return on investment. In addition, San Diego, Seattle, and
Raleigh-Durham were the largest growing regions. Firms in these regions were able to
secure contracts with pharmaceutical firms despite historically narrow odds of regional
success.
Different than the high-tech clusters, firms in biotech clusters gain revenue from
licensing intellectual property to pharmaceutical companies, or from contracting part of
the production process. Regionally, this means the benefit of production happens where
the pharmaceutical companies are located, rather than where the knowledge creation
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happens in the biotech firms. Of course, the greatest benefit is in locations which
have a pharmaceutical presence, biotech clusters, venture-capital, and commercialization
capacities.
Feser and Luger (2003) examine how the biotech and education clusters in North Carolina can be used as economic development tools. A key component of their thesis is that
cluster analysis is best used as a mode of inquiry rather than as a technical methodology.
Abandoning rigid technical methodology allows the necessary flexibility to explore and
appreciate the uniqueness of each cluster. Using this type of understanding, Feser and
Luger show that the biotechnology cluster of North Carolina is important and deserves
economic development. The ability to begin as a mode of inquiry allowed them to
uncovered high-intensity of the biotech sector and its large share of national employment.
The goal for economic development practitioners should then be to capture as much
of the growth as possible because of the region’s already high-intensity. The crossover
between the biotech, life sciences, industrial chemical, and environmental industries
provides regional advantage that may be missed when observing clusters as a technical
methodology.
Nevertheless, because industry clusters, by definition, are not ubiquitous,
industry-cluster policy would seem to imply at least acceptance of a potential
worsening of regional economic disparities. (Feser 1998, 36)
Feser’s large body of work on clusters not only seeks to understand the North Carolina
industry, but also the key dynamics that make these clusters perform. Summarizing the
main points of Feser’s work, economic development practice must seek the sources of
technological externalities that provide increasing returns, the social and cultural factors
as an influence on externalities, the role of economic and geographical proximity as an
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influence on externalities, and the potential for policy interventions on externalities. See
Cortright (2006) for a continued discussion defining clusters.
There exist clear indicators that successful companies with a trained workforce promote vitality in regions, however, Lowe (2007) best describes some of the potential for
true economic development. Lowe suggests that in North Carolina, connecting the two
ends of the product pipeline for life sciences – research and manufacturing – allows for a
clear workforce development career pathway. Addressing career pathways introduces a
new method for sector based economic development strategies. The pathway starts with
unskilled young workers working in life-science manufacturing and ends in an advanced
degree at a local research center. This describes the product pipeline in reverse, which
starts in a research center and ends in manufacturing.
The rapid expansion and increased visibility of these centers and their low
relative wages and competitive incentive packages make it increasingly difficult
for U.S. regions to compete on cost savings alone. Rather, a region’s ability
to retain life science manufacturers will require a deepening of locational
advantages other than low taxes, abundant land, and cheap labor. (Lowe 2007,
351)
Few regions have the capability to contain an entire pipeline in the same fashion. This
may be unique to knowledge industries, similar in nature to semiconductors, or other
forms of cognitive-cultural capitalism.
Of course, the research component maintains its importance, and thus, so does the
university-industry linkage. Feser and Landwehr (2006) and later Mayer (2007) examine
how the university as a research center can spur the knowledge and skills necessary
for the creation of private startups. This is not to diminish the necessary venture or
startup capital. In particular, Mayer (2007), Mayer (2005), and Mayer (2012) observes
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how in some instances, a university-industry linkage is not necessary, arguing that the
university-industry linkages in Silicon Valley were unique. Other regions may rely on
large firms to fill the role of generating research or skills, similar to the role that Intel and
HP played in Silicon Valley and the role Tektronix played in Portland. Core to this work
is the understanding that Silicon Valley’s path of economic development is unique in both
place and history, and attempting to emulate Silicon Valley will not yield another world
famous cluster. Still, insights from Silicon Valley can be used to spur entrepreneurial
dynamics and spinoff processes in other large firms and institutions.
Christopherson and Clark (2007) interrogate the role of innovation within regional
production. By surveying the photonics industry of Rochester and the media and
production industries of Los Angeles, Christopherson and Clark (2007) assert that
regions are not necessarily cohesive units that can capture growth and development.
Christopherson and Clark point to first the conflation of regions and the firms that
comprise the regions, then to the conflation of innovation (cost-cutting) and production
(expansion), as recurring themes throughout their argument. They show that innovation
systems do not address power relationships in firm or industry settings. Christopherson
and Clark (2007) also find that well functioning labor markets are necessary for the
success of innovation and well-functioning networks. A core contribution is to advocate
away from investing in corporate “innovation” and instead toward, what sounds like,
equity planning.
Chapple et al. (2004) examine high-tech and information technology (IT) centers,
looking at the different levels of specialization and concentration among different industry
clusters. Using labor classifications to identify industries, this approach is able to identify
regions with traditional manufacturing industries that are undergoing transformation.
This method highlights the growing interest (at the time) of focusing on human capital.
Additionally, their work brings to light the high-tech and IT components of the financial
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industries. Markusen, Hall, and Grasmeier (1987) found that industry-linkages and
university-linkages were not necessarily requirements for the success of these clusters.
Many of the other sectors identified as I-tech, including finance and insurance,
communications, motion pictures, and management and public relations, are
not traditionally thought of as high tech, but they support relatively large
numbers of IT jobs because of innovations in the way they conduct business.
(Chapple et al. 2004, 19)
Building off of that work, Chapple et al. (2004) argue that economic development
policies at state and local levels have shifted focus toward on industry-based strategies
based on the attraction and retention of home-grown industries and firms. The provided
rankings of high-tech and IT centers across the US was hardly surprising, but their work
made other key contributions, including hypothesizing the overlap between high-tech and
IT industries, identifying the levels of specialization and diversification that each metro
had, and signaling for future research on the levels of specialization and diversification on
regional economic performance. Chapple et al. (2004) rankings were slightly different
in nature than other rankings, spurring Cortright and Mayer (2004) to problematize
rankings of high-tech centers as an exercise.
This exchange highlights the importance of combining a thick description of regional
production, noted by Feser (1998), with the rigorous quantitative work.
2.5

Emerging Research Questions

Three sets of questions emerge from both theory and practice, begging for new research
around software production and regions. Stressing new research is software’s unique
relationship between production and output. Software’s output is software, creating a
self-fueling cycle of production, distinguishing itself from other forms of production.
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Further, the fact that software production relies on human capital for production and
innovation – rather than capital machinery and research and development – and the
relationship between production and the region, requires a regional examination.
First, around labor and technology, what is the extent of software production activity?
This broad requires an understanding of the changing nature of software production and
thus an understanding of how software production activity has changed over time. In
what ways does capitalist logic manifest itself in software production? How does software
production fuel software production and what relationship does software production
have to the automation of software workers? What is the relationship between software
production activity and larger circuits of production?
Second, around space and place, what are the regionally specific modes of software
production? In what ways do industrial districts formations vary? Specifically, what
are configurations of firms, regional labor market, institutions, and place and space
characteristics. In what ways are they related to Silicon Valley? How do software
production activities manifest in terms of regional differences in incomes? Of particular
interest to economic development scholars, and directly impacted by a particular mode
of production, is the resulting software occupations and the distribution of incomes of
software workers.
A third area requires investigation into how the actions of the local actors. Globally,
how does the growing numbers of traditionally marginalized groups – women and persons
of color – manifest in each region? Locally, in what ways are wages different between
regions for these different groups? How are these wage differentials related to the regional
mode of software production? In what ways do local actors mediate, either reinforcing
or altering, the local mode of software production? In other words, what are the local
responses to local income distribution and shifts in occupational structure.
Both software production and regional economies are necessary entry points to under37

stand new capitalist relations. Understanding these new relations thus requires examining
how configurations of software production differ across regions, how they impact industry and regional economic development outcomes, and how they are weakened or
strengthened by actions of local workers, local organizations, and local firms. These
processes offer a glimpse into how the contemporary moment of production differs from
other moments of production such as Fordist, post-Fordist, and flexible specialization.
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Figure 2.1: Idealized Marshallian industrial district.

Suppliers

Customers

# small local firm

Reproduced from Markusen, DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee (1999, 27)

Figure 2.2: Idealized hub-and-spoke industrial district.

# large locally headquartered firm

# small local firm

Reproduced from Markusen, DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee (1999, 27)
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Figure 2.3: Idealized hub-and-spoke industrial district.

# large locally headquartered firm

2 branch office externally headquartered firm

Reproduced from Markusen, DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee (1999, 27)

Figure 2.4: Idealized public-sector industrial district.

# large locally headquartered firm

# small local firm

7 government or university

Theorized depiction from Markusen, DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee (1999, 37-39)

40

41

One, or few, vertically integrated & locally headquartered
firm(s) outside urban core

Tied to dominant firm innovation & global exogenous factors

Strong local firm/sector support

Labor in-migration, low outmigration

Structure

Growth &
stability

Government

Migration

Hub-and-Spoke

Regional Dynamics

Strong labor in-migration, low
outmigration

Strong local district support

Growth & resilience potential,
tied district innovation

Large number of clustered
small or medium-sized firms

Marshallian

Strong in/out migration at
managerial levels

External firm incentive support

Dependent on production stability & global exogenous factors

One or more externally headquartered firms, dispersed or
clustered

Satellite-Industrial

Idealized Software Industrial District Type

Table 2.1: Regional characteristics of software industrial districts.

In-migration connected to periods of growth

Strong Federal/State support

Steady, dependent on continued government or project
funding

Government, military, or institutions of higher education,
clustered

State-Sponsored
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Moderate-high economies of
scale

Ties to large & small firms, locally & globally

Design & production

Weak local cooperation among
firms, but participation in external industry trade associations

Local firm-catered finance, technology, & business services

Scales

Linkages

Activity

Risk-sharing

Services

Hub-and-Spoke

Firm/Production Dynamics

Local district-catered finance,
technology, & business services

Strong local cooperation or
trade associations to mitigate
risk, increase district stability

Design-focused, district production

Strong inter-dependent & intradistrict ties, low dependency on
firms outside district

Low economies of scale

Marshallian

External sources of services, potential for local public financing

Weak local cooperation & trade
associations

Production-focused

Strong dependence on external
parent firm, weak ties to other
satellite locations / districts &
local firms

Moderate-high economies of
scale

Satellite-Industrial

Idealized Software Industrial District Type

Table 2.2: Firm and production characteristics of software industrial districts.

Both local & external sources
of services

Absence of local cooperation &
trade associations

Project dependent

Connected to global external
firms

High economies of scale

State-Sponsored
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Blue-collar
workers

Profiles

Intermediaries Internal, firm, if any

professional

Moderate personnel changes,
loyalty to firm

Turnover

&

Internal to firm, hires externally, less flexible

Labor Market

Hub-and-Spoke

Labor Dynamics

&

professional

Internal, district, worker-based

Blue-collar
workers

High personnel exchange
within district, loyalty to
district

Internal to district, hires local
and external, highly flexible

Marshallian

External, if any

Primarily blue-collar workers

Personnel changes external to
region

External to district, based on
vertically integrated firm

Satellite-Industrial

Idealized Software Industrial District Type

Table 2.3: Labor characteristics of software industrial districts.

External moderate, union

Clerical & professional workers

Moderate personnel changes

Internal if state capital, national
if military or higher-ed

State-Sponsored

Table 2.3: Table 2.1, Table 2.2, and Table 2.3 adapted from Markusen (1996).
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3 Research Design and Methodology

3.1

Introduction

The aim in this chapter is three-fold. First, I introduce research questions that fill pertinent
gaps in existing research and have clear implications for equity and economic development
policies in cities. Second, I describe the way that my research answers the questions posed,
demonstrating the appropriate match between research question, design, and method.
Lastly, I describe the data collection and analysis methods. For the technical detail of the
GIS-based IPUMS and Census method that I developed for this dissertation, please see
the Appendix.
Broadly, this research seeks to contribute to a better understanding of regional software
production and advance the conversation on software production oriented-policies and
practices that have widespread regional benefit. This research builds on the thorough
empirical scholarship of industry-focused regional development scholars (like Castells
and Hall 1994; Hall, Markusen, et al. 1983; Harvey 1990; Markusen 1986; Markusen
1996; Markusen, DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee 1999; Mayer 2012; Peck 1996; Saxenian
1983; Saxenian Fall 1990) and the in-depth theoretical contributions of industry- and
labor-focused political economy scholars (like Massey and Meegan 1978; Amin 1994; J.
Graham et al. 1988; Harrison and Bluestone 1985; Noble 1986; Storper and Walker 1989b;
Scott 2011a; Wyly 2013) with particular attention to equity, gender, and race/ethnicity in
labor markets and industrial production (like Greenbaum 1979; Reskin and Roos 1990;
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Colclough and Tolbert 1992; Massey 1995; Chapple 2006; Mayer 2008; Lester and Jacobs
2010). Building on this exhaustive list, I perform a mixed methods comparative case study
research design. In doing so, this dissertation will address three sets of questions:
The research is broken into three parts. This first part requires an understanding of
how is software produced and how has software production changed over time. The
second part requires an understanding of how regions actually produce software and a cataloging of variation in regional software production. This also requires connecting regional
modes of software production to equity and economic development through occupation
structure and income distribution. Finally, in the third part, I focus on the particular
ways in which software work becomes bifurcated and software labor markets exhibits
tendencies of dualization and segmentation. The third part also requires understanding
how local responses by workers and firms, mediated through the local organization and
institutions, respond to the equity and economic development implications of local modes
of software production. Broadly, this asks how do is the regional mode of production
reified or altered. This final part connects back to the first part. Technological advances
in software drive local responses by firms and workers to seek beneficial outcomes from
broader changes in software production.
I ask three sets of questions:
1. What is the extent of software production activity in the US? In what ways has
software production activity changed in the US since 1970? What is the relationship
between software production activity and larger circuits of production?
2. How does software production activity vary between region? How is software
produced in Seattle, Washington, Portland, Oregon, and Austin, Texas? How
do regionally specific modes of production yield different regional outcomes via
occupational structures and income distribution of software workers?
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3. To what extent has software work demonstrated tendencies toward labor market
dualization and segmentation by gender and race/ethnicity? How are these labor
market outcomes mediated by local institutions and practices?
These three sets of questions guide the research methods and subsequently the layout
of the dissertation. The first set of questions requires historical research on the evolution
of software work and a way to measure software production activity. The second set
of questions requires spatialized iteration on the quantitative data from the first set of
questions, and combining it with interviews and participant-observation to examine
the regional character of software production. I choose three case cities with software
agglomerations – Seattle, Washington, Portland, Oregon, and Austin, Texas, described
below – to compare to idealized forms of software production and to each other. Lastly,
this set of questions requires a way to operationalize the link between software production
and occupational structures and income distributions. The last set of questions again
requires combining interview data and participant-observation data with a third iteration
of quantitative data that breaks down the regional data by gender and race/ethnicity.
Through a mixed methods comparative case study, I will detail the evolution of software
production, detail regional modes of software production and identify related regional
occupational and wage outcomes, and lastly examine how firms, workers, and institutional
actors fortify or alter these modes of production.
3.2

Research Design

These questions require three types of research that cut across the boundaries of the
research questions. Specifically, to understand the production of software and how
regional modes of software production yield regional economic development outcomes, I
will: 1) catalog and characterize the evolution of software production; then 2) extensively
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examine regional variation in software production in the US and describe the relationship
to types software occupations, the income distribution of software occupations, and the
demographic composition of each occupation; and, lastly, 3) intensively examine software
production in three US regions through.
I explicitly choose to design this research in what Sayer (2001) refers to as comprising
critical research: incorporating extensive, broad based research with intensive, detailed
research. I use extensive research questions to measure the extent of relationships and ask
about the broad changes in modes of software production. Building from this tradition, I
choose an ontological perspective of the quantitative and spatial work of radical positivism
(Wyly 2009; Wyly 2011) and critical GIS (O’Sullivan and Manson 2015; Thatcher et al.
2016). This perspective makes explicit claims about the use of quantitative data and
research methods in pursuit of equity and social justice.
I use the intensive research questions to understand the how and why the extensive
relationships do or do not occur. I seek to understand the relationships change or how
they become obdurate. To properly build cases for each questions, I will use multiple
informants, multiple sources from various levels, and multiple types of sources. Building
off the tradition of Sayer, I situate my qualitative intensive work in the tradition of
dialectical research methods for social justice (Agostinone-Wilson 2013). Dialectical
research methods help form the types and forms of questions I ask of my interview
subjects.
Together, the choices in research questions, method, and data sources seek to identify
and dismantle systems of oppression. I use my position as a cis-gendered white male to
amplify the stories, and calls to action, of the women, minorities, and persons at various
intersections of identity that freely volunteered their time for this research. I cannot
fully do them justice in this dissertation. At the end of this dissertation, I reflect on the
commonplace notion that software workers are wealthy. But as I uncover, because of the
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structure of the labor market and the rapid pace of software development, this benefit
does not reach across all software workers. I use the stories in this dissertation to describe
the mechanisms, structural and social, that result in this inequity. In chapter 6, I show that
the median incomes of women and minorities in the bottom-tier of the software labor
market is about $35k a year – less than the amount required for self-sufficiency in each
of my case study regions and in stark contrast to the idea that software work produces
wealth.
I design this research primarily as case study research across what (Yin 2002, 74)
calls five ‘levels.’ At the first and second level, I qualitatively ask questions of firms
and workers and quantitatively examine data about the individual region to construct
cases within each region. In each set of questions, the third level requires comparison
across cases. The fourth level presents all the cases together to learn from the entire
study. Each set of questions has small sub questions, but connect to an overarching
equity and labor aim. The fifth level presents normative policy questions about regional
modes of production and which modes of production might present desirable economic
development outcomes.I use three subsections to organize this work, one subsection for
each set of questions, which, again, sets the layout for the next three chapters.
Finally, the data sources I detail in the in the next section cuts across each of the sets
of questions. For clarity, I choose to separately describe data collection and data analysis.
I do this in the last section of this chapter.
3.3

Research Questions and Method

This section expands on each of the three sets of questions laid out at the beginning of
this chapter that serve as the foundation for this research. In what follows, I repeat the
research questions, describe the sources of data, and connect the different levels of data
to that chapters case. Each subsection leverages the framework set out in the previous
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chapter, by “fixing” one of the items in the framework to understand the rest of the items.
For example, to understand each software period case, I fix time, industrial district, profit
cycle, and capitalist variant. To understand each region’s current industrial district, I
fix the software period (fixing time), profit cycle, and capitalist variant. To understand
regional labor market dualization and segmentation (part of the industrial district), I fix
the software period (fixing time), profit cycle, and capitalist variant. I argue that the profit
cycle and capitalist variant are the mechanisms which signal new software periods and
changes in the industrial district (and changes in labor market).
Notably, this research will skip Silicon Valley as an intensive place of examination.
Much research has already been done in Silicon Valley, and current research by other
scholars is currently being conducted there along similar, but sufficiently different, lines.
While understanding Silicon Valley can largely be gleaned from the existing literature,
research in different places with different modes of software production remain understudied. Again, “as a model for regions elsewhere, then, our research suggests that the Silicon
Valley recipe is more complex than has been acknowledged in the literature, less likely to
be easily replicated, and less attractive from a social welfare point of view” (Markusen,
DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee 1999, 292).
To get at the research questions, the research methods in this section are designed
to ask about the individual actions that firms and workers take. From these answers,
I seek to identify regional firm strategies and worker practices that dictate how firms
and workers collaborate, communicate, innovate, profit, and further their own interests.
Interviewing firms will require talking to upper/mid-level management within firms
(multiple managers in large firms) to identify firm practices, specifically seeking the
innovation strategies, regional goals and labor practices. Institutional actors in labor
market intermediaries and urban development commissions will interviewed to identify
institutional practices that seek to produce or enhance firm or labor networks. Surveying
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software workers will require recruiting via tech based networks like Hacker News,
Twitter and Reddit and to identify labor practices; specifically seeking how workers
innovate, why who their network is, their labor mobility (spatial and firm), and how
they use their network. Both firm-level and worker-level data will be analyzed to confirm,
refute or identify regional firm and labor practices.
Through this analysis, I contend I will get at the motives, both capital and noncapital, that drive these decisions, fortifying or altering the configurations that constitute
regional modes of production and thus impact economic development outcomes. Further,
firms and workers seek the most beneficial mix of capital, labor, space and place, this
questions attempts to understand what configurations yield the best outcomes for both
firms, workers, industry and region. With this explicit link, this phase will contribute
to an understanding of how firm strategies and worker practices fortify or alter regional
development outcomes through regionally specific modes of production.
3.3.1

Labor/technology: Extent and restructuring of software production

1. What is the extent of software production activity in the US?
2. In what ways has software production activity changed in the US since 1970?
3. What is the relationship between software production activity and larger circuits of
production?
With this set of questions, I seek to broadly understand software production and the
extent of its change over time.
To answer this set of questions, I rely on the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) USA data set. This data, explained later in this chapter, can provide new
insights on US Census data. I choose the US Census years 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and
the non-overlapping American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year samples of 2005–2009
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(occasionally for brevity: 2009) and 2011-2015 (occasionally for brevity: 2015). This
allows me to capture change over 10-year periods to 2000, then approximately 7-year
periods after that.
Using this data, I identify software occupations, and measure the extent of software
workers at each point. I also measure the integration of software workers into US industries by building off measures of industrial specialization. I describe this method in detail
in Chapter 4. The idea is to determine the degree to which software workers concentrate
in any one industry. The results of this inform the rest of this research, confirming
preliminary interview research which suggested that Portland software workers come
from many industries. These finding reinforce the idea that software workers are diffuse
across industries and thus measure software production activity requires measure software
labor, not using an industry-based approach.
Thus I measure the extent of software production activity as the extent of software
labor at any point in time, and in the next section, in any given metro region. With
measures of software production activity at six point in time (1970, 1980, 1990, 2000,
2005-2009, 2011-2015) and a measure of the degree of integration into US industries, I
describe how the extent of software production has changed over time. Matched with
historical research on changes in software production and software commodities, and
peppered with the unexpected accounts of software labor from my interview subjects, I
describe the changing nature of software production in the post-WW2 period. Historical
research allows me to identify key firms and organizations that shaped the extent of
software production today.
As I describe the changing nature of software production, I connect software production periods to product cycle periods (each containing 5 profit cycles). I note that during
each commodity period, the software commodity form has a new product cycles indicated
new forms of labor, capital, and spatial relationships. In each transition period, software
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undergoes restructuring that reconfigure the sets of dominant actors in software creation
and use. I draw comparison to the capitalist variants literature. Each of software’s periods
match particular sets of capitalist variant characteristics. Capitalist variants intend to
describe economy-wide characteristics, yet, software’s microcosm of production mimics
these relationships. I note that the product cycle of each software period is the driving
mechanism for the capitalist variant to change.
3.3.2

Space: Regional variation and regional production

1. How does software production activity vary between region?
2. What are the industrial district formations of software production in Seattle, Washington, Portland, Oregon, and Austin, Texas?
3. What are the regional outcomes, via occupational structures and income distribution of software workers, of regionally specific modes of software production?
With this set of questions, I seek to understand how software production has regionally
changed over time, the local nature of software production, and how it has evolved into
its current form in Seattle, Portland, and Austin. I seek to understand how software
is locally produced through regionally specific modes of production and the of income
distributions and occupational structures connected to regional production. I build on the
idea the modes of production have specific industrial districts – requiring the investigation
of each of my case region’s industrial district.
Most regions have software agglomerations that track with population and software
is likely produced uniformly. First, I analyzed US metro regions over 1 million people
in population between 1970 and 2015 to examine the regional variation in software
production. I measure regional software agglomerations, by measuring the quantity of
software workers and the share of the labor force that is comprised of software workers.
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I seek to track regional changes in relative rankings between 1970 and 2015 to better
understand the regional impacts of the restructuring of software periods addressed in the
previous set of questions.
Then I seek to identify regional modes of software production. The literature suggests
that Silicon Valley, Seattle, Austin, and Portland may exhibit regionally specific modes
of software production that can further analyzed by uncovering each regions software
industrial district. I then use interviews, historical research, and participant-observation
to identify the characteristics of each region as outlined in Table 2.1, Table 2.2, and Table
2.3. Through this data I identify key firms, organizations, groups, and institutions that
shape software production in each region. I then use this to shape future interviews and
participant-observation, ultimately triangulating and uncovering each regions’ configurations of firm strategies, worker practices, regional configurations, and their relationships. I
further seek to identify specific technological characteristics specific to software industrial
districts. Again through interviews, historical research, and participant-observation, I
identify regional variation in software use, forms of automation, and the role of technology in innovation. I document these characteristics in Table 5.3. I then compare each
regions industrial district to the ideal types of industrial districts identified by Markusen,
DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee (1999) and type formulation suggested by Brenner (2013).
Additionally, four hypothesized regional modes of production may present, expanded
in the next section.
• Silicon Valley is the archetypal software region, which the literature suggests was
once prototypically Marshallian. It is a unique global hub of semi-conductor and
software industries. Examining Silicon Valley expands our knowledge base about
the archetype, but for reasons outline above, I skip engaging directly with Silicon
Valley and instead choose to understand its connections to the three case study cities
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below.
• Seattle is a stereotype of the hub-and-spoke industrial district. Seattle’s primary
software firms are Microsoft and Amazon. Seattle has a particular spatial and
industrial history which has produced its current industrial relationship.
• Austin is a stereotype of satellite-platform industrial district. Again, Austin has a
particular spatial and industrial history which has produced this type of industrial
relationship. Austin’s primary software establishments are branch plants of Apple,
Google, Microsoft, National Instruments Delphi, etc.
• Portland is a prototype of a Marshallian district that is characteristic of production
under cognitive-cultural capitalism. First, this research will compare each region
comparatively rather than each of the above regions to just Portland. Second, this
research acknowledges that other regions may not develop in the same trajectory
that Portland has developed or is developing (ie, there is no single development
path). This research avoids the prototype-trap not suggest that the prototype is the
ideal-type for regional economic development outcomes.
I then constructed industrial district typologies for each region based by comparing the
collected data to the characteristics of industrial districts documented above. With this part
of the dissertation, I identify each of my case city’s regional modes of production and how
they map onto theorizations of industry typologies and regional production (industrial
districts) as part of broader industry restructuring. For each region, I also describe
the regions relationship to Silicon Valley to situate the region in larger networks of
production. Then I examine the industry composition of software workers to determine
the areas of employment for software workers and the types of companies that might
employ them.
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To address the final questions, I examine regional outcomes measured by distribution
of incomes and types of software occupations. Specifically, I look for software differences
in equity by looking at the shape of income curves and compare them to the expected
outcomes based on the industrial district. I also compare the occupational structure
– the amount of different jobs and their skill-level – with expectations we might have
for the industrial district. Here we see how regions reflect their industries and labormarkets, and the processes for which regions are “produced” through differing regionally
specific configurations of production. I contend that these both software worker based
outcomes onto distinct regional modes of production and yield significant differences
in income distribution and occupation structures. Examining occupational change over
time requires identifying how occupations have changed over time. I thus document the
changing occupation codes, which reflect the underlying work of laborer. I combine these
changes with information from the literature and the accounts of software workers to
identify moments of labor market bifurcation. This, along with income data, enables me
to categorize occupations based on their labor market tier, and understand the historical
tendencies of labor market dualization and segmented.
This chapter integrates space into the discussion and uses industrial districts to integrate space into the framework. As I connected software periods, product cycles, and
capitalist variants, I use the relationship between the profit cycles of product cycles to
connect to industrial districts. The needs of firms are reflecting in their locational decisions as they progress through profit cycles. These needs are expressed in the forms of
industrial districts. Since software spans multiple industries, the software commodity
product cycles becomes most relevant, rather than the profit cycles of the industries
that use/purchase/alter software commodities. Thus, the industrial districts reflect the
relationships of software production, rather than industry relationships. For software, industrial districts reflect the form of the software commodity and the capital relationships
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from capitalist variants.
3.3.3

Wage structures: occupations and their income distribution

1. To what extent has software work demonstrated tendencies toward labor market
dualization and segmentation by gender and race/ethnicity?
2. How are these labor market outcomes mediated by local institutions and practices?
The last set of questions seeks to understand outcomes of the structural changes
of software production (technology/labor) with the regionally specific nature of software production (space). I combine my interviews, historical research, and participantobservation with a third iteration of the IPUMS data, this time adding race/ethnicity and
gender. With the IPUMS data, I document the regional occupational, then tiers of the
labor market, breakdown of software work. I group the occupations, based on income
and function, into occupational groups and tiers, comparing national statistics across tiers
based on gender, race/ethnicity.
I then examine the local variation in software work across tiers for each region. I
examine the variations in incomes across race/ethnicity and gender, referring to the
constructed industrial district (from the previous set of questions), interviews, historical
research, and participant-observation to explain unexpected variations and similarities.
To understand how local institutions mediate or mitigate structural labor market
forces, I used the transcriptions from my interviews to identify actions that workers take
which concretize, challenge, or change the ways that deskilling, segmentation, racism,
or sexism impact local labor. I then group these responses by their action and by the
mediation. I draw mostly from my interviews with women and minorities as these were
the most informative on the topic. Sexism was the primary focus of my interviewees,
even those women of color. This speaks to the literature the that asserts “... occupational
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sex segregation has been more resistant to change than race segregation” (Reskin and Roos
1990, 6).
3.3.4

Mixed-methods research

One core methodological arguments is that the contemporary landscape of software
production – and the changing character of technology under capitalism itself – requires
the tracking extent of national and regional change over time alongside an intensive investigation of regionally specific software production. Each research question thus synthesizes
both quantitative and qualitative research data to construct detailed responses to each
of the questions posed. Extensively, I measure historical, regional, then occupational
changes. Intensively, I measure the changing nature of software, relationships between
firms and workers, and the forces underlying deskilling and segmentation. I elaborate on
this in Table 3.1.
3.4

Case Selection
3.4.1

Seattle, Portland, and Austin

One key variable in this research is the role of small firms in labor markets. Smallerfirms may not be as equitable in pay for women or persons of color, nor have the same
regional economic impact. Each of these scenarios might dictate differences in the types
of software occupations and hierarchies (high-level vs lower-level) present both within the
local industry and the broader region, the tendency toward types of labor networks, and
the levels of worker incomes. Further, the clustering of jobs or firms might also enable
different types of networks or cultures; some regions with smaller-firms may have laborers
that cooperate to maintain regional skill levels and compete with software production in
other regions. This largely depends on whether firms, especially large firms, control the
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Quantitative
Number of software laborers in each software period; software workers by different industry in each software period;
measures of software worker diffusions in each software period (PUMS data)
Regional subsets of software laborers in each software period
and their industrial composition; tiers and classifications of
the various occupations in the most recent period; comparison of median incomes across regions (PUMS data)
Historical occupational bifurcation tracking; national and
regional income distribution by gender and race/ethnicity;
classification of software occupations by labor market tier
(PUMS data and Bureau of Labor Statistics occupational code
tracking)

RQs

1. Extent/change of
software production

2. Regional modes of
software production,
industrial districts

3. Labor market segmentation, local mediation

Local and regionally specific responses to labor market segmentation, dualization; relationship between industrial district and local labor power; emergence, and type, of local labor institutions; priorities of regional software workers; resistance to firm strategies (participant-observation and interviewbased)

Firm strategies and labor practices across regions to construct industrial districts; regional characterization of software production, values, interactions; software-specific variations in idealized industrial districts (participant-observation
and interview-based)

Categorizations of software languages; software worker accounts across times; industry brochures and magazines (historical and interview-based)

Qualitative

Combining quantitative and qualitative analysis

Table 3.1: Synthesizing mixed-methods research.

network of production consisting of the control the local labor market, local contracting
firms, and other potential non-local collaborators.
Labor cultures of openness and combined with spatial proximity may be linked
to strong production networks, mimicking the same economic development benefits
that make locally headquartered large firms in the economic development literature.
Clustering of software jobs and firms in the urban core might heighten the pressures
of gentrification while regions with primarily suburban jobs and firms might be linked
driving new home builds – both affecting the locations and levels of concentrated poverty
and racial/ethnic segregation and complicated further by the presence of large locally
headquartered firms that may positively contribute to a broader base of employment.
The industry specialization or diversification of both firms and workers suggest different
growth and resilience trajectories. Specialization may provide higher incomes and faster
growth, but diversification may provide better protection from macroeconomic shock.
Whether these factors are important for firms or workers is part of this research.
I choose Seattle, Portland, and Austin because they are second-tier regions that compete with Silicon Valley and contribute to the landscape of software production generally.
Silicon Valley, itself, may not provide useful insights into the software production and
regional modes of production because of its archetypal status. Each case region connects
to Silicon Valley through firms and workers while exhibiting variations on the key variables identified above: firm sizes, firm interconnectivity, firm clustering, firm strategies,
labor connectivity, labor diversification, maturity of software production, and historical
development. Thus, each region provides insights that may help us understand software
more generally, regional modes of software production within each region, and draw
comparison to regional modes of software production in other second-tier cities.
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3.4.2

Hypothesized industrial district formations

Silicon Valley, as a once Marshallian high-tech manufacturing district that now serves as
the archetypal software region, will likely have produced a hyper-bifurcated labor market
as firms attempt to routinize software work. The software agglomeration of Silicon Valley
attracts both high-skilled labor and unskilled labor as firms and laborers attempt to share
in the profit; however, the continual pressure to routinize software work or automate
software development through high-level language adoption results in active deskilling
of software labors. As firms continue to grow and advance through profit cycles, firm
consolidation results in higher-levels of hierarchical forms of firm organization. Further,
this bifurcation might lead to a polarization within the industry and region, with the
lowest levels of software work being the first to be cut during the financial crisis. And yet,
held in dialectical tension, the access to high-levels of venture-capital and the potential for
firm-consolidation (being bought-out) means that small startup firms are attracted to can
present laborers the opportunity to generate wealth very quickly. Thus, we would see
very large enterprise corporations at the outskirts of the city and large numbers of smaller
corporations in the central city where laborer interaction is necessary – both locations
containing a mixture of high-level and lower-level software jobs.
Seattle, as the traditional hub-and-spoke district, may have a concentration of highlevel software workers as a result of the firm strategy to outsource and offshore low-level
software work – different than the firm strategies in Silicon Valley. This might produce
high-paying occupations within the software industry and for software workers, but
present barriers for software workers to gain access to these jobs because of high-barriers
of firm-entry. The higher quantity of both large Seattle firms and large Silicon Valley
suggests that that firms in these regions tend to innovate by acquisition of smaller firms.
These higher skilled jobs are likely to be outside the city.
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Portland may provide a mix of high-level jobs and low-level jobs because of the large
number of medium sized firms and an absence of venture capital compared to Silicon
Valley, Austin and Seattle. However, the industry growth may be muted without access to
the venture capital of Silicon Valley or Seattle to spur the growth of these firms. Firms have
been notorious in Portland for refusing venture capital investment as a firm strategy. In
fact, numerous articles in the Oregonian highlight this attitude, highlighting that attitude
that smaller Portland firms must collaborate to attract high-skilled laborers and avoid the
control that comes with accepting venture capital. While Portland firms may resist outside
capital, non-Portland firms like eBay and ESRI have recently been opening locations
within Portland seeking to tap the relatively high-skilled and inexpensive labor within the
city. Lastly, Portland innovation may not happen within the firm but between laborers
at various cooperative gatherings, suggesting higher rates of skill-trading between labors.
The once endogenous nature necessary to ‘skill’ Portland labor might be changing, as new
openings from secondary locations of non-Portland firms seek to tap the innovation cycles
of the city. Portland may be like Silicon Valley with a spatially dichotomous software
jobs, but have higher-level jobs within the city and lower-level routinized jobs outside the
city.
Austin may have the exact opposite problem as a typical satellite-district, producing
numerous low-level jobs with fewer career ladder opportunities to grow into higher-level
jobs. And while levels of software workers and software related industries may be high,
these types of jobs would be skewed to lower-end jobs, software testing and software
support firms rather than development. Austin, one a scene for high-tech hardware with
Dell, National Instruments and various memory manufacturing nearby, has had difficulty
in a once prosperous area. Recently, Apple a software firm that arguably distribute
software through its hardware, recently opened up a 4,000 job location in Austin to serve
support functions for its products. Little innovation is necessary for these support types
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operations and there may be no spatial concentration of these types of low-level software
jobs.
3.5

Data Collection and Data Sources
3.5.1

IPUMS USA, Census 1970 to 2015

The Integrated Public Use Microdata Series USA (IPUMS USA) data provides scholars
with the ability to perform cross tabulations on US census data (Ruggles, Alexander, et al.
2010). This differs from the count data provided directly from US Census Bureau websites
such as DataFerrett or American FactFinder. For example, using IPUMS USA, scholars
may determine the number people in the occupation Computer Programmer that also
identify as Hispanic, or any other combination of race and ethnicity, and median income.
Using data provided by the US Census Bureau only allows for users to determine the
number of people in the occupation Computer Programmer or the number of people
that identify as Hispanic, not both.
For urban planning, urban studies, geography, and sociology scholars, especially
those interested in equity and social justice, the IPUMS USA is a powerful data source.
However, scholars do not frequently use the IPUMS because the default geography of
their data and the changing nature of the geography. The IPUMS USA uses a geography
called the Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA). PUMAs are the smallest geographies
used by IPUMS USA and consist of 100,000 to 200,000 residents. PUMAs can intersect
geographies typically used by academics, such as counties or metropolitan areas (Core
Based Statistical Areas, or CBSAs). Further, between census years, PUMA boundaries
can change drastically. These characteristics make using the IPUMS USA difficult to use
and disseminate research that uses the metropolitan area as the unit of analysis and even
more difficult when performing change-over-time analysis of metropolitan areas.
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For this research, I use the Census 1970 1% metro form 2 sample, Census 1980 5%
state sample, Census 1990 5% sample, Census 2000 5% sample, ACS 2005-2009 5-year
sample, and the ACS 2011-2015 5-year sample. This provides 6 comparable snapshots of
data. In Appendix A, I describe how I operationalize and spatialize this data.
The key variables for this research are:
• OCC describes the occupation code according to the current years occupation
classification. This occupation classification changes over time, and I document
these changes as part of my research.
• OCC2010 uses the 2010 occupation codes and reverse codes occupational status for
each historical sample. This provides the easiest way consistently put boundaries on
what counts as software labor through time. I use the occupation codes OCC2010
provides occupation classification and historically codes 110, 1000, 1010, 1020, 1050,
1060, 1100, 1200, 1220 which I describe in Appendix B.
• INCWAGE is the income from wages for workers. Incomes over a certain percent
are top-coded, making means difficult to compute. Instead, I compute medians for
incomes where possible.
• IND1990 provides 1990 industry classification and is reverse/forward coded for
the entire sample of this dissertation. It is the most recent industry classification
that covers all samples. I use this is any industry classification that requires going
back to 1970. Importantly, because of changes in reporting, I exclude software
occupations in Public Administration and Active Duty Military are not used due
to historical comparability, which are codes 900 and over. One might expect this to
affect Washington DC, but it did not appear to have an impact on relative rankings.
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• INDNAICS is a modern industry classification used when describing 2011-2015
data.
• SEX provides the sex of recipient which I refer to as gender.
• RACE and ETHNICITY provide data on race and ethnicity. I combine these
to construct groups of white non-Hispanic (NH), Black NH, Asian NH, Native
American/Alaska Native NH, Other NH, and Hispanic/Latino. As I explain in
a second, due to issues of standard and small sample sizes for minorities, I group
these further into white NH, Asian NH, and all other.
One issues with the IPUMS USA is large standard error when performing multiple
cross tabulations. For example, the low inclusion of Black and Hispanic/Latino in some
of my regions means that getting detailed information about income and occupation run
into significant challenges of data reliability. This would also be difficult if I were to do
intersections of race/ethnicity by gender for software workers. For this reason, I avoid
going another variable deep in the research (currently occupation and one of gender or
race/ethnicity). This is an issues to be aware of for future research.
3.5.2

Interviews

I conducted 33 semi-structured interviews between August 2015 and November 2016 in
Portland, Austin, and Seattle. To initiate the interview process in each region, I used
the internet to find software workers that were active in each regions’ local Python
community by browsing Python meetup pages and user-group postings. This provided an
even entrance into each community. I identified 5 people in each region using this method.
I received replies from 12 software workers through whichever means the individual
seemed most active: LinkedIn, Twitter, GitHub, or email if none of these. In each
region, 2 of the 5 individuals were visibly women. I explained my interest in interviewing
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software workers, explained the research project, provided the IRB consent form, and
asked if I could interview them for 45 minutes. I recommend meeting at a coffee shop at a
time that suited them, but offered that we could meet at another location of their choosing,
or alternatively a video call. I separately contacted the economic development agencies
in each of the regions. I conducted interviews of tech-oriented economic development
practitioners in Portland and Austin. I did not receive a response from the Seattle or
Redmond economic development agencies.
I performed 5 practice interviews in Portland that were not included here to test out
the interview questions. To gain the fullest understanding of each region with limited
interviews, I created a set of guidelines to steer my research. I sought to perform 8
interviews in each region. I sought to have at least one-third of the interview subjects be
women (8), reaching at least 2 in each region. I also sought to interview visible minorities
in each region, however, this proved much more difficult than I expected. I sought to
interview at least 2 managers from each region. After initial interviews in each region,
I used a snowball sampling technique to interview other software workers. During
interviews I asked what kinds of places characterized software work in the region (firms,
conferences, institutions, meetups), then asked if they could connect me to software
workers they know at those places. I asked to speak to former managers, women, and
minorities. I was initially concerned that by starting with the Python community, I
would miss important actors in each region, however, this proved not to be an issue
where there were sufficiently large actors, even if they were somewhat disconnected (as
in Austin, which I explain later). In Seattle, I was able to speak to workers at Microsoft
and Amazon. In Austin, I was able to uncover workers at the University of Texas and the
State of Texas.
My interviews exceeding the interview subject guidelines I set. Below is a summary of
my interviews.
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• 33 interviews of software workers – 13 in Austin, 11 in Portland and 9 in Seattle.
• 27 recorded and transcribed interviews (6 asked not to be recorded).
• 13 women software workers, at least 2 per region, 39% total.
• 1 transgender software worker.
• 7 non-white software workers (1 Black, 3 Hispanic, 3 Asian).
• 5 non-white women software workers.
• Austin (13): 6 with experience in local public-sector, 5 with experience at local
SME, 3 with experience at a locally headquarted large firm, 2 with experience local
branch office of large firm. 3 currently self-employed. 4 with experience in Seattle,
Portland, or Silicon Valley. 3 managers. 2 “district champions.”
• Portland (11): All software workers had experience at a local SME at some point,
3 with experience at local branch office of a large firm, 2 with experience at a locally
headquarted large firm. 2 currently self-employed. 4 with experience in Seattle,
Austin, or Silicon Valley. 4 managers. 2 “district champions.”
• Seattle (9): 8 with experience at a locally headquarted large firm, 2 with experience
at a local SME, 1 with experience at local branch office of a large firm. 6 with
experience in Austin, Portland, or Silicon Valley. 6 software workers moved to
Seattle region to work at a large locally headquarted large firm. 4 managers. 1
“corporate champion.” All 4 in-person Seattle interviews conducted at Starbucks by
interviewee request.
• Firms: Across regions, a sample of the firms that software workers in this dissertation include: Microsoft, Amazon, IBM, Disney, Mozilla, Netflix, Hulu, Open
Sourcery, New Relic, Puppet, Heroku, University of Texas, State of Texas.
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• Groups: Across regions, a non-exhaustive list of the local groups and events that
workers attended: PyLadies, PyMoms, AustinFeminist, DjangoGirls, local Python
Users Group, Latina Hackers, Girl Develop IT, Gem Austin, Girl Start, Women
Who Code, Girl Connect, Texas Girls Collective, Code Dojo, Girls Who Code,
Ruby Users Group, local Linux Users Group, SXSW, OSBridge, OSCon, PyDX,
atxrails, local hackathon, Microsoft Build, Women In Tech, Python Flying Circus,
Safety First, pdxrlang, Perl Mongers, and Puget Sound Programming Python. There
were others that software workers attended in the past that had stopped attending.
I asked questions in six broad sets of categories.
1. History of entrance into software work, move to current region
2. Daily commute, typical day, typical sets of software/languages, typical interactions
with managers/subordinates
3. Connections to software workers outside group/firm
4. Connections to firms and software workers at other firms
5. Regional character, local events, connections to software workers in the region
6. Skillbuilding, ideal set of skills, ideal candidate
Additionally, as a participant-observer, I attended Python events in each region,
volunteered at conferences in Portland and Austin, and attended hackathons or other
hacking events in each region. In total, I attended 9 events, 2 in Portland and Seattle, 3 in
Austin. As a method of gaining access to these conference, my volunteer status meant that
I performed tasks like checking people-in, patrolled hallways as an “Incident Response
Monitor,” or assisted in stuffing conference bags. These events allowed me to corroborate
the answers of workers, their characterizations of the regions, and to ensure that I did
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not miss any significant firms or institutions. It also allowed me to the identify potential
interview subjects, although I only interviewed 1 person because of attendance. I kept
a field journal of these events and used this extensively when describing each regions
industrial district.
While the interviewees aren’t necessarily demographically representative of the software workers in each region, the breadth of each experiences and knowledge of the
software workers suggests that triangulating characteristics of each region from the interview subjects would be reliable. Yet, reaching black software developers, or Hispanic
developers in Seattle, proved to be the most challenging part of this research. Further,
reaching black women proved near impossible outside of a discussion at conference – and
she did not know other black women in the region that were doing software work. With
such low representation of women and minorities in software work, these challenges are
not necessarily surprising, but future research could start by trying to identify groups
like Austin’s Latina Hackers.
Members of the LGBTQQ communities are also underrepresented in this research and
have arguably more difficulty in the tech scene than other marginalized groups. I did not
ask interview subjects of their sex or sexual orientation, but one interview subject openly
identified as transgender. This individual faced significant challenges in the workplace
which I cannot capture in this dissertation. A second pass at data collection could focus
explicitly on members of the LGBTQQ community.
Lastly, as a cis-gendered white male asking electronically to speak potential interview
subjects that were non-white, women, or non-white women, I was confronted with the
question: “what’s in it for me?” This turned into one of the longest interviews I performed,
but it also makes clear that my perceived identity impacted the initial reaction of interview
candidates and most-likely their responses. Unsurprisingly, my most successful method
of interviewing women and minority women was through referral. Still, because of
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my positionality, my interview subjects likely, knowingly or unknowingly, altered their
responses and method of interaction. While I seek to use my privilege to elevate the voices
of those marginalized, the different responses that I may receive from interview subjects
and my analysis of the quantitative data may threaten the validity of my collected data
and research analysis respectively.
I transcribed all 27 of the recorded interviews using MaxQDA. I created a coding
scheme to based deskilling, issues of race/ethnicity, issues of gender, and left hand
categories of the industrial district typology tables (2.1, Table 2.2, Table 2.3, and 5.3). I
used these to triangulate the industrial district typologies, document the racialization and
gendering of software work, and then later address how structural forces are mediated
locally through different institutions (use left hand codes from the industrial district
typology).

70

4 The Restructuring of Software Production

The link between a decline in the economy-wide rate of profit
and structural realignments within each industrial sector lies
with the stresses created by heightened competition for funds.
Innovative firms which are quick to introduce new technology,
labor practices or organizational stratagems can cope with
competitive stress successfully.
J. Graham, Gibson, Horvath, and Shakow 1988, 478

Software is a funny thing. You can’t touch it, but you can
certainly pay for it. It weighs nothing, but takes dozens or even
hundreds of people to make. And sometimes it just doesn’t work
out.
Jensen 2016, in PCMAG

4.1

Introduction

Software production and its relationship to regional economies remains misunderstood
or misidentified in the literature, contributing to different future imaginations and an
inability for scholars and practitioners to leverage software production for economic development. Economic development research has long believed in the power of technologicalrelated productive activities to produce good jobs (Markusen 1986; Morgan and Sayer
1988; Cortright and Mayer 2001; Saxenian 1983). More recent research questions this
takeaway, arguing that software, as part of a suite of technology-related productive activities, does not alone produce broad-based regional wealth, but it does produce wealth (N.
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Lee and Rodríguez-Pose 2016). A broader argument of this dissertation is that software
production activity does have the capacity to produce broad-based wealth but with certain
conditions. This chapter asks three questions:
1. What is the extent of software production activity in the US?
2. In what ways has software production activity changed in the US since 1970?
3. What is the relationship between software production activity and larger circuits of
production?
To investigate these questions, and following the epigraph at the beginning of this
chapter from J. Graham, Gibson, Horvath, and Shakow (1988), this chapter will trace the
restructuring of software production activities focusing on changes in technologies, labor
practices, and organizational strategies1 across US industries. Through data from the
US Census (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000) and American Community Survey (2005–2009
and 2011–2015) of software workers six time periods, this chapter tracks the extent and
nature of software production. Primary interviews, combined with secondary historical
accounts of software production, explain the conditions and circumstances of these the
four software periods, describing the specific mechanisms of change on the “shop” floor
and in the firm.
Directly addressing this chapter’s questions, this chapter lays out three arguments:
1. First, to understand software production activity, scholars must measure the extent
of software labor. Specifically, scholars must reject the ease of identifying one or
more software “industries” or sectors to understand software production activity
because workers produce software across industries as a integral component of
capitalism.
1

“strategems” in the epigraph
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2. Second, a fourth period of software and software production activity started in the
mid- to late-2000s. This fourth period, distinct from the mass-market and desktop
computing of the previous period, draws on the connected nature personal devices,
web/mobile apps, and cloud computing as part of a “cloud and mobile” software
period.
3. Third, software production’s periods – and the restructuring between periods – falls
along three interrelated concepts: variations of capitalist relations, firm/industrial
profit cycles, and the spatial and social formations of industrial districts. Specifically, software production’s four periods have a relationship to dominant mode of
production. Each of these periods has specific profit cycles and industrial district
formations. I argue that the transition of software production along these capitalist
variants, profit cycles, and industrial districts brings new insights into the other
forms of capital production. Further, the form and changes within software production activities may be prototypical for other types of production and its respective
restructuring, geographies, and divisions of labor.
This chapter is organized in four software periods.
4.2

Software Periods and Software Production

In Table 4.1, I revise the software periods introduced by Campbell-Kelly (2004) and
Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz (2015), updating them with new insights from data
past 2010. I elaborate the description of each period to include the dominant computing
platforms, the types of software produced, and the forms of software production. As
I will show, the connected nature of fourth period is an important and distinguishing
factor from the previous period. In the mass-market software period (third), software did
connect over the internet, but in the cloud and mobile period (fourth), software runs
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on and requires connection. For example, Google Docs and the new forms of Microsoft
Office require both client and server to run. Software is also continuously updated, or
licensed, rather than purchased. Users of ESRI ArcMap or IBM SPSS know that licenses
are typically year long, and even these applications are moving to cloud format like
Google Docs and Microsoft Office. Continuous updates also allow for new competitors
to create simple proof-of-concepts, and then expand functionality as the user base grows
or as user requirements change. Software production in this period also directly engages
with clients and users, which, for open source, means that clients and users can contribute
back to the production of the software.
In Table 4.2, I extend the work of J. Graham et al. (1988) by adding a fourth, cognitivecultural capitalist variant based on the work of Scott (2011b) and Wyly (2013). I elaborate on the concept of cognitive-cultural capitalism by introducing networked machinelearning as a form of automation and relationship between capital and labor (eg software
used to write software). I introduce the idea of computational flexibility as the labor
process where software algorithms determine laborer shifts (eg fast-food restaurants) as
well as determine contracting (eg Uber selecting drivers for clients). Capital continues
to concentrate, yet, digital fixed-capital, like servers, are increasingly decentralized or
moved to the periphery (eg Google’s data center in The Dalles, Oregon). Digital capital,
as opposed to productive capital, is a circuit where commodities are also the means of
production, owned by the commodity producer, to collect the labor of buyers (eg writing
reviews, social media, or location tracking turned into commodities). I use “digital capital”
to describe this, combing work on Marxian internet studies by Fuchs (2012) and Rigi
and Prey (2015) and work on platform capitalism by Srnicek (2016). This is, at best,
rough and somewhat hypothetical, yet examples are readily available outside of software
production. Within software, these relationships and conditions are already evident.
Understanding and explaining this elaboration of cognitive-cultural capitalism requires
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future work and I make no claims on fully explaining it here. For now, and for software
production, I operationalize cognitive-cultural capitalism to explain the use of software to
write software, the use of software in an already flexible labor market, and the emergence
of large, external data centers.
In Figure 4.1, I introduce a figure to describe a framework for analyzing software
production, arguing that software’s first period was under conditions of competitive
capitalism, that software’s second period was under conditions of monopoly capitalism,
and so on. I apply work on industrial districts by Markusen, DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee
(1999) to argue that the during each of the software periods, certain types of industrial
districts flourish. Each chapter contributes to this figure and its argument. For this chapter,
the relationship between capitalist variants and software periods is most important, and I
elaborate in-depth on industrial districts in Chapter 5.
4.3

1950s and 1960s: Contracting, Increased Competition, and Punch Cards
4.3.1

Military spending, universities, and entrepreneurs

Modern constructions of the history of Silicon Valley claim that military spending, universities, and entrepreneurs play important roles in the success of the region (Saxenian
1996). These ingredients find similar histories in software and computing more generally.
Origin stories of software and computing vary, but the computing projects funded by the
US government required significant advancement in technology, required the research
knowledge at universities, and required programming at a previously unprecedented
scale. I will focus on two of the well-known computers of the 1940s that comprised the
largest computing projects of the time. The ENIAC computer, the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Compiler, was secretly developed at the University of Pennsylvania
during World War 2. The Mark I computer (also the Automatic Sequence Controlled
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Software services, specialized

1950s-1960s

Software
production

Timing

Cloud & mobile

1990s-early 2000s

Software publishers, physically
distributed, major releases, silo
development

Operating system, desktop software, flexible programs

Desktop computer

late 2000s-onward

Networked, continuous updates, community contributions, replaceable / interoperable

Mobile / web apps, server synchronization

Cloud & interconnected devices

Microsoft (1975), MicroPro Microsoft (1975), Amazon
(1978), Software Arts (1979), (1994), Google / Alphabet
Lotus (1982), Activision (1980), (1998), Facebook (2004)
Broderband (1980)

Mass-market

Adapted and extended from Campbell-Kelly (2004, Figure 1.1).

1970s-1980s

Software suppliers

Specialized software on specialized computer, fixed / static programs

One-off projects

Types of
software

ADR (1959),
Informatics
(1962), SAP (1972), Computer
Associates (1976), Oracle (1977)
Mainframe & terminals

SDC (1956), CUC (1955), CSC
(1959), Informatics (1962)

Corporate

Computing Large computer
platform

Dominant
firms

Contracting

Software Periods

Table 4.1: Periods of software.
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Money capital

Increasing

National horizontal and
vertical

Segmented labor

Fordism / scientific
management

Semi-automation /
mass-production

Monopoloy

Productive capital

Increasing

Global horizontal,
vertical, and diversified

Peripheralized labor

Flexible / post-Fordist

Full automation /
robotics

Global

Structural innovations

Historically specific capitalist variant

Adapted and extended from J. Graham, Gibson, Horvath, and Shakow (1988, Table 1).

Commodity capital

Low

Concentration

Internationalization
of circuits of capital

Regional horizontal

Redundant labor

Reserve army
Centralization

Modern industry

Labor process

Conditions
of
competition
(capital-capital)

Machinofacture

Technology

Conditions
of
exploitation
(capital-labor)

Competitive

Structural
element

Structural
relations

Capitalism in general

Table 4.2: Capitalist variants.

Digital capital

Increasing, material /
fixed-capital
peripheralized

Global horizontal,
vertical, diversified, and
temporal

Global periphery,
laborer atomized

Computational /
flexible

Machine-learning /
networked

Cognitive-Cultural
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Hub-and-spoke

Hub-and-spoke,
branch-plant

Various, mixed

Each software period has its own regional configuration, coinciding with the form of capitalist accumulation.

Distributed

Figure 4.1: A framework for connecting capitalist variants, product cycles, and industrial districts across four periods of software.

Calculator) was ENIAC’s electromagnetic counterpart and developed by International
Business Machines (IBM) at Harvard University at the same time. Both were custom built
computers, enormous in physical size, and used to compute mathematical problems for
the US military. Intelligence and military officials knew the computers had the power
to solve complex intelligence issues like decoding and calculating ballistic trajectories,
yet vastly underestimated that the complexity of telling a computer how to solve these
computational problems. The “ENIAC girls” were a crew of 100 women, at its largest,
that were responsible for running the ENIAC and whose official job title was “computer.”
Management so misunderstood the complexity of programming the digital machine that
the women programmers had to create their own social structures, labor processes, and
divisions of tasks together, socially, on the shop floor. Computing’s “innovation” was in
the use and application of the machine, but was misunderstood by management as simply
the machine itself. When Douglas Hartree, the lead physicist behind ENIAC, published
in Nature to debut ENIAC at the end of World War II in 1945, he focused on its hardware
characteristics:
Its flexibility and speed of operation will make it possible to carry out many
numerical calculations, in many fields of investigation, which without its
assistance would have been regarded as much too long and laborious to
undertake. (Hartree 1946, 546)
The use of these specialized machine-computers over the next decade made it clear
to those that were making computational demands from the systems that the nature of
operating the machine was anything but clerical. Giving instructions to the computer
required a great deal of logic and coordination amongst the programmers. In fact, working
with the SAGE system is what forced MIT, IBM and the US Armed Forces to distinguish
between specifying the system (as a systems analyst) and programming the system (as
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a computer programmer) (Kraft 1979, 144). New demands and applications of the
ENIAC and Mark I and the new computers like the iterations of the Universal Automatic
Computer (UNIVAC) and the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (the SAGE missile
defense) system, required increased efficiency on the part of the entire productive system.
4.3.2

Software contracting

After successfully completing a contract to research and develop the Mark I at Harvard University, IBM was contracted in 1958 by MIT (and by proxy the US Air Force
Cambridge Research Laboratory) to develop the SAGE missile defense computers and
computer network. IBM’s portion of the SAGE missile defense system amounted to almost $500 Million USD, or 56 computers for roughly $18 million per computer (Earnest,
Wong, and Edwards 1998). These contracts helped catalyze software production in the
1950s and 1960s by making IBM the de facto, near monopoly, computer manufacturer.
This is not a single event per se, but part of a series of events that had snowball-like
impacts in IBM’s success. The experience developing these computers translated directly
into developing future computers, and, as the Backus quote above demonstrates, became
a space for innovation.
In the 1950s and 1960s, computer manufacturers also bundled software services with
computer sales, requiring that computer manufacturers engage in software production
activities. Once a buyer purchased a computer from IBM, programmers were also
required to operate the computer and change programs per the changing requirements of
the organization. Firms – both computer manufacturer and computer purchaser – saw
programming as the single largest source of labor in the process and the easiest place to
introduce management. But, firms also saw that standardizing the operation of computers
meant that programmers didn’t have to learn new instruction sets as computers evolved.
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4.3.3

Innovation and the rationalization of labor processes

The These two needs found a common resolution in two influential events that happened
in the 1950s and matured in the 1960s, both involving IBM. The first event happened
in 1957 when IBM released one of the earliest computer programming languages compatible across computers (mainly, the various IBM computers). Formula Translator, or
FORTRAN (now Fortran) compiled to the specific assembly language of the computer
architecture. Programmers could write instructions in Fortran, then run a compiler to
optimize the program and create an assembly language program for direct use on the
intended computer architecture. The second event was the development of a computer
that could run stored programs. IBM developed the IBM 1401 computer which was the
first computer to use stored-computer programs and be fully transistorized. Later in the
1960s, IBM introduced the System/360 which could run Fortran and a new language
called COBOL. For now, the IBM 1401 represented a major advantage in flexibility,
partially because it could run Fortran and stored Fortran programs. On Fortran, IBM
touted its business applicability.
The result should be a considerable reduction in the training required to
program, as well as in the time consumed in writing programs and eliminating
their errors. (IBM 1956, 4)
The lead developer behind Fortran, John Backus, said in Think, the IBM employee
magazine, that the impetus to make Fortran came from his own frustrations.
Much of my work has come from being lazy. I didn’t like writing programs,
and so, when I was working on the IBM 701, writing programs for computing
missile trajectories, I started work on a programming system to make it
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easier to write programs for the 701. (John Backus interviewed in Stegmann
July/August 1979, 21)
IBM even proclaimed that it could reduce the total number of instructions needed for
programmer to write by a factor of 20. Firms adopted the language with these efficiencies
in mind but it took until the mid 1960s before Fortran achieved widespread adoption.
As the use of large computers spread from academia and the military to industry
through computers developed by companies like IBM, large firms with rigid bureaucracy
and hierarchy attempted to rationalize the labor process of programming. Programmers
in service of academic and military labs manufactured software by programming directly
on the computer through buttons and switches. Returning to a key characteristic of
software, and referencing Backus earlier, software’s production relies on existing software.
One way to create efficiency is to create a higher-level language that writes lower-level
code with fewer coding statements. On the first generation of digital computers used
in industry, programmers wrote software in assembly language that was specific to the
processing architecture of that computer. As the industry matured, primarily through
IBM, programmers could write Fortran and COBOL code that compiled into assembler
code. And importantly, the new possibilities available to firms because of software
and computing development translated into growth of software production activity and
computer hardware manufacturing.
The transformation of computing into industry alters software labor into a ‘purely
objective productive’ purpose.
In manufacture the organisation of the social labour process is purely subjective, and is a combination of detail workers; in machinofacture, large scale
industry has a purely objective productive organism, in which the worker is
nothing more than an appendage. (Marx 1976 [1897], 480)
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Software contracting emerged as the variant of capitalist production, and the objective
management practices adopted from software company’s parents firms introduced hierarchy, bureaucracy, and rationalization within the workplace. That is, software production
activity within the firm renders labor part of the ‘productive organism.’
4.3.4

Growth of programming as a profession

The transition from military to industry, and rationalization of the programming workplace, produced a new relation between software production activity and the programmer.
Most programmers during the 1950s and 1960s time were not trained to be programmers, but learned to program because their job necessitated it. Programmers elected or
preselected to become programmers. ENIAC and Mark I programmers were primarily
women because of the perceived clerical nature of button-pushing. Through the 1960s,
programming, along with engineering, became more selective and the public perceived
programming to be math and science heavy as computing grew. This led to a gender
preselection among potential workers, but Greenbaum (1979, 87) points out that despite
this preselection, general prejudice was the largest barrier for women entrants, and likely
minority entrants, into the emerging software labor market. Many of the women who
were in computer programming before software production activities diffused from the
lab to industry, prior to the 1950s and 1960s, stayed in these roles. During the 1950s and
the early part of the 1960s, women programmers were seldom hired (Reskin and Roos
1990).
The rationalization of the workplace in the 1960s meant that programming within
the firm (and software production activity in general) was constantly undergoing reorganization by management. One outcomes was the splitting existing the programmer into
low skilled and high skilled specializations. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the rapid
expansion of software programming and the narrow(ing) definitions of the low skilled
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occupations meant that firms again hired women programmers (Reskin and Roos 1990;
Greenbaum 1979).
The number of programmers necessary to develop a single instruction set meant that
the labor of programming required social interaction, cooperation, and collaboration
especially on the ENIAC and early computers where there was a distinct lack of management. Computers themselves were no longer confined to research and militaristic
purposes, and instead produced and sold as commodities (fixed-capital) for large businesses. Programming for these companies required different software programs for each
installation – sometimes altogether different and sometimes marginally different. New
software contracting companies formed to provide software at lower rates than computer
hardware makers by leveraging their in-house expertise to reuse code in new situations.
There were still few programmers and software contracting companies had the capacity
to concentrate laborers and code collections for this purpose.
4.3.5

Emergence of corporate production and the dialectic of software produc-

tion
As Campbell-Kelly 2004 points out, the production of software as a commodity took
the form contract work in the 1950s and 1960s. As a business to business interaction,
capital-capital, the relationship worked. Purchasers of computers also received the software necessary to operate them. Computers were still large and expensive, but IBM began
introducing a series of computers that were not customized, and could run large-scale
software programs – effectively creating large-scale software commodities market. Software firms competed through scope narrowing, budgeting, and the rationalization of
labor. The rationalization of programming organizational structures meant that management organized workers based on task or project which allowed management to leverage
organizational charts to identify accountability, measure development speed, and intro84

duce predictable development actions (Greenbaum 1979, 110-11). Greenbaum (1979)
interviewed a system analyst that expressed their reactions to reorganization.
They [top management] keep changing the organization chart. The name of
the game is change the structure. We’ve come to accept yearly restructuring–
they just keep shuffling managers around. At least once a year there is some
major productivity crisis and their response is to reorganize us into different
groups and make the groups report to different managerial functions. We’ve
come to takes these changes as commonplace. Sometimes we don’t even talk
about it; we just go on doing what we always do. (interview subject quoted
in Greenbaum 1979, 114)
Firms were aware of the expensive cost of programming labor. Firms that developed
computers and software contracting firms sought ways to reduce the expense of labor and
software production activities. The logic of efficiency permeated into the development of
software itself. The development of Fortran and the increasing management were not
unique phenomenon to the contexts of the above quotes. In the 1960s, software services
firm Informatics developed the MARK IV programming language (unrelated to the Mark
I computer). The MARK IV sales pamphlet speaks to the same time-saving concerns and
promises of efficiency that IBM’s Fortran promised.
With MARK IV we can do the 100% workload of the programming team
with 40% of the team. The available 60% is now devoted to development.
(Customer testimonial in Informatics Incorporated 1971, 7)
MARK IV is an example of a software language that abstracts instructions to fewer
commands, as outlined in Table 4.3. MARK IV, Fortran, and COBOL perform this task
and higher-level than the 2nd generation code that they produced through “compiling.”
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Informatics developed MARK IV using the same 2nd generation languages it sought to
abstract. The market for MARK IV, and other types of languages, was strong allowing
Informatics to license MARK IV to firms who already had programmers. Licensees
then generated new software programs. Here is one of software’s key characteristics:
programmers require existing software to develop new software. Since the first software
programs involved direct manipulation of the computer’s bits through button pushing,
the first forms of automation. Yet, as the customer testimonial suggests, that does not
necessarily translate to deskilling of the software worker.
Table 4.3: Software programming language generations.

Generation (GL)
1st
2nd
Early 3rd
Advanced 3rd
4th
5th

Hardware
Machine language
Machine specific
assembler
Machine independent
compiled
Machine independent,
not necessarily
compiled
Rapid language assisted
prototyping
Constraint-based AI
programming,
machine-learning

Example languages
Bit programing /
button pushing
Machine specific
assembler
Fortran, COBOL, C,
C++, C#
Python, Ruby, Perl

Level
Machine
Low

ô

Libraries exist for 3GL
LISP, TensorFlow
(library)

High

Adapted from IBM (2010) and Miller, Vandome, and McBrewster (2010).

Other testimonials in the MARK IV sales pamphlet are also illuminating.
We assigned a programmer, one of our sharpest, to a job which looked
like a job best done in COBOL. The programmer was told to do the job
in COBOL and was given six months for completion. On his own, the
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programmer secretly did the job using MARK IV and completed the job in 3
weeks. (Customer testimonial in Informatics Incorporated 1971, 5)
Fortran’s manual contains similar claims to those in the MARK IV sales pamphlet.
Object programs produced by Fortran will be nearly as efficient as those
written by good programmers. (IBM 1956)
Fortran doesn’t necessarily deskill the worker who created the Fortran code, but instead
deskills other workers, some of them software workers who are competing in the labor
market.
high-level languages and appropriate translators obviously requires advanced
skills and knowledge on the part of the language designer and programmers.
On the other hand, once that slow and expensive task is completed, the
products can be used by anyone who has mastered the ‘alphabet’ and ‘syntax’
of the simpler high-level languages. In short, highlevel languages make it
unnecessary for programmers to be quasi [hardware] engineers. (Kraft 1979,
146)
The adoption of higher-level languages allow the firm to apply a software worker’s
labor in others areas of programming in service of the firms expansion and future profitseeking. Software programming deflects deskilling from the software producer and instead
directly contributes to the general deskilling of the workforce. The software worker,
after all, is the one that produced the new software and may be the (only) one that
understands its construction, its necessary maintenance, and how to modify it for future
applications. In this sense, the software acts as fixed-capital, machinery to be used as
a means of production, for software users. Software workers, neither deliberately nor
directly, always compete to deskill each other. The reapplication of deskilled software
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workers with new technologies in the pursuit of firm efficiency contributes to the social
acceleration of competition among firms.
In the next section I will detail the developments that alter this form of production
and the commodity form of software. In the 1950s and 1960s, computing’s diffusion
into industry introduces software as a corporate commodity, from, Table 4.1, but also
introduces a transition into what J. Graham et al. (1988) calls the “competitive” variant
of capitalist production in Table 4.2. Software contracting relied on redundant labor and
machinofacture forms of production. Yet the spatially diffuse software contracting lacked
the flexibility for wider adoption by firms.
4.4

1970s and 1980s: Corporate Software, Memory and Databases

Software contractors developed computer architecture specific software in the 1950s
and 1960s. Software contracting firms sought economies of scale in the development of
software. Firms sought to reduce labor costs through automation and through increased
scientific management of software production activities. Software contracting firms, and
software producing firms in general, faced two significant challenge. How could they
create a software that would run for different clients on each of their differing computing
architectures? Would there be a significant enough market for standardized software?
This section outlines three series of events that catalyzed the corporate software era of
1970s and 1980s. Then it discusses the rise of a new profit cycle and the conditions that
led to the period where software emerged as a mass-market commodity.
4.4.1

IBM innovations and constraints

The first series of events are mainly technological and represent the technological developments of IBM. Magnetic tapes and disks began to replace punch cards, increasing the
storage capacity for both computer memory and data storage. Magnetic tapes allowed for
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large storage capacities. IBM’s introduction of the 8-inch floppy drive (officially the IBM
23FD) started the floppy drive revolution leading to the 3.5-inch floppy drive released in
1982. Fortran and COBOL were among the most widely adopted programming languages
and firms created compilers for different system architectures. These events became relevant together when, in 1970, IBM introduced relational databases, the ability to lookup
and store data for programmers to synchronize between different users and/or terminals.
The System/360 cornered the market because it had large internal memory, and the ability
to connect to both magnetic tape systems for relational databases and floppy drives for the
distribution of software. While introduced in the mid to late 1960s, the System/360 saw
its success in 1970s. The system was so successful that programmers primarily focused
on standardizing on the architecture of the System/360. Today’s computers are direct
descendants of this architecture.
In 1969, IBM, under anti-trust pressure from the US Department of Justice claiming
that IBM was attempting to monopolize the general purpose electronic digital computer
system market, decided to famously “unbundle” its operating system from its computers.
Firms could buy computers and they could buy software. Firms were already purchasing
software under software contracting agreements during this time, but this event opened
the market to any competitor. Further, it stopped manufacturing its own silicon memory
and decided to contract out these components. Intel was the first company to produce a
commercially available microprocessor in 1971, and IBM used an Intel processor in its
typewriters in 1972, before standardizing on the Intel 8080 and 8086 processors, which
are the basis for existing processor architecture (x86).
4.4.2

Economic recessions, market changes, and the software commodity

The second series of events start with the short recession of 1969-1970 and the coinciding
decision by the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates meant that firms had less cash to
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Figure 4.2: IBM’s market share and projected growth. Fortune Magazine, 1968.

From Burck (1968).
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buy expensive computers, software, and computer programmers. Despite the market
not playing out as expected between 1968 and 1972 – see Figure 4.2 from Burck 1968
– IBM still did well: firms sought lower cost options, like that of the comparatively
inexpensive and versatile IBM System/360. In 1968 software firms were among the best
performing stocks in the US stock markets and software firms faired well at the beginning
of the recession. Computer companies, after the recession, felt continued pressure as
potential computer buyers delayed their orders or canceled them altogether. Firms sought
cheaper computers and firms also sought to buy less expensive software. IBM’s decision
to unbundle software from its computers ushered a new era of software development, and
speculation in software firms.
To be clear, the first software bubble was not the dot-com bubble of the early 2000s,
but instead the later half of a recession from 1969-70 that coincided with a broader
economic recession. Ross Perot famously lost $450 million in a single day due to the
recession and the change in his software company’s stock. The unclear and unfamiliar
nature of the computer and software market meant volatility for investors (Brooks and
Lewis 1999; Campbell-Kelly 2004). Software contracting companies had emerged, but the
new flexibility to create and market software for any number of versatile machines allowed
software producers and consumers great capacity for innovation. In the late 1960s, prior
to the recession, Applied Data Research (ADR) built a prototype flowcharting program,
Autoflow, for Radio Corporation of America (RCA). RCA lost interest in the product,
and ADR focused on licensing Autoflow to new customers. They focused on firms with
the IBM 1401/1410, allowing them to standardize their software for the platform. ADR
filed for a patent on their software, the first patent for a software program. This marks the
first time that producers of software sold software as a commodity, rather than packaged
as a computer, or as custom software services (Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz 2015).
ADR’s Autoflow is an exception in the 1960s. Autoflow made ADR extremely
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successful in the 1970s when firms sought cheaper capital goods. Autoflow operated
primarily on the IBM 1401, and the IBM 1401 did not have an operating systems by
todays standards. A single program could run on the computer at a time, reducing the
overall flexibility that firms required. IBM’s decision in 1969 to unbundle its software
from its computers and IBM’s standardization on the Intel x86 architecture allowed for
Microsoft to license a DOS (disk operating system) to IBM. IBM had already developed
an operating system for its popular System/360 named OS/360, yet OS/360 wasn’t
necessarily compatible with the x86 architecture. IBM offered several different operating
systems to their clients. Microsoft’s operating system was by far the cheapest of the
offerings and compatible with Digitals Research’s Control Program/Monitor (CP/M)
which was the current market standard. Microsoft and Intel retained the rights to sell
their operating system to other computer makers. These events unfolded throughout
the 1970s and by the 1980s, IBM was selling PC-DOS, a repackaged Microsoft DOS
(MS-DOS), on their computers running with an Intel x86 architecture.
4.4.3

The spreadsheet and the operating system

The third series of events relate to the operating system and the spreadsheet. The corporate
software era of the 1970s and 1980s saw first movement of computers use move from
specialized machinery to the desktop. This move happened within large firms, and
these firms were still the main clients of the expensive desktop computer. Desktop
computers were less expensive than their mainframe counterparts. But during this move,
the personal computer, made by any number of computer manufactures, standardized
running PC-DOS on the Intel architecture and provided a single platform for firms to
create software. VisiCalc, one of the most popular early software programs, was the
IBM produced spreadsheet program that was the business standard until Lotus developed
1-2-3 which, at a lower price point, out-competed and outperformed VisiCalc. Through a
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series of chance opportunities and path dependence, the confluence of Intel’s architecture,
Microsoft’s operating system, and Lotus’s software program resulted in a set corporate
computing standards. This configuration benefited from network externalities – the
characteristic that the software or product gains value with larger adoption.
This history has primarily focused on the IBM PC, the standard within firms whose
legacy is dominant today. However, Apple released the Macintosh in 1984, Microsoft
released Windows in 1986 (which eventually supplanted MS-DOS), and an obscure
programmer released linux in 1991. Each of these platforms challenges to the dominant
desktop computing platform.
During this time, new companies in California, like Intel, benefited firm and government based research. The US military and federal government awarded the majority
of contracts through the 1960s to large east coast firms (Saxenian 1996). In the late
1960s, new competitors like Hewlett-Packard, research institutions like Xeroc PARC and
Stanford University, contributed heavily to the geographic shift toward the west and
Silicon Valley in particular (Saxenian 1983). Visits from Steve Jobs and Bill Gates to
Xerox PARC cemented the idea of a graphical operating system, both later developed into
the modern standards of desktop operating systems.
This period, and the growth of MS-DOS, marks the initial decline of IBM from
software in general. Autoflow and VisiCalc were initial forms of software commodities
that were primarily used in corporate software. Software’s commodity form hadn’t
entirely caught on. The video game industry, in the late 1970s until its bust in 1983,
provided the vision for independent software makers that could sell software as a massmarket commodity – software on a diskette could be like a video game cartridge bought
in the store. The video game industry had lasting impacts on software production. The
extravagant campuses of video game makers and their employees influenced the corporate
campuses of software firms and the expectations of software workers (Wolf 2008).
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4.4.4

Labor and new programming languages

The US Census Bureau first created software specific occupation codes in 1967 for use in
the 1970 Decennial Census (Markusen 1986). Most software production during this time
happened under three different software occupation codes: the computer programmer, the
computer software analyst, and the operations and research analyst. These occupations
went unchanged in the 1980 and 1990 census, yet the number of workers in software
production activity went from almost 300,000 in 1970 to nearly 1.3 million in 1990.
Software production activity accounted for 0.35% of all labor in 1970. By 1990, it
had tripled its share to 1.03% (see Table 4.5). The firm organization and business
practices surrounding software production in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s mirrored the
initial formations that followed the transition of software production from military and
universities to industry in the 1950s and 1960s. While firm organization and practices
persisted, divisions on the “shop floor” of software work began to emerge and software
occupations began to splinter (Greenbaum 1979; Reskin and Roos 1990). Kraft (1979)
documents this splintering in the 1970s.
The creation of two software occupations, where before there had been
only one, was to be the first of a long series of subdivisions. The analyst/programmer distinction was, and to a large extent remains, crude, tentative, and spurious. Yet it proved that programming could be divided into
two main categories of more thoughtful and less thoughtful work. Even
relatively ‘creative’ software specialists, i.e., specialists whose work involved
little mechanical detail, could now have their work routinized. The fragments
thus created could be parcelled out to less skilled workers, e.g., technicians,
or still another new suboccupation, ‘coders.’ Managers at last could begin
to replicate in programming the finer divisions long established in electrical
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engineering and other more ‘traditional’ engineering occupations. (Kraft
1979, 145)
Programming was proliferating into the workplace as software workers nearly quadrupled
their presence. At the same, the corporate era of software production also saw that more
office workers begin to interact, some even making their own software programs to run
on mainframes or desktop computers.
The growth of software production activity, both explicitly as a programmer and
as a skill, meant that there was also a demand for workers with any level programming
experience. Computer science became a college degree that equipped workers with
the skills necessary to fill software occupations and training courses became available
for existing workers to gain software skills. Even still, software was still little known
as a career path. Software’s importance and future growth were still unclear within
mainstream society and considered a boutique industry and skill.
My intention at the time, I still new nothing about computer science, I was a
computer science major and didn’t know anything about the big picture, I
didn’t take it seriously. This is a way to pay my way through as an undergraduate, then after I graduate I’ll go back to what I really care about, I’ll go back
to history, or to a political science major, I’ll join the State Department, I’ll do
something completely different. There were people that I was in school with
that talked about things like getting jobs in San Jose at the time. I graduated
in 1983, and I had no idea what they were talking about. I thought going to
California was a good idea, but Silicon Valley didn’t mean anything to me.2
Even then, it’s perception as being math and science heavy turned would-be recruits away.
2

Austin developer on programming in the 1980s. Interview, 10/31/2015, D9, transcript.
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An Airforce recruiter said I could get an ROTC scholarship if I switched to
computer science. I said no. But then I got desperate enough... I had the
aptitude for it, but I didn’t care for it... I was programming in Fortran and
assembler.3
The computer system analyst was responsible for not only programming, but translating
business needs into problems that software workers could solve. Computer programmers
were the army whose responsibility was to produce the programs with the aide of systems
analysts. Operations and research analysts either operated or research specific computer
platforms. The rationalization of software labor took on the construction-industry
characteristics of the previous software period, perceiving software to be a concretely
specifiable subject and object of labor like that of constructing a building. Software
programs and products did not behave as passively as buildings once constructed and as
divisions within on the shop floor emerged, managers reconfigured the “assembly line”
and post-production support to mimic electrical engineering.
Present-day programmer training, although institutionally separate from electrical engineering departments, almost exactly parallels the structure of the
previously developed model. The lowest level specialists-coders and applications programmers-are trained in junior or community college programs,
designed to prepare them for technician jobs in local industries. More skilled
programmers-people who work on complete programs rather than on fragments of a single program-are trained in conventional engineering colleges.
Occasionally, they are trained in liberal arts colleges, in which case they may
receive degrees in applied mathematics as well as in computer science. (Kraft
1979, 150)
3

Austin product manager on programming in the 1980s. Interview, 10/30/2015, D7, transcript.
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New specifications of software languages accelerated the division of software occupations
as those with experience in newer software languages could achieve higher labor efficiency
than their peers. Management relied on heavy up-front design to divide programming
tasks, bifurcating and dividing high-skill from low-skill work.
The corporate software era saw the languages like C and C++ make the same claims
that Fortran, COBOL, and MARK IV made in the previous software period.
At [California firm], it was a pretty boring programming job, but I found it
to be easy. Very easy. Low stress. COBOL and a language called MARK IV.
It was real top heavy with management.4
The increasing demand of software workers tempered the persistence of rigid working
conditions, new expectations from new languages and management styles, and the continuation of prejudice in hiring and the workplace. New opportunities for women and
minorities came primarily from the fact that software workers were in demand and the
existing divisions of labor within each occupation and between occupation classes were
already established.
4.4.5

Emergence of mass-marketing software

In summary, firms relied on scientific management and began extend the use of software
languages in the pursuit of automation. The 1970s and 1980s also mark the increasing
concentration of software workers, and the national competitive nature of large computing
firms. These track with the monopoly form of software production. In the 1970s and
1980s, the standardization on MS-DOS, and the standardization on Intel’s x86 architecture,
set the stage for software to be a mainstream, mass-market commodity. The growth of
software production activities across industries and the development of computer science
4

Austin developer on programming in the 1980s. Interview, 10/31/2015, D9, transcript.
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degrees provided the labor. The profit cycles afforded by corporate software would dwarf
compared the new market opened up because of the standardized computing platform –
whose size made it possible to put on desks. The result was new software programs that
provided efficiency in the workplace and home were in demand. The video game industry
influenced software’s mass-market form. Further, new sets of social relations (Saxenian
1996) and demonstrated success of video game programmers (Wolf 2008) attracted new
laborers to software production.
4.5

1990s and 2000s: Mass-market Software, Desktop Computers, AOL

With the growth of software and computing comes a growth of software and computing
events – and the events of the 1990s and early 2000s are too voluminous to document
here. Instead this section, with a focus on labor processes, organizational strategies, and
technological developments will show how this period is markedly different from previous
periods because of the rapid growth and diffusion of software into society.
Table 4.4: Growth of software labor, 1970–2015.

Numbers of software workers

Software workers
Percent increase

1970

1980

1990

2000

2005–2009

2011–2015

291,000

539,960

1,288,984

3,294,397

3,618,295

4,244,971

86%

139%

156%

10%

17%

Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015) representing
the 1970 Census, 1980 Census, 1990 Census, 2000 Census, ACS 2005-2009, and ACS 2011–2015. Cutoff
points calculated by the author. Data uses the 1990 Census Bureau industry classification to best capture
change across the entire time series. Industry data for Public Administration and Active Duty Military are
not used (codes 900 and over).
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4.5.1

A computer in every home, operating systems

In a Microsoft news conference in 2006, Bill Gates recalled his original business goals.
When Paul Allen and I started Microsoft over 30 years ago, we had big dreams
about software. We had dreams about the impact it could have. We talked
about a computer on every desk and in every home. (Beaumont 2008)
The personal computer epitomizes the 1990s and early 2000s. Demand for computers
with firms and homes grew, and with it the price and size of computers dropped. The
x86 architecture dominated all but the primarily Motorola and Apple-backed RISC
architecture of the minuscule non-IBM PC market. With a narrowing set of operating
systems, third-party software for productivity, education, or entertainment became
standard – hardware makers stopped making software specific for their platforms.
Table 4.5: Software workers share of in industry employment, 1970–2015.

Numbers of software workers
1970

1980

1990

2000

2005–2009

2011–2015

Software workers

291,000

539,960

1,288,984

3,294,397

3,618,295

4,244,971

Average share of
industries

0.51 %

0.56 %

1.06 %

2.03 %

2.09 %

2.31 %

Share of all workers

0.35 %

0.51 %

1.03 %

2.37 %

2.36 %

2.66 %

82 million

106 million

125 million

139 million

153 million

160 million

All workers

Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015) representing
the 1970 Census, 1980 Census, 1990 Census, 2000 Census, ACS 2005-2009, and ACS 2011–2015. Cutoff
points calculated by the author. Data uses the 1990 Census Bureau industry classification to best capture
change across the entire time series. Industry data for Public Administration and Active Duty Military are
not used (codes 900 and over).

Software became a retail sensation. Retailers like Egghead Software sold only software
products, and existing retailers added their aisles devoted to only to software products.
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Compact discs (CDs) and large disk drives meant that users could cheaply store large volumes of installed software on their computers – providing new distribution opportunities
for software products. In the US, software became a mass-market commodity.
While Microsoft’s series of Windows operating systems, all built on or run on Microsoft’s DOS operating system, dominated the 1990s and 2000s, Apple emerged as
Microsoft’s largest operating system competitor. Microsoft’s operating systems were
primarily for IBM lineage of Intel’s x86 architecture. New chip manufactures competed
against Intel’s dominance of the microprocessor and companies like Cyrix and Advanced
Micro Devices (AMD) competed with their own x86-compatible architectures. Linux,
made entirely open source, could run on any number of architectures and was a free
alternative to expensive Apple computers or expensive licenses to Microsoft operating
systems. Apple, realizing the cost burden of maintaining its own architecture and own
operating system while competing with behemoth Microsoft, sought to take advantage of
the network effects of software and hardware. In the early 2000s, Apple adopted a linux
variant as the base of their tenth version of their Mac Operating System (commonly Mac
OS X, now macOS) and then moved entirely to Intel processors.
This rushed account of the changes in architecture and the rapid diffusion of the
personal computer is only part of the story of the 1990s and 2000s. With a computer
in every home, the ability to connect them spurred the development of the modem and
the internet. This introduced new forms of person to person, business to customer, and
business to business relationships. Firms could sell to customers online and firms could
perform customer relationship management tasks on the new medium. New exploratory
forms of social interaction, from chat rooms to virtual reality, brought with it new forms
of software commodities.
A computer in every home made possible by the decreasing costs of computer hardware, the increased distribution data capacity provided by CDs and the fledgling internet,
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the growth of the concept of software as a mass-market commodity, and the growing
ubiquity of computing spurred software’s economic growth. The economic growth of
software in the home, and the application of software within the firm for logistics, meant
the development and sale of software demanded labor to create, modify, or maintain
software and software installations. Between 1990 and 2000, the growth of software
workers wasn’t limited to industries like data services or computer manufacturers. The
year 2000 marks a moment when software diffused into industries, including many in
the manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, finance, business, and professional
industry groups as shown in Figure 4.3.
4.5.2

Browsers, search, and the new Silicon Valley

The connectivity of computers and their users brought new attention to internet software
like the browser, run on a user’s computer, and portals, which ran on servers from internet
service provider firms. The internet browser software and the starting location of the
browser became the center of two important competitions. Netscape Navigator was the
standard internet browser, securing over 90% of the browser market share, until Microsoft
began bundling Internet Explorer with its dominant Windows operating system. By the
fourth version of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, little incentive existing for users to spend
the time or money to download and install a competing browsers. This bundling move
by Microsoft further solidified Microsoft’s dominance in controlling the the software that
ran on the growing number of desktop computers. As Netscape declined, America Online
(AOL) became Microsoft’s largest competitor because it served as browser, portal, and
internet service provider. Installing and using AOL did not require lengthy downloads
because AOL sent free physical copies of its browser to customers in the mail with free
internet hours. By 1999, AOL bought the failing Netscape.
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The history of the browser sets in motion two catalyzing socio-technical events.
First, Microsoft’s bundling of its own browser with its own operating system began
nearly decade long legal battle with the United States over anti-competitive practices.
This emboldened the Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) movement and led to a
growing backlash against Microsoft. Second, Netscape released the source code to its
browser in 1999, immediately before AOL’s acquisition. FOSS developers took Netscape’s
source code and developed Mozilla Firefox. Firefox’s success in competing with Microsoft
provided hope for open-source developers and led to the growth of open-source software
firms. Importantly, Mozilla defaulted its web portal and search engine to a Google Search.
Google, founded in 1998, swept across the internet with the rapid growth of Firefox,
becoming the default search engine for the majority of the internet, effectively eliminated
other players like AOL, Yahoo, and AltaVista. Apple had its own resurgence with that
coincided with its the release of its newest operating system, yet Microsoft had a version
of Internet Explorer and its Office productivity software packages for Apple platforms.
The success of Bay Area hardware, software, and web firms like Google, ecommerce
firm eBay, Apple, database software firm Oracle, and network hardware firm Cisco,
continued to solidify new labor markets outside the traditional east coast metropolitan
areas. The industrial diffusion of software workers met with the spatial diffusion of
software workers. In unsuspecting places like Seattle, Microsoft, media firm Real Player,
and fledgling ecommerce firm Amazon, each grew to become dominant players in their
respective markets. Software presented such new opportunity that even IBM exited the
personal computer industry to focus on large mainframes and software services.
4.5.3

Growth, bust, innovation, startups

In the late 1990s, software’s explosion into the mass-market provided opportunities for
programmers and entrepreneurs to create software products to appeal to large audiences.
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Figure 4.3: Diffusion of software workers across selected industries, 1970–2015.
INDUSTRY
GROUP

SOFTWARE
WORKERS

MINING

INDUSTRY (1990)
42 Oil and gas extraction
390 Toys, amusement, and sporting goods
380 Photographic equipment and supplies
372 Medical, dental, and optical instruments and supplies
371 Scientific and controlling instruments
370 Cycles and miscellaneous transportation equipment
362 Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts
352 Aircraft and parts
342 Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies, n.e.c.
341 Radio, TV, and communication equipment
340 Household appliances
332 Machinery, n.s.
322 Computers and related equipment
321 Office and accounting machines
312 Construction and material handling machines
311 Farm machinery and equipment
310 Engines and turbines
292 Ordnance
221 Footwear, except rubber and plastic
200 Petroleum refining
192 Industrial and miscellaneous chemicals
191 Agricultural chemicals
190 Paints, varnishes, and related products
182 Soaps and cosmetics
181 Drugs
172 Printing, publishing, and allied industries, except newspapers
130 Tobacco manufactures

MANUFACTURING

472 Utilities, n.s..
452 Electric and gas, and other combinations
451 Gas and steam supply systems
450 Electric light and power
442 Telegraph and miscellaneous communications services
441 Telephone communications
440 Radio and television broadcasting and cable

TRANSPORTATION,
COMMUNICATIONS, AND
OTHER PUBLIC UTILITIES

552 Petroleum products
541 Drugs, chemicals, and allied products
530 Machinery, equipment, and supplies
512 Electrical goods
511 Metals and minerals, except petroleum
510 Professional and commercial equipment and supplies

WHOLESALE TRADE

663 Catalog and mail order houses
633 Radio, TV, and computer stores

RETAIL TRADE

FINANCE,
INSURANCE, AND
REAL ESTATE

712 Real estate, including real estate−insurance offices.
711 Insurance
710 Security, commodity brokerage, and investment companies
702 Credit agencies, n.e.c.
701 Savings institutions, including credit unions
700 Banking

BUSINESS AND
REPAIR SERVICES

752 Electrical repair shops
741 Business services, n.e.c.
732 Computer and data processing services
721 Advertising
893 Miscellaneous professional and related services.
892 Management and public relations services
891 Research, development, and testing services
890 Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services
882 Engineering, architectural, and surveying services
881 Membership organizations, n.e.c.
850 Colleges and universities
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2014

PROFESSIONAL AND
RELATED SERVICES

YEAR

Percent software workers
> 7.18%
< 2.53%
> 2.53%
None
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(Previous page.) Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al.
2015) representing the 1970 Census, 1980 Census, 1990 Census, 2000 Census, ACS 2005-2009, and ACS
2011–2015. Cutoff points calculated by the author. The cutoff of 7.19% is one standard deviation of the
average industrial share of software workers over the national share of software workers for 2010-2014 data.
The cutoff of 2.53% is the average share of software workers in each industry for 2011–2015 data. Data uses
the 1990 Census Bureau industry classification to best capture change across the entire time series. Industry
data for Public Administration and Active Duty Military are not used (codes 900 and over).

Larger firms sought to protect their market dominance and acquired new firms that
had successful products or innovative technologies. Venture capitalists sought to grow
software firms quickly. Speculation fueled investment in software and web related firms,
signaling a new direction for stalwarts of the hardware industry. In the 1990s, the focus
shifted from hardware and computer firms to software firms and software services.
The growth of the mass-market software period was not without its own bust. The
NASDAQ stock exchange, home to the high-technology and software firms of the dotcom
boom and long a gauge of the HT/IT industries, reached its peak of over 5,000 points
during March of 2000. A decade earlier, in March of 1990, the NASDAQ Composite
Index had a value of around 450 points. The character of the NASDAQ index’s growth is
not of slow and steady climb. In March of 1999, the index had risen to nearly 2,500 points.
From this new record high, it doubling in one year to reach it’s new high in March of
2000. One interviewee captured the excitement of the of the time:
Everyone thought the new economy, the dotcom thing, was different. Everyone said it. Even your taxi driver was recommending which internet stock to
buy. Everyone was caught up in that mania.5
The growth of the number of software workers, the demand for software in the
home, the demand for software within the firm, combined with the industrial and spatial
diffusion of software skills lay prime conditions for innovations. Workers seeking to take
5

Austin developer and entrepreneur. Interview, 11/02/2015, D11, transcript.
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advantage of this growth learned to program on their own, through a new programming
book industry, or through new forms of certification. The dot-com bubble burst, sending
technology stocks into a recession. Coupled with the recession after September 11th,
2001, software and technology firms consolidated and reorganized.
By March of 2001, the NASDAQ index had fallen to less than 2,000 points, signaling a
massive a decline in investor confidence in software as a market, a commodity, and a skill.
The NASDAQ reached a low in late 2002 of around 1,200 points. The structural changes
as a result of diffusion of software within firms and labor markets had already taken hold.
Using the average share of software workers in each industry for 1970, Figure 4.3 tracks
industries that had a standard deviation above the 1970 average (2.53%) during any of
the time periods of 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005–2009, and 2011–2015. Starting in 2000,
software workers steadily occupied larger portions of industries than initial representation
in the 1970s.
Building from the oft used measures of industrial change, the coefficient of specialization and the coefficient of localization Isard (1956), Table 4.6 shows the calculation
of a coefficient of industrial specialization measuring the share of software workers by
industry. The coefficient of industrial specialization (CoIS) uses the equation

Coefficient of Industrial Specialization =

1 X Wocc,ind Wind
−
2
Wocc
W

(4.1)

where Wocc,ind is the number of workers of a given occupation (in this case, software
occupations) in a given industry, Wocc is the total number of workers with that occupation
across all industries, Wind is the total number of workers in any occupation within a
given industry, and W is the total number of workers in any occupation across all
industries. CoIS values closer to 1 signal perfect concentration (all software workers
in a signal industry) while values closer to 0 signal equal shares of software workers in
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Author’s charting from NASDAQ price and volume data.

Figure 4.3: Dotcom boom and bust, NASDAQ Composite INDEX (IXIC) 1997 to 2017.

each industry (varying by the size of the industry). The CoIS, calculated using software
as the occupation of choice in 4.6, appears to trend to zero. This tracks with events
in the software periods. In 2000, the CoIS reaches its lowest value, meaning software
workers were most diffuse across industry groups. The dotcom bust followed by the
beginning of the Great Recession in the 2005–2009 period drove software workers back
toward concentration. The nature of this concentration post-2000 is different than the
concentration pre-2000, software workers grew in industry groups like Finance, Real
Estate, and Insurance and other business oriented industries (see Figure 4.3.
Table 4.6: Measuring concentration of software workers by industry, 1970–2015.

Coefficient of Industrial Specialization of Software Workers, Industry Groups (n = 16)

Coefficient of Industrial Specialization

1970

1980

1990

2000

2005–2009

2011–2015

0.404

0.382

0.362

0.325

0.359

0.361

Based on major industry groups and their non/durable sub groups (n = 16). Author’s calculations from
data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015) representing the 1970 Census, 1980 Census,
1990 Census, 2000 Census, ACS 2005-2009, and ACS 2011–2015. A zero value means equal distribution of
software workers across industries, whereas a value of 1 means concentration in a single industry. Data uses
the 1990 Census Bureau industry classification to best capture change across the entire time series. Industry
data for Public Administration and Active Duty Military are not used (codes 900 and over).

This suggests that in the 1990s, the rapid growth of software was primarily in industries
that how low numbers of software workers. This also had the result of software firms
structuring the relationship between software worker and manager. While the software
workers are more diffuse than they were in the 1970s and 1980s, they are not as diffuse
as they were in 2000, prior to the dotcom bust, despite the NASDAQ Composite Index
showing rapid growth in technology-oriented firms.
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4.5.4

Labor practices and firm strategies

The labor practices and firm organization of the 1990s generally fit the typology of global,
diversified firms that use both centralization and globalization as strategies to manage labor
costs and extract value. The unpredictability of product cycles meant that firms resorted
to temporary, contract, labor the most routinized tasks of programming including testing
and coding. Firms also sought to manage their labor expenses by outsourcing particular
tasks to specialized software programming firms or by offshoring work in countries with
cheaper labor. The public perceived work in software to be glamorous and extravagant,
like that of the work of video game work during the beginning of the 1980s.
Table 4.7: Diffusion of software labor across industries, 1970–2015.

Diffusion of software workers across industries
1970

1980

1990

2000

2005–2009

2011–2015

Industries with
no
software
workers

38

10

3

0

0

0

Industries over
2.53% software
workers

5

5

24

47

44

52

Industries over
7.19% software
workers

2

2

3

15

12

13

Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015) representing
the 1970 Census, 1980 Census, 1990 Census, 2000 Census, ACS 2005-2009, and ACS 2011–2015. Cutoff
points calculated by the author. Data uses the 1990 Census Bureau industry classification to best capture
change across the entire time series. Industry data for Public Administration and Active Duty Military are
not used (codes 900 and over). Due to industry code changes some industries have zero workers from any
occupation. The number of industries for each period with at least one worker are 201, 202, 220, 210, and
210 for 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2009, and 2015 respectively.

During the 1990s and 2000s, labor and firm strategies were archetypically flexible. The
dot-com bust forced firms to reconfigure, focusing on managing labor costs associated
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with the rampant growth and acquisition of software workers during the late 1990s and
early 2000s. In the 1990s, large firms, especially Microsoft, began hiring firms to supply
laborers to work with full-time employees on their campuses. These contracts were short
3- to 9-month contracts. Contractors felt like they were not being compensated fairly
with regards to stocks and benefits. Microsoft contractors sued as I’ll explain in the next
chapter. The dotcom bust reshaped the business use-case for software squarely in method
to increased productivity, even those producing software, and firms shed their many of
their software workers in pursuit of different methods.
4.5.5

Emergence of the cloud and mobile devices

The mass-market software period saw the miniaturization of computing and the popularization of smaller computing platforms like the tablet, the smartphone, and the laptop.
Microsoft, Apple, and linux platforms battled for dominance in desktop computers –
in the personal and business operating systems and desktop software markets. Large
software firms continued their pursuit of scientific management, but also relied on flexible
contractors and peripheralized locations of production. Software production continued to concentrate. These characteristics match our expectation of a global software
capitalist-variant.
Yet, software makers could no longer rely on mass-market software to produce the
wealth they had previously enjoyed from selling boxed software commodities. Firms
instead streamlined desktop software production, and pursued new avenues of profit.
The emerging profit cycle depends on the growth of the internet, the required servers in
service of the internet, and the servers to provide ecommerce and customer relationship
management to clients. Microsoft, Apple, and linux also fought for dominance on these
computers which were not geared toward users per se but instead toward the automation
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of routine services. In the mid and late 2000s, new cloud and mobile firms began to
emerge, and existing companies began to restructure.
4.6

Late 2000s: Cloud, Mobile, Big Data

The current period of software development is difficult to characterize because of the
newness of the relationships. Each of the three previous periods of software development
links to a capitalist variant from Table 4.2 that characterizes technology, labor practices,
firm strategies, their spatial relationships, and their capital-relationships. What separates
this current moment, emerging sometime in the mid 2000s, is the entrenchment of global
capital amidst new technical possibilities. Physically, larger clusters of computers with
immense computing power in specially built data centers provide by firms with the storage
and power to analyze large amounts of data. Paired with processors in internet capable
devices like physical fitness trackers, watches, virtual-reality headsets, phones, smart
city sensors, etc., a dual need emerges to build both large-scale and small-scale software.
Machine learning, big data, internet-of-things (IoT) in the home or the city, and augmented
reality, are some of the buzzwords used in industry. They are all interdependent on a
set of technical components – large storage capacity for data, networked devices and
servers, and the computing power for processing machine-learning algorithms – used to
glean efficiencies in existing markets and open up new markets. Software and software
workers demand the hardware capability to provide software instructions that drive these
technological developments. These technological developments then guide, in part, the
future structure of software development.
4.6.1

The Great Recession

Like the previous period, the this current period had a bubble of its own. The Great
Recession was not a dot-com bust but instead a real-estate bust that drove the economy
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into a slowing recession after its modest recovery after the dot-com bust. The real estate
bust started in 2007 and caused what scholars call the “Great Recession” which caused
consumers to spend less, causing firms to once again, justify the labor of each of their
workers. Work in software continued to grow, just at a smaller pace, since managers saw
software workers as providing efficiency to firms. The recession hit the finance industry
hard, but the number of software workers grew during the Great Recession. While other
industries shed other jobs, software workers remained. Fewer startups entered the scene
during the Great Recession, and there is a gap in IPOs during this time.
Between the 2005–2009 (which comprises puts the start of the Great Recession squarely
in the middle) and 2011–2015, software work was back on track and continued to grow.
The economy added almost 500,000 additional software jobs, see Table 4.4, and software
continued to gain comparative labor share of industries, see Table 4.5, and continue to
diffuse into across all industires, see Table 4.1.
4.6.2

New technologies, faster internet

The proliferation of computing devices and the dichotomous relationship between centralized servers and consumer oriented devices relies on fast cellular data networks and
faster wired connections providing near ubiquitous wifi access. Apple and AT&T released
the first phone with a cellular data in 2007. Previous iterations of smartphones, like
the Microsoft phones which ran Windows CE, relied on constant connections to wifi.
Google released a competing phone in the next year and Microsoft soon after.
The distribution of handheld connected devices is only part of the story. New forms
of interaction, like virtual reality, augmented reality, and touch screens, necessitated
firms re-imagine how users interact with devices. Phones, tablets, VR headsets, glasses,
and watches, provided new opportunities for software makers to port existing desktop
software to a new era of devices, or imagine entirely new software.
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The connected nature of the devices and the software that run on them meant that
new forms of social interaction also made possible. “Social media” become a term to
describe networks of connected peers. Social media software could run on distributed
devices, however, they require immense centralized software to act as a repository for
storing links between people and the content they share.
Two important related markets came with social media and connected devices that
are important for this study. First, innovations in social media were also leveraged in
software production to improve team efficiency. New firms used best practices from social
media to curate software interactions and software tracking for both the production of
software and for any other production-line or production process with complex steps
and multiple production steps. Second, the immense amount of data collected provided
new opportunities to segment customers and create targeted advertising on distributed
devices. With regular users and a large enough user base, social media firms became
advertising firms, controlling not just how users interact, but selling advertising space
based on profiles and segments from data that users freely provide to the social media
firms.
4.6.3

New firms, new markets

At the time of writing, firms like Microsoft and Apple dominant the software landscape.
This is an incomplete list, as new firms dominate the the cloud and mobile sector in ways
that would be unimaginable in the previous period. In the previous period, software
as a commodity on every desk meant that the computer was the dominant hardware
architecture for software commodities. The war over the desktop operating system
continues to be waged. As processors (nano or otherwise) infiltrate existing devices like
coffee machines, cabs, routers, light posts, TVs, and phones, or are core to new devices
like virtual reality headsets, tablets, or e-readers, new markets for software emerge. And
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importantly, the software on these devices must talk with each other or a large centralized
server. New wars are waged for both cloud computing devices, smart phone devices, and
IoT devices, while new firms sell software as a commodity for new platforms on servers,
as smart phone apps, or smart-city software.
Firms like Amazon (founded 1994), Google (1998), Facebook (2004), Twitter (2006),
and Snapchat (2011) are some of the largest players that barely, if at all, existed in the
previous software period. Each has had an IPO that made the front page of the New York
Times and each has a listing on the NASDAQ index. Amazon IPOd in 1997, the earliest
of this group, but was still considered an online book store, not the cloud platform,
advertising algorithm, grocery delivering, drone distributed, e-reader making, behemoth
that we know today. Google, always a software company, had its IPO in 2004 while
Snapchat, the most recent to IPO, did so in 2017. Microsoft, long a software commodity
firm, had a public change of direction with the new CEO in 2014: Microsoft is now a
cloud and mobile first software company. Each of these firms relies on the dichotomous
technologies of large centralized servers run by the company and distributed computing
devices for their clients. Microsoft, Amazon, and others, even lease out some of their
own centralized server processing power and memory.
4.6.4

Labor processes and firm organization

These labor-market dominating firms centralize software design and production either
in Silicon Valley, Seattle, or both, with localization (translation) work performed in
peripheral locations outside the US. Google, a stereotypical Silicon Valley firm, has a
location outside Seattle where it centralizes its Cloud Platform and Search Ads to leverage
the talent pool of Microsoft and Amazon employees with similar experience.6 Apple,
another stereotypical Silicon Valley firm, has a location in Austin where it has a support
6

Seattle product manager at a large firm. Interview, 10/01/2016, D23, transcript.
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call center and a chip design lab. Apple’s location of the chip design lab is strategic:
Austin has a long history of chip designers and the salary requirements are much lower in
Austin.7 The support center is tangential.
As software becomes more common parts of everyday work, software workers in
other firms temper the dominance of these firms and their locational strongholds. These
firms make software that is a commodity yet as computers continue to employed in
production, firms employ software workers to integrate existing software platforms
and databases. Labor is still segmented, and retracting from its peripheralization of the
previous period, while simultaneously undergoing an automation as firms seek to use
new technologies to replace or reduce their need on software developers. One product
manager relayed that:
My job is to make sure my developers are programming as much as possible.
We have this contract, that if we do stand-up [daily 15 minute meeting] I’ll
stay out of their way the rest of the day – they want that too.
Later when discussing ideal candidates for a developer position, the interviewee laid out
expectations of skills, but also sets of software methods that they would bring to the
position.
I expect my developers to use develop tools, scripts, methods, that take some
of the day-to-day programming out of the way – make them more efficient at
what they do.8
Other interview subjects in other locations, even some with experience in Silicon Valley,
corroborated this account of the relationship between manager and worker. Managers
keeping their workers on task is hardly a new phenomenon. Programmers, however,
7
8

Austin developer and entrepreneur. Interview, 11/02/2015, D11, transcript.
Seattle product manager at a large firm. Interview, 10/01/2016, D23, transcript.
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asking their managers to skip meetings and seeking their own tools for efficiency sits
contrary to the antagonist shop-floor relationship between worker and manager that is
commonly told in these settings. Programmers also realize the role their managers play
in guiding their career, discussed in the currency of “innovation” by one interviewee.
If you don’t have a good manager, you’re not going to innovate. Doesn’t matter which side [manager or worker] you’re on. The thing about innovation is
that it a lot of times goes counter to making money now. It’s making money
now versus making money later. If you don’t have good management that
will say, look, we have to not make money now so that we can make money
later... You have to have management to have the freedom, and the intellect
to make that call.9
Among smaller firms, if pay is lower and software is not the primary purpose of the
firm, then the antagonistic relationship is more likely to persist. Interview subjects I
interviewed, in line with the literature, accept lower pay and antagonistic relationships
with managers if they can gain experience to move to other firms.
The relationship to managers is just one of the relationships the above quotes highlight.
The other is the relationship to technologies, specifically, the use of using code to write
code. This generally comes in the forms of libraries and higher languages. The networked
nature and inter-operable ideals of the fourth period allow for software workers to
leverage APIs (Application Program Interface) so that software programs can interact
across computers even if they run different hardware architectures, run different operating
systems, run different software, and are physically separated. Firms like Amazon, Google,
and Microsoft leverage this set of relationships to provide cloud infrastructure and cloud
services. Microsoft licenses access to a set of machine-learning APIs so that software
9

Austin developer at an SME. Interview, 11/03/2015, D13, transcript.
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workers can integrate machine-learning algorithms into desktops, laptops, and mobile
devices that do not have the computing power to themselves run the computationally
heavy machine-learning programs.
Software workers can use this cloud infrastructure, cloud services, and open machinelearning libraries, like Google’s TensorFlow – a fifth generation language used in combination with python for machine-learning – to aid in software production. Software workers
use this set of technologies for a wide variety of tasks. One interviewee corroborated the
use of a software product internally within their firm that used machine-learning to assign
programming tasks to the software workers on their team based on their productivity,
skills, and deadlines. During a code sprint planning, when software workers and their
managers assess software goals for the next two- to four-week10 period, then divide their
desired output into divisible tasks, they use the machine-learning algorithm to provide
initial assignments. During the code sprint, the software alerts the entire team if the team
is not projected to complete the code sprint on-time and the team will then either revise
their goals, work harder, or hire a temporary contractor.11 This is the same interviewee
that was explaining important aspects of a good manager and later stated that his current
manager was the best manager he had. In context of the manager above which stated that
his job was to make sure that his developers were always coding, this logic is obvious:
as soon as a software worker completes their assigned and verifies its functionality, the
machine-learning software will assign a new tasks based on that particular workers skills
and the the rest of the team. In one sense, even, one might carry the argument further
and argue that this application deskills the manager.
Two of the most popular tasks for machine-learning are for image classification and
behavior modeling; core components for providing driving instructions to self-driving
10

Code sprints vary in length, based on the decisions made internally within the team, but this is a
typical length
11
Austin developer at an SME. Interview, 11/03/2015, D13, transcript.
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cars and, more importantly, self-driving freight trucks. These vehicles take thousands
of pictures per minute, send them to an image classification system that identifies its
surroundings, speeds of other cars, and curves in the road, then passes these to a the
behavior modeler to determine the next course of action. This specific application,
again, deskills those who sell their labor to drive. The broad development of machinelearning deskills software workers that were using other methods because of the increased
productivity of software workers – measured by the time needed to development a set of
hardware instructions – using machine-learning. When software workers use machinelearning, or other forms of software automation, they don’t perceive their actions as
automating their own work, or even other software workers, but instead as providing new
capabilities. These new capabilities are the process which deskill other software workers,
requiring that software workers reskill themselves with the latest library, technology, or
high-level language. I continue this discussion in Chapter 6 to show how certain types of
software occupations are more vulnerable to these processes of deskilling.
4.7

Conclusion

This chapter broadly sought to understand the nature and extent of software production
activity since the formal development of the software occupation in 1970. I asked three
specific questions:
1. What is the extent of software production activity in the US?
2. In what ways has software production activity changed in the US since 1970?
3. What is the relationship between software production activity and larger circuits of
production?
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To understand the extent of software production activity in the US, I used occupation
and industry data from the US Census and the ACS across six periods between 1970 and
2015 provided by the IPUMS USA. This chapter has shown that software production is
best understood as labor in the extension of technical management that spreads across
productive activities. That is, software production, like management or clerical work, is
best understood as a laboring activity that is integral in new and established production
processes of industries ranging from health care, food production, biotechnology, finance,
education, extractive industries, and so on. I show the results of this work in Table
4.7 and Figure 4.3. Software workers are in every industry as of 2011–2015 data, and
have been since 2000. Further, since 2000, there are over 12 industries were software
occupations make up significant portions of the industry’s labor force. I also showed
that software workers were 0.35% in 1970 and that the 4.3 million software workers in
2011–2015 comprise 2.66% of the labor force. By showing that software workers produce
software across industries as a integral component of capitalism, I demonstrated that
scholars must reject the ease of identifying one or more software “industries” or sectors
to understand software production. Drawing boundaries around software production
activity by using “industry” as a unit of analysis excludes software production in other
industries. Further, an industry definition would miss prolific examples of firms like
Amazon and Uber. Is Amazon a wholesale distributor or the dominant online US
retailer and cloud infrastructure provider? Is Uber a car-sharing service or a software app?
One would miss the vast array of software workers inside these firms using an industry
definition.
To determine the ways software production has changed in the US since 1970, I return
to the IPUMS USA data and combine it with interview data and historical research.
Through interview and historical research I extend and elaborate on a framework of
software periods in Table 4.1. Further, I showed how a fourth period of software is in the
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making. Interview data confirmed these periods and informed the current, fourth, period.
One veteran developer in Portland, formerly of Seattle, put the last three periods in his
own words.
There’s really been three moments of software. The transition, in the 1980s,
from scratch programming to object-oriented programming [1970s and 1980s,
object-oriented emerged in 1972 out of Xeroc PARC]. The transition from
installed to web-based software – you know from burning CDs and floppy
disks to software housed on the internet ... and the movement to the mobile
and cloud, even before the iPhone, maybe with Windows CE [1990s and
early-2000s, web gains popularity in early 1990, Windows CE introduced
1996]. ... Then ... there’s three big things, technologies or platforms, right
now that could really drive the next moment, they’re all emerging, and have
been ‘emerging’ for a long time: IoT, machine learning, and augmented reality
[late-2000s onward].12
This chapter showed that the fourth period draws on the connected nature of personal
devices, web/mobile apps, and cloud computing. I show that each of the software periods
represent the profit cycles of firms that heavily rely on software during that time, some of
which are able to reconfigure themselves across periods – like IBM’s transition between the
contractor period and the corporate software period but decline in the mass-market period,
or Microsoft’s transition between the mass-market period and the cloud/mobile period.
Interview data and historical research document the changing software technologies,
language generations, and automation across periods. I detailed the workplace changes
across each period along with changing nature of labor dynamics, noting the capital
12

Portland veteran developer. Interview, 10/01/2016, D19, transcript.

119

relationship go from machinofacture to post-Foridst with evidence of computational
flexibility.
From Table 4.4, I show that between 1980–1990 and 1990-2000 a significant growth
period for software production activity provides the labor force for the diffusion of
software production activity and mass-market software. More specifically, that 1990 and
2000 are the only observations that the number of software laborers more than doubled.
Using a modified coefficient of localization, I showed that 2000 had the highest rate
of software worker diffusion across industries, and that the dotcom bust in 2000 had
lasting impacts on software workers’ industry composition. Despite an overall trend
toward diffusion in 4.7, after 2000, software workers began to concentrate in information,
insurance, and business based industries. Primary and secondary interview data show the
persistent attempt by management to rationalize the labor of software workers, but new
software technologies deskill software workers and render management rationalizations
out of date.
To address the final question, the relationship between software production activity
and larger circuits of production, I introduce capitalist variants and industrial districts to
the discussion of software periods and profit cycles. Figure 4.1 documents this relationship.
With the introduction of capitalist variants, I argue that software production’s four
periods have a direct relationship to capital’s historical variants. I show that two characteristics of software enable the microcosm of software production activity within capitalism
to mimic these larger structural shifts in a short amount of time. First, the production of
software requires existing software, facilitating the rapid historical trajectory of what software is available and what values become codified in the software. Second, the capacity for
a capitalist to change the functioning of machinery in pursuit of profit increases because
the capitalist no longer must build a new physical machine. The “low-materiality” of
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software allows the capitalist to reconfigure the digital machine by changing the software.
With the right knowledge, changing a few lines of code can significantly reconfigure the
digital machine. Changing the entire codebase can reconfigure the digital machine in
totality. The low-materiality and ease of reconfiguring software increases competition
between capitalists because of a heightened sensitivity between profit computing time,
accelerating the need to develop new software efficiencies and innovations. Competitive
pressures and faster rates of software development accelerates the falling rate of profit,
creating additional competitive pressures, requiring faster software, and accelerating the
flow capital along capital circuits. I conclude, then, that if software rapidly developed
along historical variants of capitalist production, then software’s emerging relationships
may provide insights into the future forms of capital production outside of software. The
form and changes within software production activities may be prototypical for other
types of production and its respective restructuring, geographies, and divisions of labor.
With the introduction of industrial districts, I argue that each of these periods has
specific profit cycles and industrial district formations. While I introduce broad geographical shifts in this chapter, the next chapter analyzes the regional character of software
production. I then examine three industrial districts to contribute back to the discussion
on of the role of industrial districts in software periods, profit cycles, and capitalist
variants.
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5 Variegated Technopoles, Production, Wages

Rapidly growing regions exhibit distinct varieties of industrial
district structure.
Gray, Golob, and Markusen 1996, 651

Contrary to common wisdom, high technology varies
dramatically from place to place.
Cortright and Mayer 2001, 2

If each local labor market represents a unique geographic
conjuncture of labor market processes, it follows that the
institutional form of the wage-employment relationship ... also
will take on a locally distinctive character.
Peck 1996, 110

5.1

Introduction

Software traces its genealogy through the places, industries, firms, and workers of semiconductor and computer manufacturing. Software operation, after all, relies on the
semiconductors in computers to operate. The first high-level software languages separated
the skills needed for software production from that of hardware design and engineering.
As Kraft put it, “high-level languages make it unnecessary for programmers to be quasi
[hardware] engineers” (1979, 146). This initial separation is the foundation for new
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forms of production specific to software. That is, software production began to require
the use of software for software development, testing, and deployment – requiring new
skills, inputs, firm structures, and spatial arrangements. Programmers, along with other
software occupations that I document in this chapter, began an uneasy relationship both
producing software and relying on it for production.
The history of software places its origins in regions like New York, Route 128, and Silicon Valley. As both computing hardware and software production matured and separated,
software production became less dependent on the regions with hardware production
agglomerations – whether concentration of semiconductor chip design or computer manufacturing more broadly. While software and hardware remain inextricably linked, new
high-level languages continue to abstract software development away from hardware and
even lower-level languages. The continued weakening of the interdependency between
software production and hardware production suggests a continued weakening of the
regional co-location of software production and hardware production.
This chapter seeks to understand the regions of software production. Addressing the
changes above, this chapters asks:
1. How does software production activity vary between region?
2. What are the industrial district formations of software production in Seattle, Washington, Portland, Oregon, and Austin, Texas?
3. What are the regional outcomes, via occupational structures and income distribution of software workers, of regionally specific modes of software production?
This chapter builds on the idea that second-tier cities, as dubbed by Markusen, DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee (1999), play important roles in regional economic development and
in shaping the global circuits of production. Silicon Valley, comprised of the metropolitan
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areas of San Francisco and San Jose, has long been the dominant region for software
production. Software production in second-tier cities – like Seattle, Portland, and Austin
– continually challenge and compete with Silicon Valley for dominance. Between each
software period, second-tier cities (regions) provide locational windows (Storper and
Walker 1989b), new regional locations that may unseat Silicon Valley’s dominance.
Software production’s low-materiality affords rapid cycles of development. Thus, as
firms and workers in second-tier regions develop new software, new forms of regionally
specific software development emerge. This chapter argues that second-tier regions have regionally specific modes of production and that these regions may exhibit differences along
forces of production (technologies, skill-sets, labor markets), social relations (class-based
firm-worker relationships), and/or spatial organizations (industrial district formations).
In this chapter, I trace the shifting geography of software production across US
metropolitan areas (metros) since 1970. I use interview data to interrogate the relationships between regional outcomes and the technologies and production methods used in
three specific second-tier regions: Seattle, Washington; Portland, Oregon; and Austin,
Texas. Then, combining interview data and software occupation data, I construct industrial district types to understand the three regions’ industrial structures, relationships
with other regional software agglomerations, and relationships with one another.
First, in the section that follows, I document regional software agglomerations since
1970. In the second section, I combine this historical context and interview data to
compare and contrast the industrial districts and structures of Seattle, Portland, and
Austin. In the last section, I show how differences in industrial structures yield different
regional occupational structures and income distributions.
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5.2

Regional Differentiation of Software Occupations

In 4, I showed how software production activity spans multiple industries and is, therefore, best measured through software production labor. To identify and differentiate
regional software agglomerations, this section measures software production labor in US
metros since 1970. Two methodological issues have hindered research in this area. First,
researchers must use boundaries to define metro regions, but government agencies change
these definitions over time. The US Census Bureau defines metro by grouping counties
together, and while county boundaries are relatively stable, metros tend to absorb counties as the region grows and commute patterns in and around the area change. Second,
scholars need access to US Census Bureau data where cross-tabulations are possible, and
the only source offering this flexibility – the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS) – comes at the cost of geographical comparability. IPUMS cross-tabulations
allow scholars to determine, for example, the number of software laborers and the laborers’ race/ethnicity, while other sources limit researchers to either the number of software
laborers or the laborers’ race/ethnicity. The geographies provided by the IPUMS are in
special geographies called Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) for 1990 and later and
county groups for 1970 and 1980. The geography types are not only inconsistent, but the
geographies themselves change with each Census and do not nest with the US Census
Bureau definitions of metropolitan areas.
Appendix A documents a novel approach to provide consistent cross-tabulations at
the metro level since 1970. At a high level, this method assigns a portion of a PUMA
geography’s population to its overlapping metro area according to the US Census Bureau’s
2013 definitions. For each 10-year Census period and PUMA geography period, the
proportion of PUMA’s population living within the metro area determines the portion
of a PUMA’s population assigned to its corresponding metro area. In this calculation, the
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US Census census-tract-level population for each period (for example, 1970 census-tract
populations for the 1970 dataset, and the 2010 census-tract population for the ACS 20052009 and ACS 2011–2015) determines the distribution of a PUMA’s population. The result
is a crosswalk for the IPUMS PUMA-based data and corresponding US metropolitan
areas for four US Census time periods – 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 – and two recent
American Community Survey samples – 2005-2009 and 2011–2015. The research in this
chapter focuses on the 51 US metros with 2010 US Census populations of over 1 million
residents (large metros).
I leverage this method to calculate the largest metro agglomerations of software
workers for the six time periods noted above. Interested in large software agglomerations,
I present the largest 25 in Table 5.1. Seeking to narrow the scope, I then identify
regions that have large shares of software workers. Table 5.2 shows the 15 largest metro
agglomerations of software workers by share of the metro labor force over the same six
time periods. Both tables contain summary statistics for all 51 large metros and the entire
US. The three cases selected in this dissertation – Seattle, Portland, and Austin – are listed
in bold in with rankings outside of the top 22 or 15 noted at the bottom of the respective
table. Arrows in Table 5.2 document significant changes among case regions or their
change in respective ranking.
Tracking the number of software workers in Table 5.1 during the 1970s appears almost
unremarkable. The largest 8 metropolitan areas take up the first 8 largest regional software
Table 5.1: Next page. Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al.
2015) representing the 1970 Census, 1980 Census, 1990 Census, 2000 Census, ACS 2005-2009, and ACS
2011–2015. The definition for large metros matches the 2013 definition of US Census Core Base Statistical
Areas (formerly Metropolitan Statistical Areas) whose 2010 US Census population was over 1 million
persons (large metros, n = 51). The IPUMS variable OCC2010 provides occupation classification and
historically codes occupations based on a 2010 occupation definition. Software occupations include codes
110, 1000, 1010, 1020, 1050, 1060, 1100, 1200, 1220. Software occupations in Public Administration and
Active Duty Military are not used due to historical comparability (codes 900 and over).
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1970

000s

Metro

1980
000s

Metro

1990
000s

NYC
39.0
NYC
63.4
NYC
131.7
LA
22.7
LA
32.2
LA
71.4
Chicago
16.9
Chicago
26.5
DC
60.3
Philadelphia
10.5
DC
22.4
Chicago
55.6
Boston
9.9
Boston
19.2
Boston
45.1
DC
9.6
Philadelphia
18.9
Dallas
40.8
SF
8.2
SF
14.4
Philadelphia
39.0
Detroit
7.5
San Jose
13.0
SF
38.9
San Jose
6.0
Dallas
12.6
San Jose
31.8
MSP
5.9
Houston
12.5
Houston
26.5
Houston
5.9
MSP
12.4
MSP
26.0
St. Louis
5.2
Detroit
11.8
Atlanta
25.3
Dallas
4.8
Seattle
9.9
Seattle
25.2
Pittsburgh
4.7
Atlanta
8.6
Detroit
24.9
Cleveland
4.4
Hartford
7.6
Baltimore
16.9
Seattle
4.3
Denver
6.7
San Diego
16.5
Atlanta
4.0
St. Louis
6.6
St. Louis
15.9
Rochester
3.8
Pittsburgh
6.3
Denver
15.7
Baltimore
3.7
San Diego
6.0
Miami
14.9
Hartford
3.0
Miami
5.8
Hartford
14.1
KS City
3.0
Baltimore
5.2
Phoenix
13.8
Cincinnati
2.8
Phoenix
5.0
Pittsburgh
11.4
Milwaukee
2.7
Cleveland
4.7
Cincinnati
10.3
San Diego
2.2
Cincinnati
4.5
Columbus
10.1
Indianapolis
2.1
Rochester
4.2
Cleveland
10.0
Selected metros not in the top 25 when ranking among metros over 1 million persons:
36 Portland
1.0
28 Portland
3.7
27 Portland
8.8
46 Austin
0.5
30 Austin
3.2
28 Austin
8.7
Large metros (n = 51)
– median
2.0
4.0
9.8
– total
218.2
397.7
947.7
National
291.0
540.0
1,289.0

Metro

2000
NYC
DC
Chicago
LA
SF
Dallas
Boston
Atlanta
Philadelphia
San Jose
Seattle
MSP
Houston
Detroit
Denver
Phoenix
Miami
St. Louis
Baltimore
San Diego
Austin
Portland
KS City
Columbus
Tampa

Metro

27.7
2,419.4
3,294.4

286.0
155.2
140.4
133.0
113.7
111.1
108.6
87.7
86.3
81.3
72.1
67.1
61.8
57.1
55.4
45.4
42.1
39.8
39.7
37.5
33.8
30.2
29.8
29.6
28.3

000s

2009
NYC
DC
LA
Chicago
Dallas
SF
Boston
Atlanta
Seattle
Philadelphia
San Jose
MSP
Houston
Phoenix
Denver
Detroit
San Diego
Baltimore
Miami
St. Louis
Austin
Portland
KS City
Columbus
Tampa

Metro

30.5
2,620.2
3,618.3

286.8
173.0
143.2
140.2
112.5
110.1
102.9
99.0
94.6
92.5
80.2
76.1
67.9
56.0
55.5
55.2
47.6
46.6
45.7
44.1
43.9
36.5
36.4
35.7
33.8

000s

Table 5.1: Metro software agglomerations by year, number of software workers, 1970–2015.
2015
NYC
DC
LA
Chicago
SF
Dallas
Seattle
Boston
Atlanta
Philadelphia
San Jose
MSP
Houston
Denver
Phoenix
Detroit
Baltimore
Austin
Miami
San Diego
St. Louis
Portland
Columbus
Tampa
Raleigh

Metro

40.2
3,095.3
4,245.0

317.6
195.0
158.8
158.5
146.6
138.7
119.9
118.8
115.2
106.9
102.6
89.5
85.2
67.9
66.7
58.0
55.7
54.9
54.8
52.8
49.5
43.4
42.7
42.4
41.7

000s
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1970

000s

%

Metro

1980
000s

%

Metro

1990
000s

Large metros (n = 51)
– mean
0.25
– median
2.0
0.25
– total
218.2 0.30
National
291.0
0.21
4.0
397.7
540.0

0.42
0.37
0.46
0.33

9.8
947.7
1,289.0

San Jose
6.0
0.79
San Jose
13.0 1.29
San Jose
31.8
Rochester
3.8
0.46
Hartford
7.6 0.97
Raleigh
8.5
MSP
5.9
0.45
DC
22.4
0.82
DC
60.3
DC
9.6 0.44
Austin
3.2 0.80
Hartford
14.1
LA
22.7
0.39
Raleigh
1.9 0.69
Boston
45.1
SF
8.2 0.39
Boston
19.2 0.69
SF
38.9
Boston
9.9
0.39
MSP
12.4 0.67
Austin
8.7
Hartford
3.0 0.39
Seattle
9.9 0.64
Seattle
25.2
NYC
39.0 0.35
SF
14.4 0.61
Dallas
40.8
Houston
5.9
0.35
Denver
6.7 0.58
MSP
26.0
Seattle
4.3 0.34
NYC
63.4 0.55
Denver
15.7
Atlanta
4.0 0.33
Dallas
12.6 0.54
Rochester
8.4
KS City
3.0 0.31
Rochester
4.2 0.54
NYC
131.7
Chicago
16.9 0.31
Houston
12.5 0.51
Atlanta
25.3
St. Louis
5.2
0.30
Philadelphia 18.9
0.51
Philadelphia
39.0
Selected metros not in the top 15 when ranking among metros over 1 million persons:
28 Austin
0.5
0.24
24 PDX
3.7
0.39
27 PDX
8.8
44 PDX
1.0 0.11

Metro

0.90
0.80
0.97
0.71

20 PDX

0.77

30.2

81.3
27.7
155.2
113.7
33.8
108.6
55.4
72.1
67.1
111.1
87.7
21.3
29.6
17.9
286.0

000s

27.7
2,419.4
3,294.4

2000
San Jose
Raleigh
DC
SF
Austin
Boston
Denver
Seattle
MSP
Dallas
Atlanta
Hartford
Columbus
Rochester
NYC

Metro

2.65
2.03
1.81
1.65
1.47
1.43
1.33
1.30
1.28
1.25
1.19
1.11
1.06
1.04
0.99

%

2.11
1.83
2.23
1.65

2.06

6.27
4.46
4.12
3.83
3.47
3.39
3.25
3.15
2.77
2.77
2.66
2.51
2.33
2.29
2.18

%

17 PDX

36.5

80.2
173.0
94.6
30.5
110.1
43.9
102.9
76.1
55.5
35.7
22.0
99.0
36.4
46.6
112.5

000s

30.5
2,620.2
3,618.3

2009
San Jose
DC
Seattle
Raleigh
SF
Austin
Boston
MSP
Denver
Columbus
Hartford
Atlanta
KS City
Baltimore
Dallas

Metro

Table 5.2: Metro software agglomerations by year, share of labor force, , 1970–2015.

2.12
1.88
2.19
1.68

2.24

6.07
4.09
3.81
3.74
3.59
3.53
3.10
2.93
2.89
2.59
2.50
2.43
2.38
2.36
2.33

%

San Jose
Seattle
Raleigh
DC
SF
Austin
Boston
Denver
MSP
Baltimore
Hartford
Dallas
KS City
PDX
Richmond

Metro

40.2
3,095.3
4,245.0

102.6
119.9
41.7
195.0
146.6
54.9
118.8
67.9
89.5
55.7
26.0
138.7
40.3
43.4
23.1

2015
000s

2.36
2.22
2.44
1.92

7.21
4.49
4.25
4.21
4.14
3.79
3.46
3.24
3.13
2.74
2.66
2.58
2.55
2.55
2.53

%

Table 5.2: Previous page. Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek,
et al. 2015) representing the 1970 Census, 1980 Census, 1990 Census, 2000 Census, ACS 2005-2009, and ACS
2011–2015. The definition for large metros matches the 2013 definition of US Census Core Base Statistical
Areas (formerly Metropolitan Statistical Areas) whose 2010 US Census population was over 1 million
persons (large metros, n = 51). The IPUMS variable OCC2010 provides occupation classification and
historically codes occupations based on a 2010 occupation definition. Software occupations include codes
110, 1000, 1010, 1020, 1050, 1060, 1100, 1200, 1220. Software occupations in Public Administration and
Active Duty Military are not used due to historical comparability (codes 900 and over). Arrows highlight
significant change ranking of case regions.

agglomerations, almost in exact order, Detroit having the lowest number of software
workers of this group, despite being the fifth largest US metro in 1970. With a couple
exceptions, the list of software agglomerations corresponds approximately to metro region
size. San Jose’s appearance after Detroit, in 1970, however, suggests that, despite the
region’s metro population of around 1 million, the city already had the beginnings of
a software agglomeration. Notably, Rochester and Hartford appear on the list despite
having small metro populations. The list places Portland and Austin among the smallest
software agglomerations, having 1,500 software workers between the two regions.
With Boston, San Francisco, and San Jose – the subjects of work by Saxenian (1996) –
remaining consistent, one might overlook a small number of important changes between
1970 and 1990. The growth of software occupations in Washington DC catapults the
region behind only Los Angeles and New York in 1970 and behind only New York from
2000 onward. Sun Belt and West Coast regions, like Phoenix, Seattle, and San Diego,
all rise in relative rankings. Regions like Philadelphia, Detroit, and Rochester all fall in
relative rankings. Hartford rises in relative rankings, then falls and drops off the list by
2000. While some of these changes can match to larger, national changes in population
and migration dynamics, military and government contracting play a role, giving Dallas,
DC, and San Jose significant positional advantage over their peers in the 1950s and 1960s.
IBM’s dominance in hardware and software during the 1950s and 1960s also propels
Hartford and Rochester on this list during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Rochester makes
129

its only appearance on this list in 1980, and Hartford makes its last appearance in 2000 –
coinciding with the decline of Bell Laboratories, the decline of Xerox, and IBM’s decision
to outsource its operating system to Microsoft.
Minneapolis–St. Paul (Minneapolis) and Houston remain in the relative middle
of the list. Both regions had significant computer manufacturing and became anchororganizations as the region shifted toward software production. In Minneapolis, Honeywell Computers was an anchor-firm, and IBM opened its Rochester, Minnesota (not
Rochester, New York as listed in the table) production facility which partnered with the
University of Minnesota to develop IBM’s Blue Gene, once the world’s fastest supercomputer. When Honeywell and IBM declined in the region, Minneapolis’s hardware and
software workers, with help from a new local technology coalition, partnered with the
medical industry and academic research and development (Slaughter and Rhoades 1996).
This allowed Minneapolis to maintain its software agglomeration. Similarly, Compaq
started in Houston, and was perhaps the most successful direct competitor to IBM. Because of their similar Intel architecture and software compatibility, Compaq computers
were able to emulate IBM computers and run software that had been designed for IBM
computers. Compaq’s growth over the next two decades led to its acquisition of the
Boston-based Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC). Compaq/DEC had, at its height,
over 140,000 employees worldwide. Silicon Valley-based Hewlett-Packard purchased
Compaq/DEC in 2002, shifting production to its own facilities and retiring the brand.
Throughout the 1980s, Houston leaders and the Texas Division of Economic Development, sought industrial diversification to avoid Houston’s reliance on oil. Through public
and private funding, Texas government, Houston government, and local elites poured
money into attracting external firms and expanding local research in energy, biotechnology, space enterprises, and international business services. The investment made in
Houston – when its software agglomeration was healthy – allowed the city to retain its
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software workers as they worked in other industries (Feagin 1988).
Houston and Minneapolis software workers were able to move from hardware industries, as the computing and semiconductor industries consolidated and restructured, to
other complementary industries after 1990. Even Boston’s status on this list – maintaining
a steady fifth place from 1970 to 1990, then a steady seventh/eighth place for the period
2000-2015 – suggests a similar story despite the story of Route 128 from Saxenian (1983).
As early anchor-firms of Route 128 declined and lost out to San Jose and San Francisco,
other institutions, like Massachusetts Institute of Technology, supplemented then replaced
the role of anchor-organization. Hartford and Rochester software workers were not able
to apply their skill-sets to other local industries and no anchor-organization provided
software jobs to replace those lost through the regional downsizing of Bell Laboratories,
Xerox, and IBM (Stanback 1985). The result for these two regions was a loss of relative
growth and ranking in software agglomerations.
Meanwhile, an emerging biotechnology industry and military/government contracting allowed DC to move up the list (Chapple et al. 2004; Cortright and Mayer 2001).
Similarly, Dallas, benefited from military and government contracting through its anchorfirm, Texas Instruments. The software agglomeration in Dallas grew tenfold between
1970 and 1990, more than any other metro on this list. Dallas continues to maintain a
strong software agglomeration, and Texas Instruments is still an anchor-firm in the region
(Stanback 1985). After 1990, other industries, like finance and insurance, employed large
numbers of software workers in the Dallas region.
Comparing the list of software agglomerations in 1970 to the list of software agglomerations in 2015, three observations are worth noting. First, software production activity
in 1970 appears evenly distributed across US metro regions with the exceptions noted
above. Second, regions with military and government contracts or those able to transition
software workers from one anchor-organization to another maintained or grew their
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software agglomerations relative to other metro regions. Third, the three time periods
starting in 2000 mark a distinct break from the previous three periods, documented in
Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3, as software spreads into other industries – and ultimately new
second-tier regions – because of the success of mass-market software of the 1990s and
2000s.
The purpose of Table 5.2 is to show the primacy of the software agglomerations
for large metro regions. The table reads as a typical list of software clusters across the
US. Metros with military or government contracts or IBM presence like Minneapolis,
Hartford, and Rochester dominate the 1970s and 1980s. By 2009 and 2015, Silicon Valley
(although, San Jose has been at the top of the list for the entire 45-year span), Seattle,
Research Triangle, and DC dominate the top of the list. These regional changes in
software agglomerations coincide with the four software periods in Table 4.1. The next
section will focus on the three case regions of this research, discuss their rise in both the
number of software workers and regional share of software workers, and interrogate their
modes of production.
5.3

Constructing an Industrial District Typology

In seeking to answer how software production activities vary between regions, the
previous section documented the varying levels of regional software activity and their
changes over time. This chapter seeks to better understand the rise, and relative success,
of three specific regions and their modes of production through interviews with workers,
managers, and key informants, further interrogation of the IPUMS data, and participantobservation at conferences in each region. I will then compare the inner-workings of each
region’s software production activity to its idealized industrial district typology from
Markusen (1996). I extend and improve on this stylized industrial district typology in 5.3
by contributing software-specific variances based on Campbell-Kelly (2004), S. D. Graham
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(2005), and Kitchin and Dodge (2011), primary interviews, participant-observation at
conferences, and other data presented in this and previous chapters.
The rest of this section will use the mixed-methods research mentioned above to
understand the software agglomerations of three regions: Seattle, Washington; Portland,
Oregon; and Austin, Texas. The stylized software districts presented in Table 5.3 are
just that: stylized. The types are hypothetical district configurations and each of the case
regions does not necessarily map onto each region. I note where are there are deviations
and seek to understand them. As a framework, they provide useful starting points for
understanding the dynamics of regional modes of software production and their regional
impacts. Markusen (1996) is quick to remind us that no region is a perfect match to
an industrial district type, and sometimes, as I’ll argue about Austin, a region may be
a mixture of two or more types – or may be in transition to a new type. In fact, as we
saw with Hartford in the previous section, the persistence of a region’s district may be in
jeopardy altogether.
5.3.1

Seattle, Washington: a classic hub-and-spoke software district

The Seattle region represents a classic hub-and-spoke industrial district structure. In
her book about industrial districts, Markusen (1996) uses Seattle as an example of a
hub-and-spoke region. The key characteristic for a hub-and-spoke region is that one or
more large vertically integrated firm(s) dominates a sector’s production in the region.
This anchor-organization, or the hub firm, dominates locally because of its stature in
external markets on national and international levels.
In Seattle, for instance, the economy is organized around Weyerhauser as the
dominant resource sector company, Boeing as the dominant industrial employer (commercial aircraft and military/spacecraft), Microsoft as the leading
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Moderate-high, within firm,
external acquisitions, capitalintensive

Development of automation
for external firms, use of
worker automation tools in development

Innovation

Automation

Development of automation
for firm and workers, use of automation tools in development

Moderate-high, within district via worker- or firmrelationships

3G+, prototyping & scalability
efficient, flexible specification,
interoperability

Marshallian

firm-

or

Use of external automation
tools, production-oriented

Low, external,
industry-based

Legacy, early 3G languages, external

Satellite-Industrial

Use of external automation
tools, some development

Moderate, internal to project,
capital-intensive

Mix of language generations,
stable, strong specification, external

State-Sponsored

Adapted from Markusen (1996), extended and updated with Campbell-Kelly (2004), S. D. Graham (2005), and Kitchin and Dodge (2011), primary
interviews, participant-observation at conferences, and the author’s calculations on data from the IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Alexander, et al. 2010).

3G+, deployment/to-market
efficient, strong specification,
custom, platform compatibility

Software

Hub-and-Spoke

Technological Dynamics

Idealized Software Industrial District Type

Table 5.3: Technological characteristics of software industrial districts.

services firm (software), the Hutchinson Cancer Center as the progenitor of
a series of biotechnology firms, and the Port of Seattle as the transportation
hub. (Markusen 1996, 32)
Seattle has several linked hub firms with global statures that span multiple industries,
and the region benefits directly from the presence of research activity at the University
of Washington. Boeing’s military orders for the Korean War and Cold War as well as
the success of its 707 jetliner required recruitment of engineers – and the University
of Washington’s expansion plan during the 1950s and 1960s aimed to address this demand (Abbott 1992). The University of Washington is where Bill Gates and Paul Allen
tested software programs written by engineers in exchange for access to the institution’s
mainframe computers.
Interestingly, the absence of successful semiconductor manufacturing differentiates
Seattle from other well-known software regions. Instead, the presence of Boeing paired
with the increasingly important technical aspects of aerospace may have given Seattle its
initial, moderately-sized software agglomeration. Investment in UW paired with Boeing’s
return to success spurred by the Vietnam War seeded Seattle’s software production. Today,
the Seattle region is home to two software titan hubs: Microsoft and Amazon. Redmond
is home to Microsoft’s headquarters, a suburban campus east of Seattle, and Seattle is
home to Amazon’s campus. Both firms have offices in the region’s three main cities:
Seattle, Bellevue, and Redmond.
Microsoft, founded in 1975, is the older of the two hub firms, but didn’t relocate to
suburban Seattle until 1978. Microsoft grew steadily in Seattle selling its BASIC programming software, but began rapid growth in 1980 with its purchase of Seattle Computer
Products’ Intel-based operating system SCP-OS, the re-branding of that operating system
to MS-DOS, and the resale of MS-DOS to IBM for shipment with all IBM computers
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(where it was re-branded again as IBM-DOS). Market exposure of MS-DOS, and the
ability to sell MS-DOS to other computer manufacturers, helped co-create a steady computing platform alongside Intel processors and Intel-compatible processors. Microsoft,
already with large market exposure, was able to innovate in operating systems and develop
software packages that would run on MS-DOS and later Windows during the commodity
period of software production. Microsoft’s success selling gaming platforms, and the
platforms’ cross-compatibility with Windows games, required Microsoft to invest in
cloud-computing capacity to enable online multi-player gaming.
Microsoft wasn’t alone in this endeavor; Seattle’s other titan hub, Amazon, would
also find itself pursuing cloud-computing. Founded in 1994, Amazon had a brief stint
in suburban Bellevue before moving to Seattle. After excelling in online book sales in
its first couple years, Amazon went public in 1997 and began an aggressive expansion
beyond books and into international markets a year later, becoming the dominant online
retailer surpassed only by Alibaba in China. Amazon moved into search, competing with
Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft in 2003, and later, in 2006, began offering cloud computing
and online storage services. Both of these services were core components of Amazon’s
online retail business: it needed to allow customers to search for products and it needed a
robust real-time solution to track the site’s rapid rate of online transactions. Amazon’s
cloud infrastructure was among the first offered as a product and rapidly became one of
the most popular. Amazon later hosted Twitter, enabling Twitter to scale as its user base
grew. Amazon’s most profitable segment is its web services, the umbrella for its entire
cloud infrastructure. In the first quarter of 2016, Amazon’s profit from its web services
was $604 million (Amazon.com 2016).
Today, both firms sell numerous other devices – including mobile phones, tablets,
and gaming platforms – and have ventured into emerging markets like machine learning,
augmented reality, and the smart home. Notably, both Microsoft and Amazon have
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invested significant capital in their cloud-computing infrastructures because cloud computing was complementary to their core business at the time, but they now both resell cloud
computing, cloud storage, and cloud-based machine-learning. The firms compete directly
with each other but have both been able to continue to be profitable and grow since the
market itself is still growing. In fact, Amazon’s cloud infrastructure has become its most
profitable market, even amid its dominance as an online retailer. Importantly for Seattle
software workers, cloud computing requires significant development and operations labor
aside from the labor demands of the firms’ other business ventures.
Table 5.4: Industrial composition of software workers in the Seattle region, ACS 2011–2015.

Largest 8 industries by share of software workers in the Seattle region by NAICS industry code
Industry

n

% of software labor

% of labor force

49,946

41.65%

1.39%

Electronic shopping

4,957

4.13%

0.14%

Software publishing

3,827

3.19%

0.11%

Aircraft and parts

3,716

3.10%

0.10%

Management, scientific and technical consulting
services

3,510

2.93%

0.10%

Aerospace products and parts

3,495

2.91%

0.10%

Other telecommunication services

3,175

2.65%

0.09%

Insurance carriers and related activities

2,858

2.38%

0.08%

Computer systems design and related services

Total number of software workers in labor force
Total number of workers in labor force

119,930
1,977,709

Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015) ACS 2011–2015.
Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1050, 1060, 1105, 1106,
1107, 1200, 1220. Industry determined using the NAICS industry classification for 2012.

The trajectory of Seattle’s software agglomeration is tied to Microsoft’s and Amazon’s
capacities to innovate and expand into new markets. In both Table 5.1 and Table 5.2,
there is not a single period where Seattle loses ground: relative to other metros, it has
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Figure 5.1: Stylized portrayal of Seattle’s software industrial district.

# large locally headquartered firm

2 branch office externally headquartered firm

# small local firm

7 government or university

grown both in raw numbers of software workers and in the share of software workers
in the labor force relative to other metros. Microsoft was hit hard by the dotcom bust
in the early 2000s. Windows remains the most popular operating system on desktop
computers despite its share continuing to decline, but it is far from the most popular
on mobile phones (Android) or server computers (Linux). While Microsoft’s growth
slowed as it reconfigured, Amazon’s transition and diversification from online retailer
to online services provider enabled the region to maintain its status and labor market.
Seattle benefited from Microsoft’s and Amazon’s ability to innovate and expand from
their original markets, and the coincidental timing of Microsoft’s lull and Amazon’s
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expansion.
Silicon Valley firms seek access to Seattle’s labor market. Google produces cloud- and
mobile-computing products in its large office in suburban Kirkland; Adobe produces its
InDesign and AfterEffects software products in Fremont, near Amazon’s new Seattle
headquarters; and T-Mobile’s US headquarters in Bellevue produces its mobile phone apps.
These production facilities leverage the local worker expertise, but as satellite locations,
have weak relationships with local hub firms.
Local governments unanimously support the hub firms and their complementary
sectors. The municipalities of Seattle, Bellevue, and Redmond have worked independently
with Microsoft, Amazon, and T-Mobile around infrastructure projects, transportation
planning, and tax incentives. Seattle’s hub firms seek high economies of scale in production, maximizing the reach of their software or websites, focusing on mass-exposure.
Small spoke firms in the region are dependent on the success of the hub firms, and there
is little infrastructure for risk-sharing among software firms in the region. Specialized
external services exist for each firm for financing through the stock market, international
business consulting, and management training. The success of spinoffs, like Expedia,
and startups, like RealNetworks, ushered in venture capital funding in the mid-2000s
(Markoff, Market, and Bridge 2008). This secured access to capital for a small ecosystem
of startup firms with minor working relationships with Amazon and/or Microsoft but
that may include former employees who used the Amazon or Microsoft technologies in
building their own software.
The Seattle region has grown, experiencing high rates of in-migration from within the
US and internationally (Jurjevich and Schrock 2014). It has become a place for unskilled
labor to become skilled and to enter the local labor market, creating another pipeline for
Microsoft and Amazon.
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I learned English and how to program at community college. It was easier to
learn C... I transferred to Georgia Tech to get my degree... I didn’t really ever
talk to anyone there, but I moved to Seattle to do Microsoft Certification and
got a job at Microsoft. It’s what I always wanted to do.13
At the same time, Seattle firms hire experienced international workers.
I worked for three years at a IT firm in India. We weren’t making software
of our own, we were making software for our clients ... the quality of work
wasn’t what I wanted to do. I had heard from friends and relatives about the
kind of work you do here [at Amazon]. I decided to pursue my masters in
the states... then I applied to Amazon.14
Microsoft and Amazon dominate the regional labor market, and each firm has its
own internal labor market. Some employees go from one firm to another, and four
interviewees in Seattle had experiences working in other regions with large software
agglomerations.
It’s common. A good one third of the people I work with [one of Seattle’s
large firms] a good one-third have worked at [the other large firm]. A lot of
workers at [large firm] went to Silicon Valley, a lot come back.
Workers are connected through exchange, and not necessarily through events that are
standard practice in other regions like informal co-hacking events (often branded as
meetups, sometimes user groups).
What’s a meetup? ... oh well, those kinds of events happen informally inside
the different groups, plus we have the [customer facing developer event]. I
13
14

Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 11/19/2015, D29, transcript.
Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/27/2016, D27, transcript.
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don’t go, but I encourage all my developers to go... I thought user groups
were just for open source.15
Another product manager, when asked about meetups, explained that the utility of
meetups was not for skill-building.
I’ve been to one but that one was organized by a friend, and I was kinda, sorta
looking for another job. I think one of the reasons that Microsoft employees
don’t go to meetups as much is because they mostly happen in the heart
of Seattle, and Amazon is there. They fit the culture of Amazon better –
Amazon churns through new college grads.16
And yet, another software developer, working remotely for a large Florida company,
laments the lack of local relationships between software workers.
When I travel for work, I love going to meetups. There’s just not the setup to
do it, and traffic, and we have to go from the eastside to Seattle or vice-versa.17
Workers gain formal experience through certification or internal training. Microsoft
has long had a strong connection with the UW and later connected with Bellevue
Community College (now Bellevue State College) to develop its Microsoft software
certification program to generate local skill. Microsoft also has an extensive internal
training program. Amazon does not have a similar external training program but does
provide time to workers to learn on their own and has internal software and business
courses.18 Both firms have been scrutinized for their labor practices. The region has
strong labor orientation (Van Jaarsveld 2004). The oldest hub firms in the region are in
15

Seattle principal at a large firm. Interview, 11/20/2015, D30, transcript.
Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/01/2016, D24, transcript.
17
Seattle developer at a large external firm. Interview, 10/04/2016, D25, transcript.
18
SSeattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/27/2016, D27, transcript.
16
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the forestry and fishing industries and have strong labor movement histories. Boeing,
younger than its extractive industry counterparts, also has a strong history of labor
organizing.
When Microsoft began hiring programmers on a temporary or agency basis, denying
access to the employee stock purchase plan, employees sued and began an effectively
unsuccessful unionization effort. Filed in 1992, however, the lawsuit wasn’t settled
until 2000, when Microsoft agreed to pay $92 million in damages (Van Jaarsveld 2004).
Microsoft instituted new rules around temporary workers but has since moved away from
this practice.19 In 2016, The New York Times featured an article with over 30 interviews
of Amazon office employees (as opposed to warehouse employees), documenting the high
expectations and unforgiving workplace (Kantor and Streitfeld 2015). Yet only one of
those interviews was with a software worker, one who left the company in 2006. The
exchange fueled a series of posts between Amazon leadership and the newspaper’s editors.
Amazon attempted to boost morale after the initial article by extending parental leave to
six weeks.20
Amazon and Microsoft software workers, as opposed to other office workers, were
aware of the article, but agreed that the team they worked for was demanding but
rewarding.
I like it a lot. It’s demanding. It’s more intellectual.21
The company is exploding. There are a lot of growing pains ... there are really
high expectations.22
One employee compared the two cultures.
19

Seattle product manager at a large firm. Interview, 10/01/2016, D23, transcript.
Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/01/2016, D24, transcript.
21
Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/27/2016, D27, transcript.
22
Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/19/2016, D26, transcript.
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They’re different vibes. Seattle is more ... mature. People have lives and more
perspective. Yet the work is hard, but we also know that overwork isn’t ...
it doesn’t translate to a better product. I don’t give my developers a lot of
pressure, but I know they know my high expectations. It’s very different than
how we used to operate.23
As a hub-and-spoke region, the technological practices fit with expectation. The firms
value stability and compatibility with existing platforms and products.
For my team it’s about adopting modern engineering techniques and adopting
best practices. We don’t care about the latest ruby framework.24
New software, new tools, and new software libraries are still important. Workers benefit
by introducing new software and demonstrating its compatibility with the existing
platform. This also provides job security for that individual worker.
The pressures ... you absolutely need to stay up to date ... you need to know
the kinds of questions a potential candidate might ask you, and you need to
know the language a candidate might solve a problem with... If you propose
a better way of doing it, you’ll stand out. If you propose a new way, you
should know it. And you’ll be in charge of it if it’s successful.25
Front-end web development changes at a faster rate than back-end operating system or
cloud infrastructure. Developers working on the online portions of hub-and-spoke firms
are still exposed to the technical churn.
Look man, I work in [****ing] front-end. My skills are outdated every
three months. Today it’s in node.js, I learn it, then it’s Angular, I learn it,
23

Seattle principal at a large firm. Interview, 11/20/2015, D30, transcript.
Seattle product manager at a large firm. Interview, 10/01/2016, D23, transcript.
25
Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/27/2016, D27, transcript.
24
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then it’s some other stupid technology with another stupid name... then we
reconfigure the team to do ... front-end and back-end more and more.26
This quote also reveals that while they create software to automate tasks in other firms,
managers also use software libraries to improve efficiency in their own workforce. Developers throughout my Seattle interviews echoed the expectation to use code to produce
better code or to produce code more efficiently. In the previous chapter, a product
manager even explained that the ideal programming candidate exhibits these behaviors.
The region is inextricably tied to Microsoft and Amazon and their engagements in
emerging markets. The software agglomeration benefits from the continued support from
UW, small spoke firms, and branch locations of firms like Adobe. The dominance of
the two hub firms suggests a growth and innovation pattern based on capital-intensive
acquisition. One developer worked at a company when it was acquired by a Seattle firm
and chose to move to Seattle. Moving into new markets necessitated the adoption of new
technologies, both emerging as important market makers in the fourth software period.
At the same time, Microsoft and Amazon continually acquire new firms to protect their
core business.
5.3.2

Portland, Oregon: a Marshallian software district

With its plethora of small- and medium-sized software firms and its well-connected
software workers who work for both local and external firms, the Portland region
represents a Marshallian Marshallian industrial district structure. Researchers not located
in Portland may skip over the region when reviewing software agglomerations, especially
if evaluating the region on the 2009 or 2015 data in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. Even in
1970 and 1980, the region may appear unremarkable in measures of software production
activity. Portland and Austin have similar sized software agglomerations through the
26

Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/01/2016, D24, transcript.
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2000s, but Austin’s software agglomeration begins to grow faster relative to other regions
in 2015.
Portland stands out for two other important reasons. First, among the 51 metros over
with populations over a million in 1970, Portland had a small software agglomeration by
count of software workers (36th) and a small agglomeration as a share of its workforce
(44th). Since then, the software agglomeration in Portland, like Seattle, performed
better relative to its peers in every period. As of 2015, Portland has the 22nd largest
software agglomeration and the 14th highest share of its workforce in software production
activities. Surprisingly, this rise comes without capital investment from government or
local institutions of higher-education. Portland has a high-tech hardware agglomeration,
but it has been historically separate from software production activity. Researchers
embedded in Portland might also point to the second reason. In the 2000s, Portland
gained a reputation among software workers for being open-source – the opposite of
Seattle’s proprietary-software hub firm, Microsoft. Portland became of the home of
Linus Torvalds, the creator and (at the time) principal developer of the Linux kernel,
the core to all Linux-based operating systems. Torvalds was an important figure in this
time period, as Linux became the operating system of choice for internet and cloud-based
servers. Portland was also where Ward Cunningham, the inventor of the idea of the
“wiki,” most famously used in Wikipedia, developed the idea. Alongside other events in
the region, this orientation toward openness and interconnectedness helped Portland’s
software agglomeration grow, albeit slowly, without the common ignition ingredients of
other software agglomerations.
The roots of the Silicon Forest, however, go back even further to the 1930s
and 1940s when a handful of electronics firms and a radio research facility
located in the area. (Mayer 2012, 79)
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Founded in Portland in 1946, Tektronix quickly became the world’s foremost
supplier of oscilloscopes. It had a dominant market share for what at the
time was a critical piece of technology for designing, manufacturing, and
servicing, all manner of electronic devices, including computers. Tektronix
was very profitable, and plowed much of its profit back into new product
development and design, in the process attracting and retaining a cadre of
talented engineers. (Cortright and Mayer 2000, 9)
In 1944, Douglas Strain founded Electro Scientific Industries (ESI, originally Brown
Engineering) in Portland’s southeast. In 1953, Strain and three engineers invested a small
amount of money into the firm. A focus on quality and frugality propelled the firm
to create respected and inexpensive resistance-measuring instruments that were needed
for manufacturing. Portland was unwilling to work with ESI to find suitable land with
the city limits at the time. As a result, ESI moved to a science park in the suburban
Washington County, where it hoped to attract other high-tech firms (Dodds and Wollner
2000).
Capturing the oscilloscope market, Tektronix had a similar upward trajectory. Founded
as Tekrad in 1946, the firm produced oscilloscopes – a core component in manufacturing
and in the design of new electrical instruments. In the 1950s, the firm followed ESI to
Washington County, and by 1960, it had become Oregon’s largest manufacturing firm
with more than 20,000 workers. Counter to traditional hub-and-spoke regions, both ESI
and Tektronix had strong interconnections with one another and the founders had strong
connections to other high-tech regions, including Silicon Valley and Boston (Dodds and
Wollner 2000).
The history of Portland hardware firms, like Tektronix and ESI, sets the stage for
Intel’s move to the region in the 1970s. Both firms dedicated significant firm resources
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to the education if its employees, an important role in the region in the absence of a
large, research-oriented university. Mayer (2005) calls Tektronix a “surrogate” university
because it filled this role. Tektronix publicly stated its commitment to reinvesting in
research and development and even offered classes to employees as a human resources
policy. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a time in which software was connected almost
exclusively to military and institutions of higher-education (both of which were missing
from Portland), Tektronix began Tek Labs and Tektronix Education Program (TEP).
Tek Labs was the research-and-development arm of Tektronix that invested profits into
research for new products. TEP was a week every year in which employees could take
classes instead of working. In 1974, TEP’s student body was larger than enrollment at
local universities, Reed College and Pacific University, and offered 99 classes.
Table 5.5: Industrial composition of software workers in the Portland region, ACS 2011–2015.

Largest 8 industries by share of software workers in the Portland region by NAICS industry code.
Industry

n

% of software labor

% of labor force

13,066

30.13%

0.56%

Electronic components and products, n.e.c.

4,146

9.56%

0.18%

Colleges and universities, including junior colleges

1,458

3.36%

0.06%

Hospitals

1,312

3.03%

0.06%

Management, scientific and technical consulting
services

1,169

2.70%

0.05%

Insurance carriers and related activities

1,161

2.68%

0.05%

Computer and peripheral equipment

1,056

2.44%

0.05%

916

2.11%

0.04%

Computer systems design and related services

Banking and related activities
Total number of software workers in labor force
Total number of workers in labor force

43,369
1,367,515

Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015) ACS 2011–2015.
Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1050, 1060, 1105, 1106,
1107, 1200, 1220. Industry determined using the NAICS industry classification for 2012.
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Figure 5.2: Stylized portrayal of Portland’s software industrial district.
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Both firms enjoyed growth through the 1970s. Portland grew its hardware high-tech
sector again in 1974, when Intel located a memory manufacturing facility in Washington
County, based on encouragement from Tektronix’s Board of Directors and relying on
its relationships outside the region. Intel’s primary restriction was that it needed to be
within a two-hour flight from its company headquarters in Silicon Valley. The Portland
region was idea because of its local labor market’s talent and inexpensive workers. Intel’s
facility manager was not concerned with the lack of a strong university presence.
“[W]e only wanted quality workers and power because it was a production
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site” (Interview with Keith Thomson, Intel Facilities Manager, 2001 as cited
in Mayer 2012, 100).
Intel’s decision to locate in Washington County spurred smaller supplier firms to
co-locate in there in the late 1970s. By 1980, however, Intel had moved out of the
memory-production market. According to a human resources study performed in the
1970s at Intel’s Silicon Valley location, potential workers were not attracted to working
at the headquarters, and Intel was struggling to retain its engineers. Intel management
sought secondary locations, and an engineering manager responsible for the iAPX 432
microprocessor leveraged the corporate policy in 1977 to move his team closer to his
family. The microprocessor – Intel’s first 32-bit microprocessor – was a commercial failure,
but it resulted in significant intellectual property. Later in the 1980s, Intel designed a
second chip in the region – the RISC 80960 – which followed the same pattern, resulting
in commercial failure but yielding significant intellectual property. Neither chip was
based on the Intel 16-bit 8086, or even x86 compatible, which was necessary to run on
the growing Intel and MS-DOS platform. Still, The Washington County team’s strong
research and development attracted other Intel teams to the region, who were eventually
able to apply insights from the previous two chips to develop the DX2-variant of the
80486, and later, the 80586, commonly referred to as the Pentium. The success of the 1993
Pentium and the 1995 Pentium Pro market successful Intel chip fully designed outside
of Silicon Valley, further, Intel also manufactured the Pentium Pro in the region. The
Pentium chip was a market success and brought prominence to Intel’s Portland-region
location, further fueling the locational decisions of national and international suppliers
(Dodds and Wollner 2000; Mayer 2012).
Intel’s growth in the region coincided with the decline of Tektronix and ESI. All
three firms were responsible for spinoffs during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (Mayer 2012).
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MentorGraphics, founded in 1981, was one of the most successful spinoffs, producing
design automation hardware and software. For some of the same reasons that Intel moved
to Portland, MentorGraphics pitched in a job ad in the local newspaper: “Engineering
and marketing opportunities are located in the clean air, uncrowded, affordable lifestyle of
Portland, Oregon and other locations” (Rogoway 2016, emphasis own).
Figure 5.3: MentorGraphics job wanted ad in The Oregonian, 1982.
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Two other startups from this era warrant mentioning. Central Point Software (CPS),
which, founded in southern Oregon, moved to suburban Portland to take advantage
of a larger labor market. Their flagship product, released in 1983, allowed users to
duplicate floppy disks, even those with hardware copy protection. Intentional or not,
it’s worth noting that the software circumvented some of the software licensing issues
of the time by forcing the disk drive to ignore the copy protection. Of course their
software was not free itself. They created other utilities in the Portland region before
Symantec acquired and shutdown CPS in 1994. Two former CPS employees founded
a new company, WebTrends, to take provide analytics for the websites of the fledgling
online retailer business. WebTrends went public in 1999, then went private and sold to
Houston-based NetIQ in January 2001 for $86 million. WebTrend founders publicly
and repeatedly refused venture capital investment in their firm – instead seeking to go
public without the influence of capital influx – much to the shock of venture capitalists
(Woodward 2001). I highlight these two examples because they are indicative of the
counter-culture ethos of many, not all, of Portland’s tech workers.
WebTrends was among a small set of firms in Portland whose timing allowed its
founders to take advantage the IPO and later acquisition when the firm went private. A
long-time Portland developer put it this way:
There were firms, but Portland is classically a B2B [business-to-business]
town, we don’t do big flash everything tech ... The problem was, even though
[some] firms went public, the market softened before people made wealth.
Founders, a few founders made money, but we didn’t see that massive wealth
creation like in Seattle... there’s no Jeff Bezos of Portland. There’s no Mark
Cuban of Portland. That has slowed the growth of Portland because we didn’t
have the capital to put back to work.27
27

Portland veteran developer. Interview, 10/01/2016, D19, transcript.
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Other developers in Portland at the time made similar comments. Portland’s software
production activities were ramping up, and when the dotcom bust happened, the speculative investment in software firms evaporated, firms could not continue to employ workers.
Portland had not already had the multiple rounds of investment into firms, wealth generation, then reinvestment into new firms that other regions had enjoyed during the dotcom
bubble. This also prevented the region from learning and skill-building in the software
startup scene.
Back then all the activity took place in Hillsboro. I bounced around a bunch
of those companies. The [software] scene back then, there was activity, but it
was hidden, there were very few companies that stood out as tech startups.
Then the dotcom thing happened, and startup became part of popular culture
and Portland didn’t see any upside in that. It wasn’t until the dotcom crash
that open source really seemed to gain footing and prestige around Portland...
there’s this culture of craft, making it as best possible ... and this culture of
collaboration and willingness to help one another.28
While the original high-tech hardware hub-firms in Portland grew, then began to
decline, Intel’s branch-plant location grew to be its largest facility and acted more like
a headquartered hub-firm, producing more research and development than Intel’s other
locations combined. Software production activity in Portland was embedded in other
industries and an absence of large successful firms that produced local capital meant
that Portland didn’t have the thriving software agglomeration that other regions had.
Portland’s exposure to software as commodity came from the proliferation of the Intel
chips that ran the software, not the software itself.
28

Portland veteran developer. Interview, 10/01/2016, D19, transcript.
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The 2000s mark a change. Workers in Portland had technical skills, but lacked the
know-how to attract venture capital and thus rapidly expand. Instead, in the time after
the dotcom bust, new startups in Portland relied on open source technologies to build
technical solutions, often web oriented. Portland’s low-level hardware orientation meant
that Perl was a common language used across industries. In 1999, Portland software
workers formed a local user group, Perl Mongers, to exchange Perl tips and tricks and
contribute to the Perl project.
And 30-40 people would show [to Perl Mongers in 1999-2000]. And that
was the cutting edge. I was writing stuff in Perl at Intel and people thought
that was weird. I was working - I was in network engineering and I was
automatically configuring routers and switches and stuff like that. My coworkers on the IT side were still manually loading things from Windows
laptops. I was on the edge of change at Intel.29
Important Perl contributors and developers also happened to live in the region,
some working for external firms. One had created a Perl module that automatically
configured routers that gained popularity among those doing networking. It became
industry standard. The regions workers, without software oriented firms to steer or
direct software development energy, found their own outlets for engineering through the
internet and ultimately toward open source projects. Ward Cunningham was among a
list of popular local developers, as well as contributors to the Eclipse, parts of different
Linux distributions, and open source packages for software development. Intel was
simultaneously working seeking to expand its footprint in server processors and in
networking hardware. Linux was the de facto operating system of the internet and thus
29

Former Intel developer now at a large external firm. Interview, 10/08/2015, D15, transcript.
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Intel began a small group of software workers that contributed to the Linux kernel,
ensuring compatibility with Intel hardware.
Open source was a thing. I think it was. I think it was a distinguishing mark
for the tech community, it brought people together for a long time.30
In 2001, just one year after only one year in SF, the Open Source Development Labs
(OSDL) moved its headquarters to Beaverton. The (OSDL) was a large consortium of
firms invested in the continued development of Linux and the Linux kernel and included
Computer Associates, Fujitsu, Hitachi, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, Nippon Electric
Corporation. By 2003, after two poorly attended conferences in San Diego, O’Reilly
Open Source Conference (OSCON) moved to Portland in hopes the Perl community
would bolster its numbers – and it did. In fact, OSDL’s move prompted Torvalds to move
to Portland, as mentioned earlier. Portland became a hotspot of development, and firms
sought to use open source to develop products.
The Portland open source community was well organized and well connected via
community email lists. Starting in 2004, an influx of firms moved to Portland or moved
their engineering workers to take advantage of the open source milieu. This list includes
Jive, New Relic’s engineering headquarters (which hired Ward Cunningham), IBM’s
Linux development group, Janrain, Oregon State University’s Open Source Lab, Puppet
Labs (now Puppet), and Urban Airship (Rogoway 2011). Local firms worked with local
government to form a notable incubator project. Portland’s small firms grew to medium
firms. More recently, the community has sought to stay connected and pursue issues that
collectively affect software workers in the region by writing open source calendar tracking
for the region (somewhat reject the branded meetup), forming conferences like OSBridge
30

Portland developer at an large external firm. Interview, 10/08/2015, D15, transcript.
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and PyDX with a focus on equity and diversity training, and events like WriteTheDocs
aimed at improving documentation in open source software to reduce barriers to entry.
Portland’s accidental collection of Perl developers made Portland remains a “sticky”
place for open source, yet the region continues to be in a healthy turmoil In 2007,
the OSDL merged with the Linux Foundation and moved to SF. In 2016, OSCON
permanently moved from Portland to Austin. Portland firms and software workers may
have missed opportunities in the software as commodity growth period, but leverage the
absence of capital to build strong relationships within the community. Building off its
experience in networking and its business to business history, this has the right business
to business knowledge and as new firms grow. A private equity firm acquired Jive in 2014.
New Relic, still headquartered in Silicon Valley continues to expand. Bank Simple, a bank
and financial software company, moved its headquarters to Portland. Puppet continue to
grow. Other than Intel, the original group of hardware firms in the region continue to
retract (Rogoway 2014).
The region certainly resembles a Marshallian industrial district. The growth and
structure of Portland is dependent on the network of small and medium sized firms,
aided by Intel’s continued and significant branch-plant adjacency, to continue to innovate.
The structure is still dominated by small and medium firms, and the labor market
is internal to the district. The region continues to grow as it attracts new migrants
(Jurjevich and Schrock 2012; Jurjevich and Schrock 2014). According to my interviewees,
Intel, while enormous, does not dominate the software labor market, but instead relies
on the district as well. Washington County has long been supportive of large firm
investment from companies like Intel, Nike, and Tektronix. Portland, initially unwilling
to work with Tektronix and ESI in the 1950s, now cooperates with technology – and
software – firms, incorporating them into its economic development plan. The Portland
Development Commission even donated seed money to the local incubator and the
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OSBridge conference.
Workers have strong intra-district relationships, and because of the internet connected
nature of open source, have formed organizations and conferences to build and protect its
workers. Two successful annual conferences were already mentioned. A new community
initiative, SafetyFirstPDX, aims to develop code of conduct language so that any conference organizer can have access to a variety of language and guidelines around conference
organization. These strong local connection aim to reducing risk to the district, not
necessarily to the firm, and provide specialized skills, business and technical training, and
even advice on how to navigate, or reject, venture capital investment.
Early third generation languages like Perl may have been a reason to come together, but
the region, and the language, are not as prominent as it once was. Perl provided important
flexibility in hardware infrastructure, but the region has strong Python (PyDX) and
Ruby orientations. The region uses these tools to development tools for other businesses,
relying on its strong worker relationships, the interstitial space between existing firms, for
sources of innovation. Two interviewers explained that Portland is a place of “accidental
innovation” because software workers in Portland are trying to solve their own software
development issues. Nike, and the US headquarters of Adidas, are firms in the region
that employ small but influential groups of software developers. Wearable technologies, a
small, but emerging market, employs software workers in both firms, overlapping with
hardware technologies researched and produced locally at Intel. Several small startups
have emerged in the wearable technologies space, some even claiming that their startup
idea came from the founder’s own needs for fitness tracking. Interviewees shared a strong
narrative between accidental software innovations and adjacent industries.3132
Portland. Seattle’s front porch. Silicon Valley’s backyard.33
31

Portland developer at an large external firm. Interview, 10/08/2015, D15, transcript.
Portland economic development practitioner. Interview, 10/02/2015, D14, transcript.
33
Portland veteran developer. Interview, January 16, 2016, D19, transcript.
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5.3.3

Austin, Texas: a region in flux

The Austin region does not match a single type from Markusen’s industrial district
typology. At first blush, Austin appears to be solely a state-sponsored region. The Texas
State Capital building looms large over downtown and to the north is the sprawling, but
still urban, University of Texas campus. For these reasons alone one might miss the other
software production activities in the region. I will argue that Austin is a mixture of statesponsored and branch-plant types and that this mixture is of on-going change that may
develop into a Marshallian industrial district mixture. At the time of writing, Austin’s
industrial type is in flux and there is significant variability and uncertainty in future
pathways of development. Even if Austin’s branch-plant and Marshallian components
evaporate, Austin has the advantage of obdurate state-sponsorship.
Austin has positioned itself as a technopolis since at least 1957, when the Austin Area
Economic Development Foundation, a public-private partnership, aimed to leverage its
state-sponsored assets and economic structure to attract new high-tech manufacturing.
“A team of public and private leaders built upon UT’s [University of Texas]
research programs by attracting manufacturers of electrical and scientific
equipment. Austin’s success in the 1960s and 1970s in making the transition from government to high-technology manufacturing was built on the
traditional factors of relatively low-cost land, a high-skilled workforce at
reasonable wages, and a desirable quality of life” (Humphrey 2013, 17 cited in
Straubhaar et al. 2012, 67).
This process put into motion a series of high-tech manufacturing satellite-branch plant
openings that included IBM typewriters and Texas Instruments chips in the 1960s and then
Motorola chips in the 1970s. These branch plants and the expansion of UT’s computing
and engineering, while not exclusively software-oriented, are certainly complementary
157

to the rise in software production activity in Austin. In the early 1970s, the US Navy
contracted UT’s expanded engineering research team to produce better components
to collect and analyze data from naval instrumentation. In 1976, research faculty led
by James Truchard founded National Instruments to create better equipment without
the constraints of working within UT or being a government contractor. Growth for
National Instruments was slow during the 1970s and 1980s, but this marked one of the
first successful spinoffs from UT’s investment in engineering and computing research.
In 1979, Silicon Valley-based Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), and Intel’s primary
competitor, also opened a semiconductor branch-plant facility in the region (McComb
2010; Humphrey 2013).
In software’s 1970 and 1980 business-based period, Austin supplied the semiconductors
that powered business computing. The amount of software production activity, compared
to other production activity and relative to other metros, catapulted Austin into the top 7
regions by software labor force share starting in the 1980s. Further, the administrative
tasks of both the state capitol and the home of the University of Texas system both
required mainframe computers to process the everything from taxes, to admissions, and
payroll for the growing state. This further added growth of software production activity
in the region. Yet, the linkages between software production activity related to branchplant chip manufacturing remained separate from software production activity in the state
capitol which remained separate from the software production activity at the University
of Texas.34 Weak links between these silos fit with expectation of both branch-plant and
state-sponsored district types.
Austin’s computer hardware sector continued to grow in the 1980s and 1990s into
the software as commodity period. In 1982 amid increasing competition from Japan,
the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC), a consortium
34

Austin product manager in government. Interview, 10/30/2015, D7, transcript.
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of declining chip manufacturers that sought to save costs by joining efforts in research
for chip design and manufacturing, chose Austin to be its home because of its strong
record of public-private partnerships. Austin beat Silicon valley as a potential location
and San Antonio endorsed Austin’s bid. Local businesses, combined with UT and
the City of Austin, provided incentives of $62 million. Later, in the 1988, Sematech,
another research consortium of semiconductor manufacturers originally sponsored by
the Department of Defense to engage in research to design chips for the US government.
In 1983, the Dean of UT’s College of Business founded a think-tank called the Innovation,
Creativity, and Capital Institute (IC2 ). The IC2 promoted the high-tech, albeit nonsoftware focused, economic success of Austin as a model for other regions based on the
economic development relationships local government, universities, and the private sector
(Straubhaar et al. 2012; Humphrey 2013). This top-down model values the economic
development relationship rather than the relationships between workers and conveniently
ignores the important role that the state capitol played in contributing in the demand for
high-tech workers.
In 1984, former UT student Michael Dell founded Dell Computer Corporation
outside Austin in suburban Round Rock. The company grew steadily through the 1980s,
but didn’t grow rapidly until Dell started selling computers directly to customers in 1996
through its website which allowed visitors to customize their orders. Dell then surpassed
Compaq as number one computer retailer in 1999, and then again became number one
retailer when Hewlett-Packard purchased Compaq in 2000. Dell grew fastest in the early
2000s, coinciding with the release of Windows XP and their expansion into low-end
or small office servers. National Instruments released LabVIEW in 1986, a graphical
programming language, which allowed engineers to program advanced data acquisition
instrumentation by creating software flows that looked mimicked the flows of a circuit
board. National Instruments catered instruments for military research, academic research,
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Table 5.6: Industrial composition of software workers in the Austin region, ACS 2011–2015.

Largest 8 industries by share of software workers in the Austin region by NAICS industry code.
Industry

n

% of software labor

% of labor force

22,127

40.27%

1.17%

Computer and peripheral equipment

3,810

6.93%

0.20%

Electronic components and products, n.e.c.

2,381

4.33%

0.13%

Colleges and universities, including junior colleges

1,972

3.59%

0.10%

Electronics stores

1,956

3.56%

0.10%

Management, scientific and technical consulting
services

1,529

2.78%

0.08%

Software publishing

933

1.70%

0.05%

Non-depository credit and related activities

909

1.65%

0.05%

Computer systems design and related services

Total number of software workers in labor force
Total number of workers in labor force

54,943
1,055,142

Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015) ACS 2011–2015.
Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1050, 1060, 1105, 1106,
1107, 1200, 1220. Industry determined using the NAICS industry classification for 2012.

and manufacturing, effectively connecting its fate to Austin’s high-tech economy .
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 show that Austin failed to maintain its comparative growth
between 1980 and 1990, but maintained a significant software agglomeration. Austin again
grew its relative share between 1990 and 2000, but the 2000s saw the decline of much of
Austin’s semiconductor manufacturing as Sematech relocated to Albany, New York, MCC
shutdown, and both AMD and Motorola closed their Austin production facilities after
failing to compete with Intel and suffering hard from the retreat of computer purchases
related to the dotcom bust. Dell continued to grow because of its expansion into new
markets. Austin, as a region, continued to grow and its reputation as a technopolis along
with it thanks to the IC2 principles of economic development relationships between local
government, local university, and the private sector. In terms of software production
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Figure 5.4: Stylized portrayal of Austin’s software industrial district.
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activity, this also marks the period when the complementary branch-plants semiconductor
district began to falter and replaced with the computing-based hub-and-spoke district of
Dell. Dell and UT dominate the hardware labor markets, but only UT dominated the
software labor market (McComb 2010).
Importantly, in the late 2000s, the same model that attracted branch-plant hardware
production began attracting branch-plant software production. Google, Twitter, Dropbox,
Microsoft, Apple, have locations in Austin. It’s not uncommon for large firms like these to
open locations outside their headquarter region, but these locations often don’t contribute
to the core production, software or otherwise, activities of these firms. In some instances,
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Microsoft and Google have locations that are co-working spaces for workers across teams
that are not located in the firms headquarter location. Apple in Austin is an exception in
this case, much like Google and Adobe are in Seattle. Apple seeks to tap the local research
and design labor market around semiconductor chips and to develop its own chips for
its computing devices. More in line with expectation Apple, along with Google, have
customer and technical support facilities in Austin.
While these small branch-plant facilities opened in the 2000s, the 2010s mark the
potential emergence of connected workers in small firms interacting with software production branches. In the 2010s, several small Austin startups began to grow and become
the cornerstones of the region’s startup scene. These includes BazaarVoice, WPEngine,
and RetailMeNot. Software production activity in these firms was still minimal compared
to the larger region, but were explicitly software, not hardware. This period also marked
the emergence of high-profile branch-plant opening from Australian firm Atlassian. Atlassian makes productivity software for software developers and moved its entire software
production to Austin. Further, Dell’s continued expansion into cloud computing spurs
software production specific to the operations data centers.
It’s odd because ... it’s hard to say, because on one hand people are like the
tech scene in Austin is so big and so great. On the other hand, yes, but it’s
never going to be like Silicon Valley, it’s like a shave of San Francisco, like
you could never compare it to those cities, but compared to a lot of cities
there’s some good startup initiatives. I wouldn’t, I guess I could say there’s
some enterprise kinda things going on.... it’s a small tight knit bunch with a
lot of new people. ... knowing people from other cities, I get the impression
that Austin is really supportive.35
35

Austin developer at a large external firm. Interview, 11/05/2015, D1, transcript.
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The influx of software workers at software firms may have trouble connecting to the
software workers in government, at UT, and in hardware-based hub firms. One manager
put it bluntly, confirming what other public sector software developers had already said:
I’ll say that the actions you [worker] have with the broader community is up
to them. It’s not particularly encouraged or discouraged. Now, obviously, you
can improve your skills by doing that and [subordinate developer] took that
tact. I do very little of it. I do different things when I leave. ... Sometimes with
government agencies ... there’s a gulf between what’s going on in government
and the private sector. Where it’s going now, we might be more mainstream.
It’s almost surprising how much little of [interaction with programming
community] there is.36
One entrepreneur and developer organizes a monthly meetup that ranges from 40 to 75
people per month in an advanced third generation language. This developer advocates for
Austin and the strong labor demand.
There are 110 people moving to Austin everyday. Austin is a place people
want to be and [firms are] struggling to fill roles. Get them skills. Get them
jobs. It’s social and technical. It’s friendly, we share, it’s good for your team
and good for your career and people find jobs and co-founders.37
Austin doesn’t have the built environment and clustering of downtown software workers,
but this meetup organizer explained that there’s a lot of parking downtown for people
coming into town. Tuesday’s after 6:00 p.m. parking is free and I’m told that this
warrants a lot of meetups to happen on Tuesday nights. Another developer mentions
that Austin is a growth hub. Firms have to use code sharing technologies, new languages,
36
37

Austin developer on programming in the 1980s. Interview, 10/30/2015, D7, transcript.
Austin developer and entrepreneur. Interview, 11/02/2015, D11, transcript.
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and prototyping-based production methods. Amazon’s cloud infrastructure is a standard
among startups works well with the flexible languages that workers are using, allowing
them to scale as necessary.
We have to stay up on new frameworks and new languages. Python and Ruby
are vital to the success of our startups... we’re not going have a startup with a
product in C++ [laughter] ... they don’t even teach that.38
Above, the public sector manager mentions that they’re becoming more mainstream
alluding to the recent switch from legacy programming languages to Python. This has
led the subordinate to attend local meetups to gain experience. Certainly a mixture of
technologies are present from legacy mainframe technologies to bleeding edge software
languages. None of the interviewees outside the public sector were aware of the 500
software developers within UTs administration, 300 software developers within the state
capitol, or the thousands of developer spread across teams in both.39 While these are
small numbers in the near 55,000 software workers in Austin, they are larger than the
well-known Atlassian development site and all are in the urban core.
Meetups are less about deep learning and more about interacting. [Everyone
has the opportunity to participate.] Austin isn’t wrapped up [with] what
company you’re at. We’re more open to sharing experiences.40
Each of my interviewees explained that meetups is a place where skill-building can
happen, but everyone benefits socially and that they are good places for mentoring or
career-building. Common to the public sector interviewees, workers learn skills within
the organization as opposed to having experience before starting. In fact, one public
38

Austin developer and entrepreneur. Interview, 10/27/2015, D4, transcript.
Numbers based on interview with high-level government-based project manager with experience in
both location. Interview, 10/30/2015, D7, transcript.
40
Austin developer at an SME. Interview, 10/31/2015, D10, transcript.
39
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sector organization uses the IBM Information Processing Aptitude Test (IPAT), licensed
from IBM in the 1980s, to select candidates. Candidates are not required to have any
programming experience. If candidates score high on the IPAT and perform well in
interviews, they spend the first 3-6 months learning both a legacy language and Python.
The City of Austin has long supported investment in high-tech, but has only recently
supported software production activity. Capital Factory is one of the largest tech incubators alongside Google for Entrepreneurs, both of which provide product advice, startup
space, and meeting rooms conditioned upon acceptance into the program. Capital Factory
also runs a selective and intensive 3-month coding school.
Not everyone has access to the software labor market or these coding schools. Austin
has long had discussions about equity and technology, especially with the role of IC2
has played in the region. Numerous local organization, partnered with international
organization, seek to protect and develop the local software scene. Like in Portland,
strong organizations like Women Who Code and local initiatives like Latina Hackers seek
to provide the training to navigate the becoming, and advancing, as a software developer.
However, the women interviewees lamented that these initiatives are often short lived,
sometimes only having one meeting, before forgotten. Within the regions hardware firms
and within the public sector, there exist women-only networking and support groups,
they aren’t as specific women in software, and don’t provide networking opportunities to
other software firms in the region.
Part of the purpose of these groups is to discuss working conditions and the types
of expectations that software workers can or should communicate to their managers.
Significant challenges still exist for Austin to develop a successful Marshallian software
district.
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I got tired of being told ‘your job is to execute’ everywhere I worked [in
Austin]: we know how develop, but not many know how to manage.41
Branch-plant and hub-and-spoke hardware manufacturing firms employ large numbers
of software workers with little connection to the rest of the city. Software-focused public
sector production activity has weak, but strengthening, connections to software workers
in small firms in the region. The small firms are well-connected through meetups and
connections from gained at startup spaces. Small firms are dependent on new technologies
and being ahead of competition in terms of technologies. The public sector organizations
depend on stable, legacy software. There are exceptions to both.
Austin’s software production activity is strong, but its type is a mixture. Austin is
certainly state sponsored, but there appears opportunity for a Marshallian district to
emerge, and whether that Marshallian district interacts with existing software production,
whether in the public sector or the workers embedded in industry throughout the region,
remains to be seen. The successful agglomerations in Seattle, Portland, and Austin all have
significant components of cloud computing. In Austin, Dell’s server business employs
Austin’s largest visible group of cloud computing devoted developers in the region.42
While doing field research in Austin at the end of 2015, two important events happened related to Austin’s software-adjacent production activity. James Truchard, CEO of
National Instruments, announced his retirement at at the end of 2016. National Instruments subsequently offshored all its local manufacturing, after offshoring a large portion
of it in the previous year, and continues to retract its Austin workforce (Graar 2014;
Andersen 2017). Second, Dell purchased EMC43 and its Silicon Valley-based subsidiary
VMWare. Boston area-based EMC (now Dell EMC) surpasses global firms like IBM,
Hewlett Packard Enterprise, and Hitachi Data Systems, to capture the largest share of
41

Austin developer at an SME. Interview, 11/02/2015, D12, transcript.
Austin developer and entrepreneur. Interview, 11/02/2015, D11, transcript.
43
EMC is not an acronym
42
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the market in data-storage systems. The acquisition fits in line with Dell’s continued
investment in servers and cloud computing as data-storage is a key component of data
center operations. VMWare provides virtualization software, allowing a single computer
to run multiple similar or different operating systems, a key component of large data
center operations (Rockwell 2016). At the time of writing in 2017, it does not appear
that Dell will relocate the software production activity components of these firms to
Austin, or how this purchase will impact Dell’s Austin-based software production activity
in cloud computing.
Austin is a region in flux – or perhaps, as Markusen, DiGiovanna, and Y. S. Lee says,
it’s a “sticky mix.”
5.4

From Industrial Districts to Regional Outcomes
5.4.1

Comparing the observed industrial districts

Summarizing the work in the previous section, I highlight the different variations in
industrial districts characteristics in Table 5.7. These characteristics form the basis of each
region’s specific mode of software production. As firms and workers in each of these
second-tier regions develop new software, they diverge across production (technologies,
skill-sets, labor markets), social relations (class-based firm-worker relationships), and/or
spatial organizations (industrial district formations). In this section, I analyze how the
different modes of production identified in the previous section, and their historical
trajectories, produce different sets of software occupations and income distributions in
each region.
Again, software production’s low-materiality affords rapid cycles of development,
feeding back into changes in the production of software and fueling regional divergence.
The particular technologies impact what software is possible, firms organize the method
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Strong relationship between hub-firms and external firms, weak local relationships
Weak relationships between workers outside of
firm
Strong relationship to Silicon Valley, dominated by Microsoft and Amazon, each having
their own internal labor market
Few, strong internal firm dynamics

Firm links

Fourth
period

Automation

Innovation

Software

Intermediaries

Labor market

Reliance on Microsoft and Amazon cloud performance, experimental languages

Historically proprietary, reliance on 3G+ languages, developing new libraries/languages for
cloud infrastructure, connected to Microsoft
platforms and Linux platforms
Based on acquisition of small local or external
firms, small research units internal to anchorfirms
Make automation tools for other firms, use of
automation tools on own workers

Caters to hub firms, strong connections to University of Washington

Government

Labor links

Hub-and-spoke with strong university links,
historical benefits from Boeing’s presence

"Accidental innovation" related to software
workers interacting across industry lines, inbetween spaces/events important
Makes automation tools for other firms and
workers, adoption of automation tools in development by workers
Small firms provide cloud infrastructure tools
and developer tools, serving other software
businesses

Strong, based on local events, local serving conferences
Historically open source, reliance on flexibility
of newer 3G+ languages, strong ties to Linux

Strong relationships between workers, strong
regional worker identity
Strong relationship to both Seattle and Silicon
Valley, workers connect with each other

Strong relationship between firms

Recent acknowledgment of software (separate
from hardware) and pursuit of economic development strategy

Marshallian district with adjacent industries,
benefits from Intel’s networking and IoT focus

Growing startup scene leveraging cloud infrastructure, Dell to play increasing role, fall-back
on public-sector

Sponsored through public-private partnership
of Capital Factory, new connections to UT and
Dell
Use of automation tools by other firms

Strong, connected to Capital Factory, and local
events
Reliant on newest open-source for competitive
advantage, orientation toward 3G+, significant
expertise of legacy languages in public sector

Growing Marshallian district, historically
public-sector district adjacent semi-conductor
industry, benefits from Dell’s server software
focus
Recent acknowledgment of software (separate
from hardware) and pursuit of economic development strategy, strong public-private partnerships
Growing relationship between firms, and between public-sector and firms
Growing relationships between workers,
slowly accessing public-sector workers
Multiple: public-sector and private-sector, with
increasing relationships, growing rapidly

Significant variation in industrial districts of Austin, Portland, and Seattle.
Portland
Austin

Structure

Seattle

Table 5.7: Comparing industrial districts of Austin, Portland, and Seattle.

and direction of production, and workers provide the knowledge. Though, as we saw in
Portland, workers have high levels of interaction outside of the firm. Software workers in
Portland have higher loyalty to the district than Seattle’s workers, who tend to have higher
loyalty to the firm. Austin’s industrial district is evolving from a public-sector industrial
district, benefiting from the hardware industries in the region, into a Marshallian district.
Its Marshallian district, like Portland’s, is relying heavily on open-source technologies and
languages to benefit from the network externalities of open-source language adoption. The
connection to open source further encourages networking and exchange between software
workers in Austin, who form meetings, user groups, and local-serving conferences. This
differs from Seattle, where events are either held within the firm or serve connections to
other large firms. The Microsoft Build Developer Conference and Amazon’s re:Invent are
both held in Seattle and are both aimed at drawing in other software firms and workers.
Microsoft and Amazon have strong linkages to large firms outside the region but relatively
weak relationships with spoke-firms in the region. The connections among spoke-firms
are also weak. Made through their employees and their products, connections among
small firms in Portland and Austin are stronger. Software workers at small firms in Austin
are making connections to two large public institutions in the region.
While each region has strong connections to Silicon Valley – through industry linkages
in Seattle, labor linkages in Portland, and branch operations and growing labor linkages in
Austin – the labor market processes within each region are regionally distinct. Software
workers, as part of an educated labor force, are among the most mobile workers, and my
interviewees were no exception. While some had only worked in one of the three case
regions, most had worked in multiple cities, and some even had experience working in all
three locations and Silicon Valley. As expected, Seattle has internal labor markets, internal
to each firm, but the two hub-firms both compete locally for top talent and draw workers
from around the world. The labor market in Portland and Austin is internal to the district
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and based on making connections among existing software workers. Community groups
and user groups in these regions organize technology-specific meetups and events, which
serve as labor market intermediaries for new workers. While the events provide space for
accidental innovations, mentoring and other interactions at the events allow workers to
build tacit skills, practice presentations, and get advice on resumes (especially tips on key
words and phrases used to filter applications). Austin uniquely has a second labor market,
internal to its large institutions.
Austin software production differs from Seattle and Portland in the generation of
software languages commonly used. In Austin’s internal public-sector institutions, an
established presence of legacy software requires special training programs on legacy languages, like NATURAL and the locally designed WebAgent, distinguishing the expertise
in the region. Public-sector software workers are attempting to modernize to frameworks,
like Django, and languages, like Python, but a proposal for a new set of servers and various
off-the-shelf software packages–some developed in Seattle–threatens to bring automation
and replace workers in public-sector institutions. As I showed in the previous section,
other forms of automation in Austin attempt to regulate software worker tasks and time
management through machine-learning.
Seattle software production differs from that of Portland and Austin in terms of
open source and proprietary software development and use. The proprietary nature of
software programming in Seattle forces the firm to seek innovation internally or through
acquisition. Conversely, the networked nature of open-source software development
requires interaction both locally and globally. Workers gain skills and expertise by
exchanging knowledge locally. For workers and startups without capital investment, open
source provides a way to enter the market without upfront technology or licensing costs.
In Seattle, Microsoft and Amazon can invest in or acquire local firms and provide those
firms with access to their proprietary platforms and technologies in pursuit of innovation.
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Figure 5.5: Income density curves for software workers, Austin, Portland, and Seattle.
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Distribution of Software Worker Incomes (2015 USD)
Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015) ACS 2011–2015.
Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1050, 1060, 1105, 1106,
1107, 1200, 1220. Data is based on income from wages (INCWAGE) and excludes income reported on 1099s.
Vertical dashed line represents median income of software workers, reported in Table 5.8. To mitigate
the visual impacts of person-weighting and top-coding, the author transformed the underlying data for
presentation purposes. First, the author multiplied the INCWAGE variable by a “jitter” variable that is
randomly selected from a set distributed along a normal curve between 0.8 and 1.2. Second, the density
function redistributes top-coded incomes using a quadratic decay curve starting from the 75th percentile
income for each region. The modified income is for display purposes and is not used for calculation.

5.4.2

Distributions of software worker incomes

These software production differences produce regionally specific labor market processes,
confirming the idea that wage-employment relationships take on local characteristics
(Peck 1996, 110). We then expect to see related differences in occupational structures and
distributions of income. I show the income distributions of software workers in Figure
5.8 and Table 5.8. Seattle has a higher median income for software workers. The regional
median income and the ratio of software median income to regional median income are
included in the table, allowing comparison of regional variations in income and cost
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of living. Seattle software workers make more than their counterparts in Austin and
Portland and make more relative to the regional median income. The even distribution
of software worker incomes is in part due to the two hub-firms’ controlling incomes for
large shares of software workers, using corporate policy as guidelines in promotion and
salary increases.
In Seattle, more workers are in the middle of the income distribution. Portland and
Austin both have larger shares of workers at the bottom of the income distribution curve.
The middle of Austin’s income curve splits into two, or possibly three, income groupings,
likely representing different groups of incomes set by a more rigid public-sector institution.
In Portland, the large number of small firms gives the region’s distribution of income
more variation and results in more workers in a larger middle. For each region, the 25th
and 75th percentiles of income are approximately $30,000 above or below its median
income. This suggests a common spread of incomes across all software occupations in all
regions, even though variances exist between the regions in the middle. as noted earlier.
Certainly, regional modes of production affect incomes within regions. However,
the income distributions across all workers can explain only some of the variation. For
Table 5.8: Median incomes across Austin, Portland, and Seattle, ACS 2011–2015.

Median incomes of software workers, Austin, Portland, and Seattle, ACS 2011–2015.
Austin Portland
Seattle
Median income, software workers
Median income, all workers
Software workers’ median income : regional median income
25th percentile income, software workers
75th percentile income, software workers

75,359
31,045
2.43:1
44,000
105,121

72,000
30,040
2.40:1
41,101
100,115

94,000
37,400
2.54:1
61,939
123,878

Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015) ACS 2011–2015.
Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1050, 1060, 1105, 1106,
1107, 1200, 1220. Data is based on income from wages (INCWAGE) and excludes income reported on
1099s.
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Table 5.9: Software occupation classification, ACS 2011–2015.
ACS software occupation codes and classification based on job function.
Code

Title

Classification

Median Income

110

Computer & information systems managers

Managers

95,000

1020

Software developers

Engineers

90,000

1106

Network architect

Engineers

90,000

1200

Actuaries

Specialized Analysts

96,005

1007

Information security analyst

Specialized Analysts

80,092

1005

Computer research scientist

Programmers

74,085

1010

Computer programmers

Programmers

73,771

1006

Computer scientist & systems analyst

Analysts

71,000

1220

Operations research analyst

Analysts

71,320

1060

Database administrators

Administrators

71,227

1105

Network & computer systems administrators

Administrators

64,074

1030

Web developers

Coders

42,155

1050

Computer support specialist

Coders

46,454

1107

All other computer occupations

Other

60,000

Note: See Table B.1 in Appendix B for descriptions, incomes, and more information.
Incomes in 2015 USD. Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek,
et al. 2015) ACS 2011–2015. Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1010, 1020,
1030, 1050, 1060, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1200, 1220.

further analysis, I take the fourteen software occupations from the ACS 2011–2015 and
group them into eight classifications based on typical tasks and functions: managers,
engineers, specialized analysts, programmers, analysts, administrators, coders, and all
other occupations. Each classification, except managers and all other occupations, is the
combination of two occupations. In Table 5.9, I list each occupation and its national
median salary.
To gain further insight, I compare the occupational structure of each region by looking
at the prevalence of each occupation classification. Table 5.6 and Table B.1 show these
results. Two observations are obvious. First, the regional share of engineers for all regions,
comprised of network architects and software developers, makes up more than half of
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the regional software labor force. Second, Portland and Austin both have larger shares of
coders, programmers, administrators, and analysts, all at the expense of engineers.
Microsoft had formerly split its software occupations into testing, development, and
development in testing.
We went through a restructuring, and we found that the metrics that we had
for measuring success at each position could be rigged ... you could have
excellent metrics, but that didn’t translate into a better product. We wanted
to make a better product.44
My interview subject continued to explain the metrics system combined with the rank
ordering of employees on teams promoted achieving useless metrics. Further, with
new software testing tools and procedures developed into Microsoft’s Visual Studio
programming platform, the company decided to combine the responsibilities of testing
and development in testing into the singular developer role.
So now, everyone is a developer, and everyone writes test cases and tests it
themselves. It translates into a better product, it makes us more efficient in
the right way.45
Another manager explained that this allowed the firm to hire better developers.
We can go to any university and hire, or hire people with experience ... people
that can just jump right in and don’t require a lot of hand holding.46
This describes the use of automation by Microsoft within its workforce. Microsoft created
Visual Studio for other firms to develop on its platform, but it was also developed to automate low-skilled labor–which would appear in the coders or programmers classifications
44

Seattle principal at a large firm. Interview, 11/20/2015, D30, transcript.
Seattle principal at a large firm. Interview, 11/20/2015, D30, transcript.
46
Seattle product manager at a large firm. Interview, 10/01/2016, D23, transcript.
45
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and would incorporate a tool-dependent, high-skilled version into the already high-level
engineering positions.
As I showed earlier in the chapter, workers go between Microsoft and Amazon.
Workers go back and forth all the time. So when they do something new, it’s
only a matter of time before it makes its way over, and same goes if we do
something new. ... We’re different companies, we do things different and we
use different technologies, but there’s a lot of spillover ... in how things get
done.47
Portland and Austin are similar in their occupation structures, but Portland has
fewer high-level engineers and more coders and programmers. In Portland coders and
programmers comprise one-third of the software work force, yet they comprise less than
one-quarter in Seattle. In my Portland interviews, two key variables became evident in
describing Portland’s tech scene: open source and a networked community.
You don’t even have to try hard. Just show up [to a meetup] and someone
will have you coding .. they’re all on Calagator [Portland-developed meetup
and user group tracker48 ]. It’s easy to get started.49
Another Portland developer and informal mentor at multiple meetups placed importance
on the combination of open source and local community.
I give people tasks on this little project I’ve been working on. It’s silly. But
it’s free [open source], and then they interact with people all over the world,
which is really empowering, especially when they come back to [the meetup]
and talk about it.50
47

Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/19/2016, D26, transcript.
Calagator: Portland’s Tech Calendar (http://calagator.org/).
49
Portland developer at an SME. Interview, 10/20/2015, D16, transcript.
50
Portland developer at an external SME. Interview, 09/10/2015, D32, notes.

48
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The developer continued to explain that their role as a mentor meant staying alert for
new jobs and teaching mentees how to prioritize meetups and events in the region. Open
source, they explained, made it so that anyone could learn to develop code quickly.
Cloud-infrastructure tools – like those provided by Microsoft and Amazon – give new
developers the ability to scale their programs and focus on improving their coding skills
without having to worry about servers and operations.
Austin is similar to Portland, but software workers are still establishing an open-source
identity. Further, the community centers around Capital Factory and is not dispersed
among firms or coding schools, like in Portland. Capital Factory places importance on
venture capital, a different model than Portland, and software workers in Austin work
for the state government either directly or through the University of Texas. The larger
number of small firms in Portland and Austin, combined with the desire to hire workers
that don’t require hand-holding in Seattle, contributes to the shares of managers in each
region. Regions with more small- and medium-sized firms require more managers, while
those with large firms seeking to reduce the need for managers will have a smaller share
of managers.
5.5

Conclusion

This chapter sought to understand the local nature of software production and the
development of software agglomerations in Seattle, Portland, and Austin. I asked two
specific questions:
1. How does software production activity vary between region?
2. What are the industrial district formations of software production in Seattle, Washington, Portland, Oregon, and Austin, Texas?
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Figure 5.6: Software occupation share of region labor force, stacked, ACS 2011–2015.
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3. What are the regional outcomes, via occupational structures and income distribution of software workers, of regionally specific modes of software production?
To address the first question, I leveraged the IPUMS-USA data source from Chapter
4 and used a geographic weighting system to construct a comparable metro dataset of
software workers between 1970 and 2015. I traced the changing fortune of US metros’ software agglomerations and showed how the historical development of software
co-evolved with spaces of software production. I then constructed industrial district
typologies based on interviews, historical research, and participant-observation, and using
the characteristics of industrial districts in Table 2.1, Table 2.2, Table 2.3, and Table 5.3. I
then combined this data with participant-observation and interviews in the third section
to understand the development and variation between the three software agglomerations
of Seattle, Portland, and Austin.
To address the third question, I again referred to those three case regions. For each region, I demonstrated how historical developments resulted in software industrial districts
with regionally specific modes of production. I examined the history of the three case
regions, their industrial districts, and the ways in which their software firms and workers
produce software. Specifically, I analyzed each region’s forces of production (technologies,
skill-sets, labor markets), social relations (class-based firm-worker relationships), and
spatial organizations (industrial district formations). With this data, I created industrial
district types to reflect my three cases regions and detailed their industrial composition. I
used Table 5.3 to add software-production-specific characteristics to the idealized industrial district typology. Then in the last section, I showed how these regionally specific
modes of software production, and their differences, yielded local occupation structures
and income distributions.
Further, I argued that these second-tier cities challenge the dominance of Silicon
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Valley’s software agglomeration. And that the fates of regional software agglomerations
lies in the ability of the firms and workers in the industrial districts to adapt to the new
profit cycles of new software periods. For example, Microsoft’s dominance in the massmarket software period did not ensure success in the cloud-and-mobile software period,
but with new leadership, Microsoft is starting to adapt. Amazon emerged as a cloudand-mobile software firm and may have helped build regional specialization in cloud and
mobile technologies. Similarly, Portland and Austin had small software agglomerations
that emerged from different historical trajectories in the 2000s. Both regions benefited
from adjacent industries, and Portland benefited from the development of an open-source
network of software workers across industries. Lastly, in Section 5.3, I show how the
low-materiality of software, and the requirement to use software to produce software,
afforded the evolution in software’s capitalist production variants. In this chapter, I
created and operationalized a framework that connected the periods of software to profit
cycles, industrial districts, and capitalist variants in software production.
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6 Segmentation and Bifurcation: Equity and Economic Development

[T]he very shortage of programmers and their resulting
privileged status is giving strong impetus to the development of
programming tools that could de-skill programmers or reduce
the demand for them substantially.
Hall, Markusen, Osborn, and Wachsman 1983, 36

The workforce in these industries is increasingly coming to be
divided between highly qualified scientific and technical staff and
semiskilled (predominantly female) assembly workers. This
dichotomisation of skill within the labour force has some
tendency to be reflected within the spatial pattern of the
industry.
Massey and Meegan 1978, 283

Profound discontinuities in the labor market are legitimized
through the attribution of skilled status. In this sense, skill
should not only be seen simply as a resource that is rewarded in
accordance with the precepts of human capital theory, but as an
ideological construct reflecting the distribution of power in the
labor market.
Peck 1996, 135

6.1

Introduction

The seemingly always newness of software production, and high-tech in general, may
afford a conceptual disconnect between a region’s software production and the existing
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social and spatial relations of production. But, as I’ve shown in Austin, Portland, and
Seattle, software production transforms between each software period, taking on place
specific modes of production that evolve out of a region’s existing firms, industries,
people, and their connections. That is, as software production globally evolves, the
local specificities of social and spatial relations act as scaffolding in the new periods that
configure local software production. As we saw in Portland and Austin, for example, their
hardware orientation in the 1970s and 1980s during the corporate software period meant
that the regions missed much of the benefit of the software commodity period, but are
now benefiting from business to business cloud software (Portland) and client-side cloud
software (Austin). Software production activity is a continuation of a regions specialized
knowledge, arranged by its industrial district.
In chapter 4, I showed how the historical development of computing and software
yielded a labor market structure that spans industries and, because of labor rationalization,
whose internal logics began to mimic the professionalization, forms of skillbuilding,
and certification of electrical engineering occupations. I linked the evolution software
production to different forms of capitalist production and their multi-decade profit cycles.
Within each of software’s capitalist variant of production and associated profit cycles,
I showed how software workers, and the IT departments they work under, frequently
undergo restructuring due to the diffuse nature of software work, the perpetual desire for
scientific management, and the constant churn of technological (software) development
and (software) automation.
In the last chapter, chapter 5, I showed that the restructuring of software production
over four periods varies by region. Regional modes of production – sets of social and
spatial relations determined by firm strategies, labor market practices, and technologies
– yield variation in occupational structures. Importantly, the occupational structures
determine the distribution of occupations, power relationships between occupations, and
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the income distribution in the region.
In this chapter, I connect the resulting occupational bifurcation to firms exercising
capitalist logics of the detailed and spatial divisions of labor. Technological development,
in the pursuit of profit, drive the transition of profit cycles and development of new forms
of capitalist relationships in each software period. Within the realm of production, the
resulting software developments automate existing forms of production, provide increased
efficiencies where software is already used, and afford new forms technical possibility.
For workers, the result worker deskiling and continued alienation, existing occupations
become bifurcated, and reskilling is necessary to tap into new technical possibilities.
These outcomes feed back into the cycle, necessitating that firms seek more automation
through software development as firm management may seeks to divide the individual
components in production in pursuit of efficiency.
Occupational bifurcation manifests as labor market dualization and leads to locally
specific forms of segmentation. Labor market segmentation – the development of sublabor market(s) divided by skill, gender, or race & ethnicity – builds from local social and
spatial configurations resulting in a high-skill labor market and a low-skill labor market.
The low-skill software labor market is distinctly more female and more non-white, raising
questions of career mobility and equity. Privileged workers, when threatened by deskilling
or decreases in occupational status and wages, benefit from institutional forms of sexism
and racism and tend to maintain their status and/or wages. Women and minorities
become disadvantaged in the labor market. Spatially, firms may separate design from
production, choosing to locate an engineering department in one city and a support team
in another. Depending on the mode of production, the type and method of producing
software, different sets of occupations – with real wage differences – may concentrate in
certain regions.
Addressing these issues, and building on the last chapter where I showed that regionally
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specific modes of production yield different regional outcomes through locally specific
occupational structures, this chapter asks:
1. To what extent has software production demonstrated tendencies toward labor
market dualization and segmentation by gender and race/ethnicity?
2. How are these labor market outcomes mediated by local institutions and practices?
I answer the first question in the second and third sections. First, I further examine the
dynamics of occupation bifurcation and dualization of the labor market. In Tables 6.1 and
Figure 6.1, I present the historical trends of bifurcation in the software occupations. In
Table B.1, in the Appendix, I collect occupation descriptions and national statistics on for
each occupation, including incomes, income breakdowns by gender and race/ethnicity,
and the number of workers. Based on function and incomes, I further group occupations
into four tiers of the labor market. I use these four tiers to understand gender and
race/ethnicity dynamics, addressing the feminization of the labor market.
In the fourth section I address the second question. I leverage both participantobservation and interviews to inform the local responses to labor market outcomes. I
show how local institutions, organizations, and practices provide different leverage points
to counter the uneven impacts of labor market dualization and segmentation.
In the conclusion, I combine these three sections. Labor market dualization and
segmentation are broad structural forces, but I introduce both software-specific and
locally-specific tendencies. I argue that:
1. The product of software labor is software, and software is the same “machine”
used to automate software work. The rapid pace of software development thus
coincides with the rapid deskilling of software workers. Software workers thus
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implicate themselves in creating programs which deskill themselves and other
software workers.
2. Regionally specific modes of production mold the dualization and segmentation of
the local software labor market. Nationally, the share and number of women and
persons of marginalized racial/ethnic backgrounds is growing, but primarily at the
lowest tier of the labor market. Occupations in the lowest tier are more precarious
than their higher-skilled counterparts, require less skill and provide less income.
Local variations on national trends depend on the regional mode of production.
3. Labor market intermediaries -– through initiatives and groups within large firms
like the example in Seattle, through community-led events like the example in
Portland, or through community-organizations like the example in Austin — play a
important roles in enabling marginalized workers to build technical skills and gain
soft, or tacit, skills to better navigate the labor market.
This chapter argues that regional divergence in software production shape the form
of, and the responses to, labor market dualization and segmentation. I show that labor
market dualization and segmentation manifest differently in each region. I show that local
responses, mediated by local institutions and local practices, are necessary to mitigate the
detrimental impacts of the local manifestations of segmentation and bifurcation.
6.2

Bifurcation: The Race to Stay Competitive
6.2.1

The firm logic to divide tasks

In the 1980s, Hall, Markusen, Osborn, and Wachsman research the computer industry
and note how software is different than computer manufacturing. Their epigraph at the
beginning of this chapter is a reminder, that, even in the 1980s with a small overall labor
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force, there was strong desire to reduce management’s reliance on software workers. I
include the epigraph below, but with more context.
... present day programmers come, for the most part, from a small, welleducated, professional segment of society with rather specialized aptitudes...
and the very shortage of programmers and their resulting privileged status is
giving strong impetus to the development of programming tools that could
de-skill programmers or reduce the demand for them substantially. (Hall,
Markusen, et al. 1983, 36)
Judging from the growth in the size of the software labor market, demand for software
workers, has increased, intensifying pressure to deskill or reduce the demand, and reliance,
on software workers.
To reduce demand on software workers, or at least attempt to mitigate its impact,
managers document software work and split it into subcomponents, bifurcating each
individual occupation into higher-level cognitive tasks and lower-level repetitive tasks.
Not all occupation splits reflect this split, as I’ll get to later, but the pattern of splitting
between high- and low-level tasks is pervasive in software work.
Yeah. They split us into front-end and back-end. I started on front-end ... but
now I do back-end. It’s more rewarding.51
Another interviewer put the dichotomy between the two types of positions into perspective.
Usually I ask myself if we can just leverage a library to do what a front-ender
does. Can we bootstrap it?52
51
52

Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/10/2016, D27, transcript.
Portland developer at an SME. Interview, 11/21/2016, D28, transcript.
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Splitting work between front-end and back-end on the web may, at first, appear to be
natural. There are alternate ways to split the work, but today, because of the advent of
high-level web-based languages and libraries, front-end development work has less prestige
than back-end development work. Back-end work has evolved too, but not in the same
way that front-end work has evolved into high-level software activity. The development
of high-level code is both a way to automate and to gain new capabilities. This dialectic is
not lost on software workers.
Low-level code is for really specialized purposes, it what you use to make the
high-level possible. High-level code is democratizing. Yes, it’s automation,
but the idea is that you can give everyone the ability to write high-level code
and you only need a few low-level people. Think what VB [Visual Basic] did
– it’s mind blowing.53
Visual Basic (VB) – introduced by Microsoft in 1991 as an event-driven, third-generation
programming language – introduced new efficiency among office workers. VB has simple
instructions and integrates into the entire Microsoft suite of applications. The net gain
in efficiency, measured relative to other firms, becomes negligible because of the near
universal adoption and integration into Microsoft’s popular office suite. On the one
hand, languages like VB deskill some of the work that other programmers do by making
programming more accessible, but it also requires that VB receives wide adoption through
skill-building. Users of Microsoft Excel use VB functions without realizing the underlying
technologies.
The software workers I interviewed all generally shared the opinion that more people,
if not everyone, should know how to program. Interviewees shared the idea that technology was advancing, without identifying the drivers of technological development nor
53

Seattle product manager at a large firm. Interview, 10/10/2016, D23, transcript.
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identifying the broader social and technical issues for which software is developed, or
should be developed, to resolve. One interviewee, in particular, was aware of the threat of
becoming less competitive, expressing his need to be reading the newest blog posts on
server-side efficiency and learning new languages.
I had to learn puppet [programming language] or else ... or else I would
become a dinosuar [hesitant laughter].54
Two of my interviewees described the need to stay updated in new languages and libraries
as a “race condition.”5556 A race condition refers to the problematic program execution
situation where the output of a program depends on the execution sequence of two or
more other underlying subprocesses. A race condition may produce undesirable and
unexpected results, or crash the program entirely, when the underlying subprocesses run
in a sequence not intended by the programmer either through lack of specification or
events that the programmer cannot control. The interviewees expressed anxiety over
feeling pressured to race, literally, the constantly changing knowledge requirements of
their work with the threat of undesirable or unforeseeable implications if they did not
stay up to date.
All of the interviewees mentioned the importance of more people, if not everyone,
learning how to program and develop software. Some interviewers went as far as to
say that learning to program was part of a natural evolution, like learning how to read
and write. Technological development, including software development, does happen
through experimentation. Firms, led by their managers, invest time and money to
increase efficiency by reducing their demand on labor, either adopting software which
replaces non-software workers or by adopting libraries which reduce or deskill existing
54

Portland developer at an SME. Interview, 05/05/2016, D31, notes.
Portland developer at an SME. Interview, 05/05/2016, D31, notes.
56
Austin developer and entrepreneur. Interview, 10/27/2015, D4, transcript.
55
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software workers. Between 1970 and 1990, software workers were not managed by a
manager specific to software or information technology. My interviewees that were
programming in this period, and the literature, suggest that software workers instead
reported directly to business managers, C-level executives, or their direct reports (Reskin
and Roos 1990; Greenbaum 1979). Managers, even those with limited understanding,
sought to breakdown the tasks of software development to shorten development cycles
or increase development output.
Quotes in previous chapters showed how managers quarantine developers from interaction with other business units so that they have the most time to develop software.
Managers expect software workers to already have a skill-set and use other software
programs to increase their efficiency. Managers also expect their developers to keep
scrupulous notes, or code comments, to document not only what the program does, but
method of production. Teams meet to break down the tasks and assign difficulty, time,
and a team member to each task – ultimately making the software worker replaceable.
Returning back to Hall, Markusen, et al., the business goal is to ...
... reduce the number of people required to produce the same number of
units of software and/or to transfer as much work as possible from highlytrained (expensive) to lesser-trained (cheap) personnel. One model for this
is the ‘software factory,’ a hierarchical, assembly-line in which software
production is broken down into small stepwise tasks which are performed
by less-skilled programmers passing their little pieces from cubicle to cubicle.
(Hall, Markusen, et al. 1983, 34)
The need for software workers to stay relevant is in part connected to the ways firms
need to manage, and reduce, costs. Firms do so by using software tools which reduce the
need, or quantity, of workers necessary to complete tasks that would otherwise require
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specialized skill sets and thus expensive workers. Software firms are susceptible or prone to
adopt productivity or automation tools in software development. This allows for the firm
to hire less expensive users of software and reduce the number of developers of software –
hence, bifurcating the occupation, and creating a dual labor market. As software workers
introduce new software libraries and languages, software workers themselves race to stay
competitive on the labor market by learning new skills. As detailed in the last chapter,
interviewees in Austin and Portland expressed how new software is vital to themselves
as software workers, but also to the success of the local software community. We saw in
Portland that the rise of open source helped its software agglomeration grow. In Austin,
ruby and python frameworks are key to its success.
6.2.2

Five changes in the software occupational structure

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the US Census Bureau collect information about
occupations and group them according to function and salary. Importantly, they develop
an occupational classification system that represents the different types of occupations
across industries – that is, the classification system isn’t a prescription and is instead a
reflection of the types of work that workers perform. The period between 1990 and 2000,
the largest growth in software labor of any period in this study, present three noteworthy
phenomenon in this regard.
First, a new managerial class dedicated to overseeing software work emerged (occupation 110 in 1990, see Figure 6.1). Computer and information systems managers, its
formal title, is not a recode of other managerial positions (less than 5% come from other
managerial occupations) and is not a recode of existing software workers, the occupation
is new (Beckhusen 2016). The emergence of this new class validates the business use
of software and the need to have specialized knowledge about how manage technical
projects, whether adopting and integrating existing software or building software within
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the firm, and the software workers assigned to those projects. Firms even develop entire departments whose tasks are technical business operations, employing analysts and
administrators.
Second, the computer systems analyst and scientists occupation splits into two topically different occupations, representing the emergence of the internet, a network focused
analyst position and a non-network focused analyst position. This, unlike the splits
mentioned later, does not necessarily represent the bifurcation of an occupation, but the
topical differentiation between those working on software for desktops and mainframe
servers versus software for the internet, firm intranets, and web servers.
Third, the computer programmer position splits into software engineers and computer
programmers. This marks the first bifurcation of software occupations that existing data
make available to track. Other bifurcations happen in the 1970s but are not documented
in occupation codes (Reskin and Roos 1990, see for example). The computer programmer
in 1990 (occupation 229 in Figure 6.1) had a median annual salary $60k per year. In 2000,
software engineers (later software developers), the top-tier of the occupational split had a
median annual salary $87k and there were fewer women and a higher wage gap between
genders and between white non-Hispanic workers than and their minority57 counterparts.
The lower-skilled of the split, in the middle-tier labor market, also saw in increase in
yearly salary, but at only a fraction of the increase of their higher-skilled counterparts.
The computer programmer earned $72k per year in 2000, and had higher shares of
women, minorities, and a smaller wage gap than the computer programmer in 1990. See
occupations 1020 (software engineers/developers) and 1010 (computer programmers) in
Table B.1. When the occupation splits according to the logic of management, the lower
skilled occupation takes on a routinized role while the higher skilled occupation takes on
a higher-skilled role. Generally, fewer higher-skilled positions exist where there were once
57

Excludes Asian non-Hispanic, and future references to minority in this section.
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lower-skilled positions.
These first three moments – one new occupation, a topical split, and a skill-based
split – have ramifications today. The management role continues to be the highest paid
software occupation and continues to grow. The topical split of computer analysts into
network-based and non-network based set the ground work for another two splits between
the 2010 occupation codes and the occupation codes used for today (evident between
the 2005-2009 period and the 2011–2015 period). And, since their equal split in 19902000, the number of workers in a software engineer/developer role has double while
the number of workers in the computer programmer occupation has decreased slightly,
indicating the rapid and continued expansion of technical occupations. The last split,
an occupational bifurcation, in 1990 represents the continued growth of network and
internet technologies. The two resulting occupations from the computer systems analysts
and scientists occupation both split again in 2005-2009 making evident their capture and
codification of these two occupations by management and the development of software
libraries and languages.
The fourth and fifth splits happen between 2005-2009 and 2011–2015. The fourth split,
another bifurcation, divides the computer scientist and system analyst (occupation 1000
in Table 6.1) into research scientists, systems analysts, and all other computer occupations.
During this time period, workers in these occupations grew from 728,000 to 920,000.
Prior to the recoding, the position of computer scientist and computer analysts were
nearly indistinguishable as both required technical skill to analyze computer models and
automate systems. However, with new tools to automate analysis, and in fitting in line
with turning software production activity into software using activity, a break appeared
in the reported occupations: computer systems analyst was its own separate activity. Prior
to the break, the joint computer scientist and systems analyst earned a median annual
salary of $70k per year. After the split, the 13,000 workers in the higher-level occupation
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had a median annual salary of $74k, had fewer women and minorities and a larger wage
gap for both women and minorities. As expected, the lower-level computer systems
analyst retained 490,000 workers, had median annual salary of $71k, had more women
and minorities, and had less of a wage gap than the research scientist counter part. The all
other computer occupations category is difficult to track because of the lack of clarity
in the varying functions. All other computer occupations had 418,000 workers, had the
lowest salary, highest rates of women and minority participation, and the smallest wage
gap compared to the two other occupations. These numbers are presented in Table B.1
for computer scientist and system analyst (occupation 1005), computer systems analyst
(occupation 1006), and all other computer occupations (occupation 1107).
The fifth split, also a bifurcation, is the split of the network systems and data communication analysts (occupation 1110 in Table 6.1) into computer network architects,
information security analysts, and web developers. This is the clearest example of the
bifurcation of an occupation into new distinct occupations with their own labor markets.
In 2005-2009, the network systems and data communication analyst had a median
income of $60k per year, was nearly a fifth women and there was near wage equity
between white workers and their minority counterparts. When the occupation split, it
Figure 6.1: (Next page) Author’s representation using data from Beckhusen (2016), the Bureau of Labor Statistics Standard Occupation Classification (Labor Statistics 2010), the IPUMS-USA Occupation
Crosswalks (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015).
Table 6.1: (Following Figure 6.1) Counts of software workers are author’s calculations from data gathered
from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015), the Bureau of Labor Statistics Standard Occupation
Classification (Labor Statistics 2010), and Beckhusen (2016). Data from the 1970 Census, 1980 Census, 1990
Census, 2000 Census, ACS 2005-2009, and ACS 2011–2015. The IPUMS variable OCC provides occupation
according to matching Census/ACS definitions. The IPUMS variable OCC2010 provides occupation
classification and historically codes occupations based on a 2010 occupation definition. Using OCC2010, a
dataset of OCC observations limited to the OCC2010 software occupation codes of 110, 1000, 1010, 1020,
1050, 1060, 1100, 1200, 1220. Software occupations in Public Administration and Active Duty Military are
not used due to historical comparability (codes 900 and over).
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Figure 6.1: Significant occupation recoding of software labor by occupation code, 1970–2015.
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1980

64 Comp sys analysts
& sci (179,100)

229 Comp programmers (285,160)
66 Actuaries (10,140)
65 Ops & sys researchers & analysts
(65,560)

1970

4 Comp sys analysts
(66,600)
5 Comp specialists,
n.e.c. (9,100)

3 Comp programmers (139,900)

34 Actuaries (4,200)

55 Ops & sys researchers & analysts
(71,200)

65 Ops & sys researchers & analysts
(226,980)

66 Actuaries (18,706)

229 Comp programmers (612,103)

64 Comp sys analysts
& sci (431,195)

110 Comp & info sys
managers (423,651)
1000 Comp sci & sys
analysts (728,294)

1110 Network sys &
data comms analysts
(335,975)

1100 Network &
computer sys admins
(213,801)
1060
Database
admins (95,138)
1040 Comp support
specialists (436,159)
1020 Comp software
engineers (789,518)
1010 Comp programmers (506,360)
1200
Actuaries
(22,409)
1220 Ops research analysts (66,990)

11 Comp & info sys
managers (303,238)
100 Comp sci & sys
analysts (653,110)

111 Network sys &
data comms analysts
(315,443)

110 Network &
comp sys admins
(185,231)
106 Database admins
(73,127)
104 Comp support
specialists (366,137)
102 Comp software
engineers (679,805)
101 Comp programmers (636,019)
120
Actuaries
(20,757)
122 Ops research analysts (61,530)

Bifurcation of software labor, occupation codes, titles, total size, 1970 to 2015.
1990
2000
2005-2009

Table 6.1: Bifurcation of software labor, 1970 to 2015.

1007 Info security analysts (51,009)
1030
Web
devs
(188,937)
1105 Network &
comp sys admins
(205,491)
1060
Database
admins (107,724)
1050 Comp support
specialists (566,709)
1020 Software devs,
all (1,036,507)
1010 Comp programmers (439,936)
1200
Actuaries
(26,519)
1220 Ops research analysts (75,341)

110 Comp & info sys
managers (524,707)
1005 Comp & info research sci (13,624)
1006 Comp sys analysts (490,119)
1107 Comp occupations, all other
(417,886)
1106 Comp network
architects (100,462)

2011–2015

split into two separate, but unequal, top-tier high-skill positions and a bottom-tier lowskill occupation that is the lowest paid occupation of all software work. The 2011–2015
breakdown is as follows. The top-tier high-skilled network architect occupation (see
occupation 1106 in Table 5.9 and Table B.1) had a median annual income of $90k and had
a small wage gap for women, but lost the majority of the women in the occupation and
women comprised 10% of the occupation. Minority representation stayed high and wage
gap increased only slightly. The ratio of median incomes between minorities to white,
non-Hispanics was 1:1 in 2005-2009 and 0.82:1 in 2011–2015. The top-tier high-skilled
information security analyst (see occupation 1007 in Table 5.9) had a median annual
income of $80k and had larger shares of women and minorities than the original position.
Income disparities increased to 0.82:1 for both women and minorities. This position,
while as prestigious as the network architect occupation, remains in the top-tier labor
market with its high annual salary and degree requirements. Most alarming is the third
occupation in the low-tier low-skill labor market. Web developers (see occupation 1030
in Table 5.9) had a median annual income of $42k. The occupation maintains about
15% minority representation and increases representation of women from 25% to 35%.
The drop in median income is met with decreases in the wage gap of other two top-tier
occupations, dropping slightly to 0.84:1 for women and decreasing for minorities to
0.99:1.
Changes reported to American Community Survey, and to some extent the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, result in the occupational recoding. They approximate the functional
and occupational changes within firms. From discussion with my interview subjects and
observations job hunting sites, the web developer position is not new to the 2011–2015
period, suggesting a delay between initial observation and its normalization into an occupation. Nonetheless, the topical split of analysts in 1990 into a network-based occupation
led the pathway for the split of the network systems and data communication analyst
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into three occupations in the 2011–2015. While all three occupations produce software –
whether designing cloud infrastructure, monitoring and securing cloud infrastructure,
or developing applications for cloud infrastructure – the key differentiator between the
three positions is the degree in which workers in these occupations use software. The
description provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the web developer occupation
even includes the phrase “may use software” which does not appear in the descriptions of
any of the other occupations. The other bottom-tier low-skilled occupation, computer
support specialist, earns on average more than their web developer counterpart and using
software is part of that occupation, but not to the degree of the of web developer.
The codification of one part of a network systems and data communication analyst
into occupation is at the heart of bifurcation in software production activity. The web
developer roles demonstrates the use of software and management rationalization to
decrease the labor operations cost of the firm. The relative higher wage ratios for women
and minorities to their comparator groups is an artifact of the compressed wage rage as
the mean income of the web developer, again, is only $42k per year. The occupation still
generally requires a 4-yr degree and training.
6.2.3

Bifuraction toward what end?

In this section, I used interview quotes and five moments in the occupational restructuring
of software work to show that with the growth of software production has come the need
for firms to reduce their labor costs by using software to replace developers with users.
Within software, this might happen when a software worker uses a library, a higher level
language, or a machine-learning techniques to to gain programmatic efficiency, displacing
the work of other software workers. The product of software labor is software, and software is the same “machine” used to automate software work. The rapid pace of software
development coincides with the rapid deskilling of software workers – what my interview
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subjects expressed as a an anxiety-ridden “race condition.” Software workers therefore
implicate themselves in creating programs which deskill themselves and other software
workers. Lastly, I showed that from the direction of managers and the codification of
workers actions, occupations undergo splits, ultimately bifurcating occupations.
In the next section, I dig deeper into the impacts on women and minorities through
the creation of dual labor markets within the broader software labor market.
6.3

Segmentation: Sub-labor markets, race, and gender
6.3.1

Toward feminization

One of the occupational splits was topical in nature, but the other three splits exemplify
occupational bifurcation. The process of occupational bifurcation creates dual labor
markets. As software occupations bifurcate into two or more occupations, with at least
one top-tier high-skilled position and at least one lower-skilled position in the middle-tier
or bottom-tier, the bottom of the software labor market grows. This lowers the barrier to
entry within software as a whole. Importantly, as the low-end of the labor market grows,
because of the resorting by employers of the labor queue, the bottom of the labor market
begins to include those who may have not had access to these jobs: primarily women
and persons of color. Yet, this new job is not the same as the job that their primarily
white and primarily male counterparts had and promotion in this already white and male
dominated set of occupations is often dependent navigating ideals of masculinity.
I present national level detail of the software labor force on median income and
labor force representation by gender in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2. Similarly, I present the
same type of data by race/ethnicity in Figure 6.3 and Table 6.3. I’ve separated Asian
non-Hispanic (Asian) and white non-Hispanic (white), creating a minority group that
summarizes all other race/ethnicity combinations.
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Table 6.2: National median income by gender for software workers, 1970-2015
National median income by gender for software workers, 1970-2015.
1970

1980

1990

2000

2009

2015

240,700

394,380

858,111

2,347,303

2,662,948

3,156,591

50,300

145,580

430,873

947,094

955,347

1,088,380

17%

27%

33%

29%

26%

26%

Men

71,390

66,538

70,122

75,362

77,893

75,879

Women

46,387

46,582

58,435

62,174

65,561

64,074

0.65

0.70

0.83

0.83

0.84

0.84

66,126

166,304

35,460

48,116

74,220

72,262

Size of workforce
Men
Women
Percent women
Median income

Income ratio
Median income
All software workers

Incomes in 2015 USD. Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek,
et al. 2015) ACS 2011–2015. Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1010, 1020,
1030, 1050, 1060, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1200, 1220.

This data suggests that minorities and women receive only part of the pay that of
their white and male counterparts. Further, the concentration of women and minorities
toward the bottom of the pay scale suggest that they are in the bottom of the labor market.
Minority representation had quadrupled since 1970. The wage gap for minorities decreased
between 1970 and 1990, then increased drastically 1990 and 2000, before flattening. The
wage gap for women has only improved since 1970. However, there has been little change
for either minorities or women since 2000 as both have had the same wage ratio of about
.84 or .83. Women’s participation in software occupations increased between 1970 and
1990, reaching 30%, but since then has only decreased to about 26%.
This data shows that during the mass-market software period of the 1990s and early
2000s, gains by women and minorities slowed or even reversed. This also coincides
with the largest growth of software workers, suggesting that as software work grew and
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software production became a more desirable job, white men and Asian, workers possibly
recruited internationally, filled these vacancies at a greater rate than women and minorities.
Between no period does the raw number of any group decline.
The income violin plots – with box plots to show standard deviation and an asterisk
to show median income for each group – tell many stories. First, women and minorities
entering the software labor market enter, or stay, at the bottom of the income distribution
at greater rates than men. Second, the high number at the bottom suggest that there are
fewer opportunities for advancement, or that women leave the workforce earlier. There
are also fewer women at the top of the income distribution when comparing to men. For
example, at the top of the income distribution, 4.3% of men make over $150k per year
while 1.7% of women cross that threshold. To compare, if we were to find the income that
separates the top 4.3% of women (effectively the 95.7th percentile), the annual income
drops to $122k per year. The ratio of the top 4.3% salary of women to men is 0.81:1, a
higher wage gap than the median incomes of women to men, evidence of higher gender
inequality in higher income software occupations.
The percentages in themselves are staggering, but so are the raw numbers: 4.3% of men
software workers is 412,963 men, while 1.7% of women software workers is only 63,279
women. Certainly social reproduction plays an important part in the income distribution
because of career tenure and career interruptions like maternity leave. However, the
differences in incomes, income distributions, and labor market representations suggest
structural issues related to bifurcation of occupations and the segmentation of the labor
market.
The income violin by race/ethnicity shows similar results. The relationship between
the income distribution of white software workers and minority software workers mimics
that of the relationship between men and women software workers above. Minority
software workers experience higher income inequality at higher income levels. The
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income distribution of Asian software workers has a much higher representation at the
top of the income distribution and has a noticeably smaller share of workers at the bottom
of the income distribution. This might reflect the hiring out of graduate degree programs
and/or foreign visa. The median income of Asian software workers has historically been
higher than that of all other minorities. Asian software workers surpassed the total
number of all other minorities in the 2005-2009 period, with significant implications for
both the Black/African-American and Hispanic/Latino communities. These numbers
reinforce the idea of a structural privileging of whites and men in the software labor
market.

Incomes (2015 USD)

Figure 6.2: National income distribution by gender for software workers, ACS 2011–2015.
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The structural shaping of the software labor market – through occupational bifurcation and the dualization of the labor market – isn’t exclusively a recent phenomenon.
Prior to the significant gains of both women and minorities leading up to 1990, Reskin
and Roos document the feminization of software production and computer work in
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Incomes (2015 USD)

Figure 6.3: National income distribution by race/ethnicity for software workers, ACS 2011–2015.
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the 1970s. They show that a variety of factors led to the increased role women in the
workforce.
...as the computer workforce grew, managers sought to contain labor costs
by separating from programming two new occupations: systems analysts,
who designed information systems; and coders, who translated programs into
computer codes and entered data. (Reskin and Roos 1990, 43)
This split happened in the US prior to the beginning of this study. The women in
their study who entered the workforce were not able to enjoy the same benefits as their
male counterparts. Unlike the other industries that Reskin and Roos document, new
women entrants into software production experienced ...
... segregation ... between mostly female low-paid analysts whose daily tasks
involve interacting with users and mostly male high-paid analysts who make
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decisions about information systems and interact with analysts, programmers,
and managers. (Reskin and Roos 1990, 182)
The bifurcation of software occupations in the last section has the same makings of the
feminization that Reskin and Roos identify. This structural inequity between gender and
race/ethnicity reproduces itself, further segregating women and minorities. Feminization
suggests a growing number of women and minorities in the work force, but they show,
and this data reinforces, the growth is in the lower end of the labor market. Today, this
garners greater importance because since the work of Reskin and Roos, the software
production labor market in the US has grown tenfold (1980), the share of women in the
software workforce has steadily decreased (1990), and wage gap of minorities has steadily
increased (1990).
In Figure 6.4, Figure 6.5, and Table 6.4, I show income distributions for the three
case cities by gender and race/ethnicity. I highlight the regional differentiation between
regions, due to their mode of production. In line with the national datasets, we see that
the income distributions for women and minorities are at lower incomes than the income
distributions for men and whites.
Austin’s mixed industrial district typology, exhibiting both Marshallian and publicsector tendencies, appears to have a large even distribution of incomes for men and
women software workers. Portland also has an large even distribution of software
workers. However, Portland’s income distributions are at slightly lower income levels
and with two distinguishing characteristics for women – larger shares of workers are at
the bottom of the income distribution and the top end of the income distribution has
an accelerated tapering. Both Austin and Portland have slightly higher income ratios of
women to men, indicating a smaller wage gap.
The open-source Marshallian district allows for workers to enter at the bottom of
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the labor market. The public-sector tendencies of Austin’s industrial district provide
steady promotion opportunities with set wage levels. My public-sector interviewees in
Austin were aware that they may get paid less than if they were to seek employment in
the private-sector, but they each expressed relief in the stability of the job and the well
documented internal hierarchy and career ladder. Of course, not all workers that work in
the public sector stay in the public sector, but interviewees expressed that the public-sector
provided safe-guards that made the lower pay attractive for women. These incremental
wage levels may be the small spurs on the bulge of Austin’s violion plot, evident for men,
women, and whites. Unlike the other two regions, the dichotomy between Asian and
minority software workers is drastic. Asian software worker incomes concentrate at the
high-end of the income distribution and tapers off toward the low-end. The minority
income distribution concentrates at the low-end and tapers off in irregular fashion. Austin
had a strong community of Hispanic/Latino oriented meetups and groups, and, at 18%,
had about twice participation of minorities in the software labor force than Portland or
Seattle. Based on conversation – and a topic for future research – I expect the bulge at the
bottom to be majority minority women, while the top taper to be majority minority
men. While each region had similar income ratios of women to men, Seattle’s being the
smallest of the group, the income ratio for minorities to whites was by far the largest.
Despite the highest representation of minorities, they appear to be to earning less than
minorities in other regions.
Portland and Austin are similar in median wages for software workers. As a whole
and across gender, Austin software workers earn $2k–$3k more than their Portland
counterparts, but when comparing race/ethnicity, drastic differences emerge. Asian and
white software workers in Austin earn about $5k than Portland Asian and white software
workers. The median incomes and the violin plot show a reversal for minority software
workers: Portland minority software workers make $5k more than Austin minority
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Figure 6.4: Income distribution by gender for software workers, Austin, Portland, and Seattle, ACS
2011–2015.
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software workers. By race/ethnicity, Austin’s software workers have the highest income
stratification, ranging between $53k and $90k, whereas Seattle’s ranges between $84k and
$96k.
In Portland, minorities and women have the largest share in the lowest portion of
the income distribution, yet, once outside this share, there Portland workers exhibit a
healthy middle to their income curves. Asian software workers make more than minority
counterparts, but again the violin plots are not nearly as drastic as Austin’s. There
appears to be a earlier narrowing of income distributions at the high-end of the income
distribution. Portland also had the strongest and healthiest on-boarding community,
welcoming entrants into software production and giving them guidance. As a interviewee
said in the previous chapter, one just needs to show up and someone will be helping them
code.
Seattle contrasts to Portland and Austin in that each of its violin plots resemble near
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Figure 6.5: Income distribution by race/ethnicity for software workers, Austin, Portland, and Seattle, ACS
2011–2015.
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perfect diamonds, with three small notes. First, in stark contrast to Portland and Austin,
the diamond shapes of Seattle’s income distributions leave far fewer software workers at
the bottom of the income distribution. Second, men, as the highest paid group across
any region, had the longest high-end tail in income distributions. Lastly, there appears to
be a noticeable flattening at about the $100k mark in the plots for women, Asians, and
minorities. The flattening is most noticeable in the plot for women’s income distribution.
On the first note, Seattle’s industrial district is the most mature. Microsoft started at
the cusp of, and epitomized, the mass-market software period. The hub-and-spoke nature
reflects the labor market practices of Microsoft and now Amazon in the cloud/mobile
software period. As a previous interviewer noted, both of firms shape the labor practices,
firm strategies, and technologies, of the other, and the spoke-firms in the region. The
diamond shapes reflects the mature and steady growth of the two firms, creating managers
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and providing clear entry points into the firm. Notably, and unlike Portland and Austin,
a software worker would move to Seattle to work for Microsoft or Seattle, rather than
moving without a job to learn to code, like one might in Portland or Seattle.
The second and third notes are related. The flattening of incomes, most noticeable
for women and likely minority women, is the manifestation of a glass ceiling. Men at
Microsoft and Amazon provided the most insight into this phenomenon in interviews.
Some viewed it as a matter of fact.
Well we had an internal report about diversity. Our numbers were better
than most large tech companies. Most of the women [at large firm] are in
non-technical positions ... of course [shrug].58
Others explained that because of their interview process, mainly higher-up engineers
would do the interviews. Interviewees elaborated by describing similar scenarios. On
the day of an candidates interview, a human resources representative, likely a woman,
would greet the candidate. After an initial screening, the rest of the day, comprised of
interviews conducted by senior employees, likely all white or Asian men. The result was
an exacerbation of the gender gap. Only recently have the firms, separately, decided to
alter their interview processes.
To be clear, Seattle’s numbers in Table 6.4 appear almost as equitable as Portland and
Austin in gender, and more equitable in race/ethnicity. As reported in the last chapter,
the median Seattle software income is 2.5 times greater than the metro median, higher
rate than Portland and Austin. Yet the regional mode of production, mediated through
the industrial district, varies the challenges experienced by different groups of workers.
Portland and Austin appear the most similar in that the challenges for women are in
58

Seattle product manager at a large firm. Interview, interview identification withheld.
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entering the regional labor market, whereas in Seattle the challenges for women are in
moving into top management positions.
In the next section I will dive deeper into these issues by examining sub-labor markets.
6.3.2

Segmentation and dualization of the labor market

To gain finer detail into the labor market, to address the three occupational bifurcations
(moments) documented in an earlier section, and to explore feminization of software
labor, I group occupations into four tiers of the labor market: management, top, middle,
and bottom. I choose this method, instead of a simple “dual” labor market, to examine
the long term impacts of the bifurcation of occupations from earlier time periods. A fifth
tier collects all other computer occupations which I include for reporting purposes, but it
cannot be clearly analyzed without further information about the roles of workers in this
occupation. The labor market tiers presented in Table 6.5 are collections of occupation
classifications in the last chapter. For example, engineers and specialized analysts comprise
the top-tier of the labor market while programmers, analysts, and administrators comprise
the middle-tier.
Each tier represents a sub-labor market within software production, having differing
educational or experience requirements and rewarded with matching salaries. The management tier is upper management. The top-tier are technical design, architecture, and
risk mitigation functions. The middle-tier comprises producing and maintaining technical
designs or risk mitigation plans through the development or application of software. The
bottom-tier comprises technical work that relies heavily on already produced software.
Similar to the data in the previous chapter, I present the violin plots and summary
statistics on gender in each region in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.7 and on race/ethnicity in
Table 6.7 and Figure 6.7. Each facet deserves detailed analysis, but the task at hand is
to compare the extent of labor market bifurcation and segmentation and variation local
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Figure 6.6: Income distribution by labor market tier by gender for software workers, Austin, Portland, and
Seattle, ACS 2011–2015.
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Figure 6.7: Income distribution by labor market tier by race/ethnicity for software workers, Austin,
Portland, and Seattle, ACS 2011–2015.
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manifestation. Therefore, I will focus primarily on larger trends. I use interview data to
gain further insight into sub-labor markets. I focus primarily on gender in this section,
reflecting the topics of choice of my interviewees, even women of color.
Women’s participation in the each tier across regions was fairly similar. Notably,
women’s participation in the middle tier was lowest. The middle and bottom tiers
also had highest wage gap of the other tiers. Women in Portland’s middle tier had the
greatest inequity, but traded that for far higher pay in the top tier. In Austin, women in
management had near parity with men.
In Austin and Portland, minority participation taper significantly in the higher tiers.
For race/ethnicity, Portland’s bottom tier and top tier were highly unequal, yet the
middle and upper management tiers were the best performing among the regions. Seattle
had consistent minority representation in each tier, yet, like Austin, had a significant drop
in race/ethnicity wage gap in the top tier. Further, Austin had the lowest race/ethnicity
wage gap of 0.61:1 in its rather large middle tier.
One takeaway thus far is that while the income distributions looked similar for Austin
and Portland, the occupations, and more importantly the sub-labor markets that comprise
those income distributions, vary drastically between region. The mechanisms that exist
for workers in each region to move up in a tier thus also vary drastically. In terms of
purely wage, at no time is moving up a tier a poor choice. Yet, moving up to a higher tier
in the labor market is also difficult. Little if no formal training exists from firms at the
bottom of the labor market. Instead, workers must rely on organizations and networks
outside firm boundaries to climb the career ladder. In places like Seattle, the bottom of
the labor market is already small.
In places like Portland and Austin where there is a relatively large bottom tier of the
labor market, there is little incentive for firms to train workers. One woman lamented
that sexism at the bottom of the labor market expressed this as being expendable to the
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firm, and a liability if she was promoted.
They don’t care about us really, like, what’s in it for them [manager]? I
already experience harassment in the workplace, they’d rather probably see
me out the door [laughter].59
Another women took a previous job as a junior developer with the promise of training.
Even though the pay was less, I took the job because they were willing to train
me... but then they didn’t train me, any of us. It wasn’t a good environment
for women.60
Seeking promotion often requires adhering to certain rules of masculinity and confrontation. An earlier quote from a women documented the incentives to propose new solutions
to managers in team meetings. She also complained that she didn’t bring up solutions
because she didn’t want to have to argue about it with the rest of her team, and in her
own words brought up the masculine nature of the workplace, success and, tying to the
previous quote, promotion.
I’d rather just stay quiet. I’ll write an email later, I just don’t want to ...
argue with the team. It can be hostile and very masculine when you propose something new, especially if they [men on team] don’t know about it
already.61
Even the non-workplace functions of “tech-culture” present challenges.
I hate the game room. It’s too aggressive and competitive.62
59

Portland developer at an SME. Interview, 05/16/2016, D32, notes.
Austin developer at an SME. Interview, 10/03/2015, D2, transcript.
61
Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/27/2016, D27, transcript.
62
Austin developer at an SME. Interview, 10/03/2015, D2, transcript.
60
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And yet, even among women in the workforce, when a women doesn’t express their
opinions, or confront sexism, they can receive backlash from other women.
... people like me get it from the other side too – for not addressing sexism
eveeeery single time something happens. If I did, it would be the only thing
that I do all day, forget working. We should just be able to address the sexist.63
The initial move out of the bottom tier, for women who enter the software labor market
at the bottom, is one of the most commonly identified challenge for women software
workers. Also common among the women I interviewed was the use of a network to find
their current job. Yet to develop that network to get a job outside of the bottom-tier of
the labor market was difficult, even though she was well qualified.
It was all friends of friends. And I felt like it was like once you’re in the
bloodstream, you’re in, and you can kind of do go anywhere and do anything
just by the people you know. [long pause] It took a minute to get into the
bloodstream, like breaking in was kind of hard, but once you’re in, Austin is
small enough that there’s enough, and there’s enough business that people
will quit to go to another company all the time. And now you know someone
at that other company.64
Competition still exists at the bottom of the labor market. She, like the other women I
interviewed, distinguish themselves from other women who attend coding schools but
did not attend college, later commenting that coding schools can only prepare you to do
the code, but not the other tacit queues of the labor market.
It doesn’t matter if you went to Yale or UNT [University of North Texas],
people are willing to work with you.” Even if you only went to a coding
63
64

Portland developer at an external SME. Interview, 09/28/2016, D18, transcript. Emphasis original.
Austin developer at a large external firm. Interview, 11/11/2015, D1, transcript. Emphasis original.
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school ... “people would be willing to work with you, but it’s not the same as
someone who went to college where you [pause] learn more than just code.65
Two other women explained it differently.
You can’t have a bootcamp grad [coding school] be your primary developer.66
Where you go – how far you go – is about about where you start. Man
or woman or whatever. That has certain benefits [chuckle] ... if you’re a
college-educated man.67
The reconfiguring of education in the US to view software development as a job skill
that has potential to create wealth among those with limited access requires scrutiny.
During the time of writing this dissertation, quotes from my interview subjects along
with two events suggest we rethink this narrative. Without the non-technical training,
like integration into a network, navigating promotion, and navigating masculine values,
women and minorities entering at the bottom of the labor market are not equipped to
climb the career ladder.
Recent work has challenged the idea that for-profit educational institutions, like coding
schools, produce workers with adequate skill-sets for the workplace. Instead, for-profit
educational institutions prey on marginalized workers seeking to break into lucrative
occupations and careers (Cottom 2017). Second, ITT Technical Institute (ITT Tech)
closed down its 130 campuses citing trouble with the US and state prosecutors over
predatory practices (Moore-Gerety 2016). ITT Tech, founded in 1969, was the oldest
technical training institution and well-known as promising skills to workers in technical,
and software, fields so that they could get good jobs.
65

Austin developer at a large external firm. Interview, 11/05/2015, D1, transcript.
Austin developer at an SME. Interview, 10/03/2015, D2, transcript.
67
Portland developer at an external SME. Interview, 09/28/2016, D18, transcript.
66

213

With these insights, the systematic bifurcation of software occupations, and insights
from my interviewees, we might conclude that coding schools supply low-skill, low-wage
computer work in large volumes. As we saw from Hall, Markusen, et al., we might
consider this as assembly line software development – similar to the assembly lines of
Detroit. Those workers that enroll in coding schools without college degrees may find
themselves trapped in bottom tier occupations, even with the necessary technical skills.
Women, and especially women of color, face additional gender and race/ethnicity based
racism and sexism.
Yet, even with a single occupation – in a top-tier – the gendering of roles has tangible
impacts.
We’re all architects, but they have me doing the work that is customer facing.
I like it better, but it’s all the women doing anything customer facing. I know
it’s sexist, but I just kinda gave up on pointing it out every time.68
The interviewee continued and explained that coworkers perceived her job as less skilled
than those doing purely technical work, all of whom were men, even though they had the
same job titles. She had the same qualifications and she had more experience than at least
half of her co-workers. She also complained that the customer facing job was, even though
perceived to be less-skilled, was actually a lot harder because it required combination of
both technical and social skills, and she exerted significant emotional labor in working
with customers.
Three women who interfaced directly with customers also shared stories of interacting
with customers who demanded to speak to their boss, one customer even going so far
as to ask directly for the man in charge. In one of the cases, the interviewee was highestlevel customer-facing employee, and in the another, the interviewee was the head of the
68

Portland developer at an external SME. Interview, 09/28/2016, D18, transcript.
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department. To reiterate, they were doing technical software production work alongside
customer-facing work.
All three women, spanning each region, mentioned that they were pigeon-holed
into the work because of their gender. Further, because their jobs are perceived as less
technical, they feel as if they are not rewarded to pursue new skills – addressing the race
condition of software workers – like the men in their same roles. This is at heart of how
bifurcation negatively impacts women. If the technical portion of their job were to be
automated through software, as we expect firms to do, then the men who were able to
pursue new skills would have a better chance of moving into the higher-tier occupation
and the women who were not able to pursue new skills would become the users of the
software. They would be doing technologically based emotional labor.
Referring back to Table B.1, both of the occupations which pay the least require some
sort of customer, or client, facing interaction. They also highlight the use of software.
These are already perceived as more feminine. Median wages in these occupations for
women in both Portland and Austin are less than $35k per year. To move to a middle tier
occupation, the median income for women is about $60k in both Portland and Austin.
This is where the two regions differ begin to differ. In the middle tier, the median income
in Portland is $79k. In Austin it is only $73k for men.
The median income for bottom tier in both regions is in the mid $30ks for minorities.
A move to the middle tier in Austin, for minorities, is met with a median income of $46k.
A move to the middle tier in, for minorities, Portland is met with a median income of
$62k. For Asians the median income in both regions is in the mid $80ks, and for whites
the median income is in the mid $70ks.
I end this section on a rather dire note. I showed how the systematic bifurcation of
software occupations leads to the race of workers to stay competitive by learning new
skills while avoiding being deskilling by other software workers. I showed how sexism
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hinders the progress of women within software work, and combined with bifurcation,
create gendered occupations and gendered roles within single occupations.
In the next section, I look at local responses, mediated through organizations and
institutions, to these forces.
6.4

Local Mediation: Community, Collective Action, and Change

In this section, I discuss the local mediation of labor market dualization and segmentation
outcomes. That is, I discuss the local mediation of the structural forces that lead to
deskilling, and the gendering and racialization of software work, and the uneven distribution of incomes. Institutions and organizations mediate between individual actions
and outcomes and broader society-wide phenomenon. Thus, I focus on local mediation
expressed as the practices of local municipalities, firms, labor organization – whether,
conferences, events, or communities. I call out specific municipalities, firms, and groups,
and use the term labor market intermediaries (LMIs) to refer to the role that they play in
within the labor market. I build from my interview data, participant-observation data,
and the data presented throughout this dissertation. The type and function of an LMI is
dependent on the regional mode of production. Thus, where applicable, I draw on the
similarities between regions, like the Marshallian tendencies of Portland and Austin. In
other places, I draw on the regionally specific components of the region, like Austin’s
public-sector influence, the absence of large firms or a large public-sector, or Seattle’s large
hub-firms.
To understand local mediation, I used the transcriptions from my interviews to
identify actions that workers take which concretize, challenge, or change the ways that
deskilling, segmentation, racism, or sexism impact local labor. I then group these responses
by their action and by the mediation. The chapter subsections reflects the type LMI. As
such, I draw mostly from my interviews with women and minorities in this chapter and,
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following the topics of discussion of my interviewees, I focus primarily on the issues of
deskilling, segmentation, and sexism. Racism did come up, but not in the repeated fashion
that sexism did, nor in references specific to software production. I will address it below.
I close this section by discussing the unique nature of software, stressing the importance of these types of local mediation for software agglomerations.
6.4.1

Labor- and community-groups

A small number of labor- and community-groups, led and organized by local software
workers, act as important LMIs in each of the regions. Those oriented around specific
software technologies or languages tend to seek combat individual and regional deskilling.
Those oriented around women or minorities combat racism and/or sexism in combination
with deskilling, creating opportunities for women and minorities to climb the career
ladder. They are volunteer run and occasionally receive funding from, but frequently use
space provided by, municipalities and/or firms.
The type and orientation of the labor-led LMIs takes on distinctly local character. For
example, in Austin, one of my interview subjects participated in, or started, the local
PyLadies, PyMoms, AustinFeminist, DjangoGirls while also attending the local Python
Users Group. Another Austin woman had a list that didn’t overlap and included Latina
Hackers, Girl Develop IT, Gem Austin, Girl Start, Women Who Code, Girl Connect,
Texas Girls Collective, Code Dojo, and Girls Who Code, while also attending the local
Ruby Users Group. Other women in Austin attended these meetups in conjunction with
others. These groups reflect the communities active involvement in combating gender
and racialized deskilling, creating networks that allow women to find jobs, and provide
solidarity. Latina Hackers’ main purpose was to combat the intersection of structural
racism and sexism by providing a network of women who could network with each other
– seeking to publicize the group in hopes of “smoking out” other Latina software workers
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to build a stronger coalition.69 The group also engages in providing local Latina teenagers
with instruction on software development.
The lists were just as long for some of the women software workers in Portland, but
also included women who started entire annual conferences – OSBridge and PyDX – that
stress the inclusive nature and selected presenters using metrics of equity as well. As
OSCon, mentioned in Chapter 5, moved briefly moved to California for a year, women
and minorities from local meetups banded together to create entire annual conferences
with equity focuses. OSBridge even cutting across technology boundaries and instead
serving the open-source as an ideal. Conference spaces typically hold local Portland
conferences, and firm spaces and bars typically host meetups and user groups. Firms like
Puppet, Jive, New Relic, and Urban Airship all host meetups as long as an employee is
there during the meetup – which sometimes overlaps with the interests of employees.
Some stress the importance of providing women role models to those still in school,
like any of the “girl” groups (with the exception of DjangoGirls), but focus on mentoring
and providing a way to exchange knowledge within the community. I asked every
interview subject how they got started in software and how they grew into their existing
career trajectory. Every woman I interviewed brought up mentoring and networking –
without me specifically asking. They stressed the importance of mentors and networks
in starting or expanding their career. I asked every interview subject how they got
started in software and how they grew into their existing career trajectory. Every woman
I interviewed brought up mentoring and networking without me specifically asking.
While not all LMIs, or even meetups, provide some formal mentoring, having a network
of women or persons of color in similar occupations provide an opportunity to share
experiences. Most LMIs promote some sort of mentoring and those that have received
some mentoring are quick to seek out mentees.
69

Austin developer. Interview, interview identification withheld.
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One interviewee directly associated the growth of her career with the insights and
network she gained when she found a mentor.
My career finally starting taking off when I found other female product
managers mentors.70
Another woman repeatedly mentioned the craft nature of programming, thus necessitating
mentors.
Mentors are vital. Programming is a craft.71
Technical skill building act as justification for these groups. It certainly plays an important
part. However, interviewees expressed two other important parts of these groups – and
LMIs in general: the role of networking, and the role building tacit, non-technical, skills.
A woman in Portland pointed out that there are numerous methods of gaining technical
skill, but the local network and mentoring are not something you can necessarily reading
coding tutorials.
There’s not a lack of learning materials, there’s a lack of mentoring.72
One woman stressed getting over the typical gender role of self-doubt. She learned
the importance talking with other women, even informally, about being a woman in a
male dominated workplace, placing value on having a network to navigate the workplace.
Get over the self-aggrandizing role and stop asking ‘am I going to embarrass
myself?’ That’s a constant topic.73
Another said it differently.
70

Austin developer at a large external firm. Interview, 11/05/2015, D1, transcript.
Austin developer at an SME. Interview, 10/03/2015, D2, transcript.
72
Portland developer at an external SME. Interview, 09/28/2016, D18, transcript.
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Portland developer at an SME. Interview, 10/20/2015, D16, transcript.
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a space that is comfortable ... to lower your guard a little.74 (I need)
Labor-led LMIs like serve important roles. Prior to being successful equity-focused
Portland tech conferences, the two groups were informal networks of colleagues that
crisscrossed in meetups and user groups. While the interviewees stress the importance
of these groups, one women in the Austin complained that the meeting groups lack
the longevity and funding to make permanent impacts. PyDX has yet to approach the
Portland Development Commission, but that may be changing soon. The economic
development agencies can importantly connect the needs of the local labor market to
partners and funding throughout the community, sometimes connecting one group of
workers to another group of individuals.
6.4.2

Municipality led initiatives

Each interviewer that mentioned an influential LMI mentioned their local nature. Referring back to the idealized industrial district typology, we recall that workers in huband-spoke district workers are loyal to the firm, whereas Marshallian district workers are
loyal to district. Similarly, the local-focused, whether firm or district based, was necessary
to focus on the immediate needs of the labor market.
Municipalities, and their economic development agencies, play important roles in
coordinating firm initiatives, a discussion for the next section, and for liaising between
firms and labor groups. This allows for local municipalities fund and give legitimacy to
local firm and labor needs. In Austin, Capital Factory does just this, shaping and reflecting
the local labor market. It provides spaces for local meetups, provides low-cost startup
space, and has a gender and racial diversity requirements as part of its coding school. The
original group of Capital Factory founders approached the City of Austin’s Economic
Development Department for funding of Capital Factory. This was the catalyst to making
74
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the rag-tag group of 17 developers turned local champions – originally only connected
by one of the founders — into the mentors for the first class of the startup accelerator,
connecting the group to other public and private resources. Today, Capital Factory, as a
public-private initiative Local entrepreneurs seek venture capital, local software workers
use coding schools to expand from their legacy coding training into new languages like
Ruby and python.
In the Seattle region, municipalities primarily work to meet firm needs. In Portland
and Austin, municipalities also seek to meet firm needs, but, like Seattle, they focus on
large firms which may be technology-oriented, but aren’t necessarily software focused.
These are important, but I argue the importance of software-specific LMIs in the last
part of this section. In Portland, the successful and local serving OSBridge conference
approached the Portland Development Commission for seed funding. They were able to
get a small grant and make the first conference a success. PyDX has yet to approach the
city, but has found funding from other local firms.
6.4.3

Firms and firm associations

The Seattle region does have community groups, but the community is less organized
and overshadowed by the dominance of Amazon and Microsoft. More specifically, the
community is less organized across firm boundaries. Instead, both Microsoft and Amazon
have internal mentoring programs, internal classes or pay for classes at local universities,
and have informal book groups – two mentioned the book written by former Yahoo
CEO “Lean In,” which were the best attended book groups that either had participated
in, and were happy to report that the group was critical of her work.
To be clear, firms can play important LMI roles that can sometimes mitigate the
impacts of labor market segmentation and deskilling. Sometimes though, they can’t –
or mitigation is against their best interest. The story of Microsoft’s recent restructuring
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to make its employees all developers, phasing out the testing-only engineers, is just one
example. Large firms do have both technical groups and groups that are, for example,
specifically for women. But large firms, especially more mature ones, still have remnants
of a company culture that one might have expected to from IBM or Tektronix. These
types of cultures realize the value in investing in labor, within firm boundaries, even
if the cost and benefits of which are not easily attributed to a segments profit or loss.
These types of programs, of course, require that the company is making enough surplus
to reinvest in technology, expansion, and labor. Companies like Amazon, which only
recently became consistently profitable, may not have the same types of expectations or
culture.
One Austin employee that worked at a branch of a large, mature, external firm said
that she goes to all the women-oriented meetings.
There’s actually really good conversation there. And sometimes when we
pick our battles, we can, we make change happen like the presentation group.
I ask for funding for [name of local labor-led group].75
Workers at every large firm I interviewed, whether headquartered locally or at a branch,
reiterated the importance of mentoring. A women in Seattle didn’t care that her mentors
were both men, one of them she sought out informally and the other was formally
assigned through her on-boarding.
Every place is different. I wanted to know what would be valuable to Amazon.
I would not have been able to move from front-end to my position without
their help.76
75
76

Austin developer at a large external firm. Interview, 11/05/2015, D1, transcript.
Seattle developer at a large firm. Interview, 10/27/2016, D27, transcript.
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Another woman in Austin sought the mentoring of a woman at a local branch of a large
external software oriented firm. She related her happiness in her current job to her
learning how to handle various situations from her mentor.
It’s simple. If you’re not happy, you’re not going to stay.77
And often it is in the firms best interest to support mentoring, skill-building, and
networking, even if it crosses firm boundaries. It often benefits firms in ways that manager
may not be able to identify, hence the importance, as one interviewee put it to stress the
technical skills over tacit skills when seeking firm support. The hard technical skills are
what the managers of the software workers I interviewed think are important to their job.
Firms also play important actors in creating or participating in multi-firm led initiatives. In Portland, led by Puppet, a group of the largest (small) software firms alongside
branch plants of other software firms, banded together to create a diversity pledge. The
pledge is to improve diversity in women and minorities in technical positions. One of my
interview subjects advised on the measures of success and the method of reporting. One
of the key issues was salary transparency – a sticking point for some of the firms – which
was later made optional.
6.4.4

What makes this unique to software?

LMIs are, of course, important across any laboring activity or industry. Two items make
LMIs more important for software. The first is that software production produces more
software. The second is the already low inclusion rates of women and minorities. These
two characteristics feed into each other.
First, as I’ve shown at length, software production is unique because software produces
software. Software is a tool of automation used to increase efficiency. Its low-materiality
77
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means that its production requires little material input and that drastically reconfiguring
and replacing its purpose or function can be a few lines of code. Thus the speed of
software development is rapid compared to other types of production because human
knowledge, through living labor and the dead labor stored in existing software, is the
primary input. With the internet, the distribution can be instantaneous and free. There
is no need to ship a design to manufacturer to produce prototypes, send them back for
approval, and so on until it gets into a store where a customer visits to purchase the
physical commodity. The low-materiality means that firms’ costs are overwhelmingly
labor related. Software workers, which have only their labor to sell, produce new software.
Firms and workers use software to improve the efficiency of software production (recall
the back-end developer asking if he could just use a front-end library instead of having
to work with the front-end developers). This means that when software workers make
software for firms, they may be deskilling themselves, their colleagues, software workers
in another country, or society in general. Consequently, software workers are under
constant pressure to reskill themselves by learning new software libraries or languages.
Second, the already dismal inclusion rates of minorities and women are unlikely to
improve on their own without significant structural changes – if anything, they seem
to reinforce barriers for marginalized groups seeking entrance into the software labor
market. Certainly feminization offers one avenue of change, but because of the first issue,
women and minorities are at a disadvantage in skillbuilding that will meaningfully impact
inclusion or wages. The metaphorical rungs on the ladder that lead to climbing into the
top-tier of the labor market are few and far between. Instead, women and minorities will
continue to concentrate at the bottom of the labor market. Certainly there are broader
social issues at play, namely blatant bigotry, but software production is already infamously
dominated by white men.
These items place increased importance on the role of collective action. Collective
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action, as a labor group, through government, or at the firm, allows for software workers
to decide how and what software to produce – enabling software workers to engage in the
question “software production for whom?” In this research, the strongest collective action
groups were the groups that sought to address issues of inclusion first, then technical
skillbuilding second. Building stronger local labor-led groups helps to mitigate the negative
structural tendencies toward rapid deskilling and the racialization/gendering of software
work. Those groups which seek to address inclusion are most likely to not only mitigate
negative impacts of labor market dualization and segmentation, but also to create software
for the district, a scenario that happened in Portland in the late-2000s and early-2010s.
These are what led to Calagator, a calendar to track local events, and WriteTheDocs, a set
of local conferences to improve documentation of open-source software – both tools vital
for new entrants to Portland’s labor market and to software in general.
I’ll end this section with a quote from a women from Austin about why she participates
in so many different groups.
What kind of culture do you want to make? [You] have to create these
moments.78
6.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, I sought to understand the labor market dualization and segmentation
of software production, its local manifestations, and how it is locally mediated through
institutions and practices. Specifically, I asked two questions:
1. To what extent has software production demonstrated tendencies toward labor
market dualization and segmentation by gender and race/ethnicity?
2. How are these labor market outcomes mediated by local institutions and practices?
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To address the first question, I iterated on the IPUMS dataset, adding race and gender
as key variables to the growing list of income, occupation, and metro region and again
analyzed interview and participant-observation data. I present the historical trends of
bifurcation in the software occupations by developing Tables 6.1 and Figure 6.1. I then
combined occupations into like groups, forming labor market tiers. I use these four tiers
to understand gender and race/ethnicity dynamics, addressing the feminization of the
labor market. I showed how five moments of occupational bifurcation manifest as labor
market dualization. I then showed how these structural forces are mediated through the
regional mode of production. I show that the low-skill software labor market is distinctly
more female and more non-white and that there are fewer opportunities for workers in
the bottom tier of the labor market to advance.
Lastly, to address the last question, I found similarities in the experiences of software
workers and outlined how local responses, through labor-groups, local government, firms,
or combinations of these, give labor greater power to mitigate negative impacts that I
identified addressing the first question.
Building on this research, I’ll repeat the claims I made at the beginning of the chapter.
1. The product of software labor is software, and software is the same “machine”
used to automate software work. The rapid pace of software development thus
coincides with the rapid deskilling of software workers. Software workers thus
implicate themselves in creating programs which deskill themselves and other
software workers.
2. Regionally specific modes of production mold the dualization and segmentation of
the local software labor market. Nationally, the share and number of women and
persons of marginalized racial/ethnic backgrounds is growing, but primarily at the
lowest tier of the labor market. Occupations in the lowest tier are more precarious
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than their higher-skilled counterparts, require less skill and provide less income.
Local variations on national trends depend on the regional mode of production.
3. Labor market intermediaries -– through initiatives and groups within large firms
like the example in Seattle, through community-led events like the example in
Portland, or through community-organizations like the example in Austin — play a
important roles in enabling marginalized workers to build technical skills and gain
soft, or tacit, skills to better navigate the labor market.
This chapter argues that regional divergence in software production shape the form
of, and the responses to, labor market dualization and segmentation. I showed that
labor market dualization and segmentation manifest differently in each region. I showed
that local responses, mediated by local institutions and local practices, are necessary
to mitigate the detrimental impacts of the local manifestations of segmentation and
bifurcation. Ultimately, however, this chapter argues that collective action is a necessary
response to mitigate broader structural forces that detrimentally impact women and
minorities.
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Table 6.3: Median income by race/ethnicity for software workers, 1970-2015.
National median income by race/ethnicity for software workers, 1970-2015.
1970

1980

1990

2000

2009

2015

Asian, NH

5,200

21,820

89,711

386,098

558,665

769,133

White, NH

273,600

476,500

1,081,902

2,493,945

2,574,136

2,814,476

12,200

41,640

117,371

414,354

485,494

661,362

4%

8%

9%

13%

13%

16%

Asian, NH

62,178

59,886

68,174

79,710

84,156

85,000

White, NH

66,126

61,549

65,877

72,464

74,220

72,262

Minority, all other

52,967

53,234

58,435

60,870

61,935

60,000

0.80

0.86

0.89

0.84

0.83

0.83

66,126

166,304

35,460

48,116

74,220

72,262

Size of workforce

Minority, all other
Percent minority
Median income

Income ratio
Median income
All software workers

(Table 6.3, Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.2) Minority excludes Asian non-Hispanic, listed separately. Incomes in
2015 USD. Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015)
ACS 2011–2015. Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1050,
1060, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1200, 1220.
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Table 6.4: Median income by gender and race/ethnicity for software workers, Austin, Portland, Seattle,
ACS 2011–2015
Gender and race/ethnicity dynamics for software workers.
Austin

Portland

Seattle

Men

43,511

33,287

93,881

Women

11,437

10,083

26,055

21%

23%

22%

Men

77,424

75,297

98,070

Women

66,140

63,232

80,092

0.85

0.84

0.82

Asian, NH

9,129

5,764

31,680

White, NH

35,965

33,074

78,211

9,854

4,532

10,045

18%

10%

8%

Asian, NH

90,104

85,000

96,666

White, NH

75,359

70,081

94,631

Minority, all other

52,694

57,963

84,310

0.70

0.83

0.89

75,359

72,000

94,000

Size of workforce

Percent women
Median income

Income ratio
Size of workforce

Minority, all other
Percent minority
Median income

Income ratio
Median income
All software workers

(Figure 6.4, Figure 6.5, and Table 6.4) Minority excludes Asian non-Hispanic, listed separately. Incomes in
2015 USD. Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015)
ACS 2011–2015. Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1050,
1060, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1200, 1220.
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Table 6.5: Software occupation labor market tiers, ACS 2011–2015.

Codes

ACS software occupation codes and labor market tiers based on job function.
Titles
Classification
Median Income

Upper Management
110
Computer & information systems managers
Top-Tier
1020
Software developers
1106
Network architect
1200
Actuaries
1007
Information security analyst
Middle-Tier
1005
Computer research scientist
1010
Computer programmers
1006
Computer scientist & systems analyst
1220
Operations research analyst
1060
Database administrators
1105
Network & computer systems administrators
Bottom-Tier
1030
Web developers
1050
Computer support specialist
Other
1107
All other computer occupations

Managers

95,000

Engineers
Engineers
Specialized Analysts
Specialized Analysts

90,000
90,000
96,005
80,092

Programmers
Programmers
Analysts
Analysts
Administrators
Administrators

74,085
73,771
71,000
71,320
71,227
64,074

Coders
Coders

42,155
46,454

Other

60,000

Note: See Table B.1 in Appendix B for descriptions, incomes, and more information.
Incomes in 2015 USD. Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek,
et al. 2015) ACS 2011–2015. Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1010, 1020,
1030, 1050, 1060, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1200, 1220.
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Table 6.6: Median income labor market tiers by gender for software workers, Austin, Portland, Seattle,
ACS 2011–2015

Tier
Size of workforce
Upper
Management
Top

Middle

Bottom

Median income
Upper
Management
Top

Middle

Bottom

Median income
All

Labor market tiers and gender dynamics for software workers.
Gender
Austin
Portland

Seattle

Men
Women
Percent women
Men
Women
Percent women
Men
Women
Percent women
Men
Women
Percent women

4,784
1,881
28%
16,677
3,322
17%
11,380
3,291
22%
7,877
2,117
21%

3,808
1,597
30%
11,819
2,752
19%
8,554
2,937
26%
7,107
2,043
22%

8,948
3,920
30%
49,322
9,538
16%
19,743
7,512
28%
10,980
3,678
25%

Men
Women
Income ratio (women:men)
Men
Women
Income ratio (women:men)
Men
Women
Income ratio (women:men)
Men
Women
Income ratio (women:men)

90,104
89,543
0.99
95,000
80,092
0.84
73,084
61,939
0.85
42,000
34,778
0.83

96,110
82,094
0.85
90,104
81,148
0.90
79,041
59,068
0.75
42,155
34,596
0.82

110,000
90,104
0.82
108,393
94,849
0.88
90,560
72,717
0.80
55,063
46,807
0.85

All software workers

75,359

72,000

94,000

(Table 6.6 and Figure 6.7). Incomes in 2015 USD. Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMSUSA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015) ACS 2011–2015. Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005,
1006, 1007, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1050, 1060, 1105, 1106, 1107, 1200, 1220.
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Table 6.7: Median income labor market tiers by race/ethnicity for software workers, Austin, Portland,
Seattle, ACS 2011–2015

Tier
Size of workforce
Upper
Management

Top

Middle

Bottom

Median income
Upper
Management

Top

Middle

Bottom

Median income
All

Labor market tiers and race/ethnicity dynamics for software workers.
Race/ethnicity
Austin
Portland
Asian, NH
White, NH
Minority, all other
Percent minority
Asian, NH
White, NH
Minority, all other
Percent minority
Asian, NH
White, NH
Minority, all other
Percent minority
Asian, NH
White, NH
Minority, all other
Percent minority
Asian, NH
White, NH
Minority, all other
Income ratio (minority:white)
Asian, NH
White, NH
Minority, all other
Income ratio (minority:white)
Asian, NH
White, NH
Minority, all other
Income ratio (minority:white)
Asian, NH
White, NH
Minority, all other
Income ratio (minority:white)
All software workers

Seattle

810
4,906
949
14%
4,959
12,106
2,934
15%
2,018
9,980
2,673
18%
771
6,861
2,362
24%

332
4,781
292
5%
3,303
9,824
1,444
10%
1,186
9,137
1,168
10%
604
7,063
1483
16%

2,306
9,523
1,039
8%
20,877
33,619
4,364
7%
5,276
19,726
2,253
8%
2,281
11,001
1376
9%

103,232
90,000
67,077
0.75
92,106
94,849
87,508
0.92
87,000
75,000
46,000
0.61
66,140
40,000
38,444
0.96

130,150
88,000
81,093
0.92
94,849
87,747
68,502
0.78
85,000
71,000
61,939
0.87
64,004
40,701
34,778
0.85

100,000
106,000
84,310
0.80
101,172
110,127
100,135
0.91
87,472
84,310
72,262
0.86
55,745
52,648
45,000
0.85

75,359

72,000

94,000

(Table 6.7 and Figure 6.7). Minority excludes Asian non-Hispanic, listed separately. Incomes in 2015 USD.
Author’s calculations from data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015) ACS 2011–2015.
Software occupations include OCC codes 110, 1005, 1006, 1007, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1050, 1060, 1105, 1106,
1107, 1200, 1220.
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Figure 6.8: Count of software workers in each labor market tier, Austin, Portland, and Seattle, ACS
2011–2015.
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7 Conclusion

This mixed-methods dissertation sought to understand the dynamics of software production in regional economies. To do this, I embarked on a journey to trace and analyze the
changing nature of software production, the changing geography of software production,
the regionally-specific modes of production, and the tendencies to contribute to gendered
and racialized inequity. In the end, I found that software workers are hypersensitive to
capitalist logic because of the unique nature of software and software production. Workers
seek network and skilling-based communities to avoid risk exposure. The place-based nature of software production and these communities provide avenues to combat deskilling,
and dualization and segmentation along lines of race/ethnicity and gender. I’ll review
some of the key findings before returning to a brief discussion of the need of collective
action in software work.
7.1

Summary of Findings

I argued that software production is like management or clerical work. Therefore,
software is best measured as a laboring activity that is integral in both new and established
production processes. Software labor is integral in industries ranging from health care,
food production, biotechnology, finance, education, and extractive industries. I showed
that software workers were 0.35% in 1970 and that the 4.3 million software workers in
2011–2015 comprise 2.66% of the labor force. I introduced a fourth period of software
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production that draws on the connected nature of personal devices, web/mobile apps,
and cloud computing. Each of the software periods represent the products cycles of firms
that heavily rely on software during that time, some of which are able to reconfigure
themselves across periods. Management persistently pressures software and software
workers increase efficiency in order reduce labor costs. Changes in the workplace and
software production itself transform the capital-labor relationship in software production
from machinofacture to post-Foridst, with evidence today of a computational flexible
relationship.
In each software period, new regional software agglomerations emerge, reordering
the relationships between regions. Regional modes of software production – locally
specific software production – became more divergent over time. Specifically, in 1970 a
region’s level software production was dependent on mostly on the size of the region. By,
2015 regions had thriving and differentiated software industrial districts. As firms and
workers in each of these second-tier (not Silicon Valley) regions develop new software,
they diverge across production (technologies, skill-sets, labor markets), social relations
(class-based firm-worker relationships), and/or spatial organizations (industrial district
formations). Different modes of production, situated in a regions historical trajectories
produce different sets of software occupations and income distributions. I examined the
history of my three case regions, their industrial districts, and the ways in which their
software firms and workers produce software. Specifically, I analyzed each region’s forces
of production (technologies, skill-sets, labor markets), social relations (class-based firmworker relationships), and spatial organizations (industrial district formations). With this
data, I created industrial district types to reflect my three cases regions and detailed their
industrial composition. Seattle exhibits tendencies of a hub-and-spoke industrial district,
Portland exhibits tendencies of a Marshallian industrial district, and Austin exhibits
tendencies of a mixed industrial district. For each region, I demonstrated how historical
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developments resulted in software industrial districts with regionally specific modes of
production.
Second-tier cities challenge the dominance of Silicon Valley’s software agglomeration.
The fates of regional software agglomerations lies in the ability of the firms and workers
in the industrial districts to adapt to the new profit cycles of new software periods.
For example, Microsoft’s dominance in the mass-market software period did not ensure
success in the cloud-and-mobile software period, but with new leadership, Microsoft is
starting to adapt. Amazon emerged as a cloud-and-mobile software firm and may have
helped build regional specialization in cloud and mobile technologies. Similarly, Portland
and Austin had small software agglomerations that emerged from different historical
trajectories in the 2000s. Both regions benefited from adjacent industries, and Portland
benefited from the development of an open-source network of software workers across
industries.
Software production has historically undergone bifurcation, resulting in labor market
dualization and segmentation. Five moments of occupational bifurcation manifest as
labor market dualization. Four tiers of the software labor market can be to understand
gender and race/ethnicity dynamics, addressing the feminization of the labor market.
Structural forces are mediated through the regional mode of production. I show that
the low-skill software labor market is distinctly more female and more non-white and
that there are fewer opportunities for workers in the bottom tier of the labor market to
advance. Women and minorities are systematically disadvantaged in the software labor
market as bifurcation privileges those at the top of the labor market. With already low
inclusion rates, women and minorities find themselves stuck at the bottom of the labor
market. Yet, there are similarities in the experiences of software workers that develop
local responses, through labor-groups, local government, firms, or combinations of these,
to give labor greater power to mitigate these negative impacts.
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The product of software labor is software, and software is the same “machine” used to
automate software work. The rapid pace of software development thus coincides with the
rapid deskilling of software workers. Software workers implicate themselves in creating
programs which deskill themselves and other software workers. To fight these tendencies,
collective action is necessary. Collective action allows for software workers to decide
how and what software to produce – enabling software workers to engage in the question
“software production for whom?” In this research, the strongest collective action groups
were the groups that sought to address issues of inclusion first, then technical skillbuilding
second. Building stronger local labor-led groups helps to mitigate the negative structural
tendencies toward rapid deskilling and the racialization/gendering of software work.
Those groups which seek to address inclusion are most likely to not only mitigate negative
impacts of labor market dualization and segmentation, but also to create software for the
district.
7.2

Collective Action

I opened the dissertation with a quote, perhaps a plea, to learn how to code from President
Barack Obama. But without collective action – like the important roles that labor-led
groups in the last chapter provide to enable marginalized workers to build technical skills
and gain soft/tacit skills to better navigate the labor market – regional software work
resorts to reducing inclusion of women and minorities. I showed that regionally specific
modes of production mold the dualization and segmentation of the local software labor
market. Nationally, the growth of women and persons of marginalized racial/ethnic
backgrounds in software occupations is encouraging, but growth is “quarantined” at the
lowest tier of the labor market.
Occupations in the lowest tier are more precarious than their higher-skilled counterparts, require less skill and provide less income. Local variations on national trends depend
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on the regional mode of production. Even still, because of the structure of the labor
market and the rapid pace of software development, the benefits of software production
do not reach across all software workers. I use the stories in this dissertation to describe
the mechanisms, structural and social, that result in this inequity. In chapter 6, I show that
the median incomes of women and minorities in the bottom-tier of the software labor
market is about $35k a year – less than the amount required for self-sufficiency in each
of my case study regions and in stark contrast to the idea that software work produces
wealth.
Noble (1986), Braverman (1998), Massey (1995) research other technology-oriented
industries. Auto workers, for example, were once highly admired and performed highly
skilled work. As the auto industry matured and automation became more pervasive, a
similar bifurcation happened amongst automakers. We now use the auto worker as the
classic “retrain the autoworker to program” when we talk about tech. In this sense, these
structural forces aren’t new. What is new is the rate at which they feedback into the labor
market. I noted earlier that this same phenomenon is what allows software profit cycles
to advance so quickly, and why software production, as it continues to evolve, provides
glimpses into the ways that capitalism in general may evolve and how it might affect other
forms of production. This should sound an alarm. Even if we retrained autoworkers,
their positions will likely be just as precarious, if not more so, than when they were
autoworkers. With just a few lines of code, we could negate the need for them altogether.
7.3

Interventions

The state and labor can serve important roles to intervene, mitigate, and potentially
reverse some of the structural forces outlined in this dissertation. Examples from each
region present preliminary blueprints for such interventions. For example, the highly
networked laborers in Portland used their power across firms and across industry to
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learn from each other, elevate the status of the region, and pressure local firms to pledge
to increase diversity and diversity transparency. Local economic development agencies
promote these numbers, further attracting and growing the number and career trajectories
of traditionally marginalized software workers. In regions with hub firms, like Seattle,
workers use their power within the firm to raise awareness around gender through book
groups. In Austin, networked workers seek to ensure that traditionally marginalize groups
have the same access to technical education and career networking that their counterparts
do. The public-private partnership model in Austin provides a blueprint for both Seattle
and Portland to continue to support local entrepreneurs.
While these examples are only blueprints, other more generalizable observations
emerged from this research for economic development agencies. First, connecting workers
across firm, industry, and public-private divides are vital to increase the power of laborers.
At first, this might seem counterproductive to firms, and capital, but stronger labor
networks only increase the “sticky-ness” of regional software production, fueling further
agglomeration. Second, the role economic development agencies have in promoting
locally-serving software conferences that focus on inclusivity and regionally-specific
technologies have direct impact for both laborers, firms, and the interconnected nature of
both laborers and firms. The benefits may be obvious in regions like Austin and Portland,
but even in Seattle, these events have the potential to facilitate and improve relationships
between large firms, small firms, and individual contractors – potentially improving equity
and helping create local and specialized knowledge. In Portland, economic development
support came in the form of money to sponsor local events, but support might come
in seeking to create the networks necessary to develop events altogether. Finally, local
economic development agencies have responsibilities to pressure software firms, large and
small, to report numbers of equity and diversity in technical software roles. These could
be tied to easements or tax credits.
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Each of these intervention points seeks to increased labor power and growth local
software agglomerations. Increased labor power might help workers combat equity
and raise awareness about the deskilling nature of software work in general. Increased
inclusivity is a key ingredient in “innovation” – but also in creating better social outcomes.
7.4

Future Research

There are several avenues for future research as a result of this work. The most immediate
would be to extend the intensive research to new regions. Of particular interest is
the regions of DC and Baltimore because of their similarities to Seattle and Portland
respectively. DC is public-sector dominated and Baltimore has a smaller startup scene
similar to, but different than, Portland or Austin. Importantly, equity and inclusion are
of key concern in both regions. Second, the addition of non-PUMS data sources might
provide additional insights into the dynamics observed in this dissertation and might
include data from venture capital totals from Thomson Reuters, regional top firms by
industry from RefUSA, firm/establishment size from County Business Patterns, industry
employment in HT/IT industries, or detail from the National Establishment Time-Series
data. Third, expanding on the capitalist variants seems to be larger and longer, but
important, component of this research. Finally, examining the specific role of masculinity
and the internalization of the neoliberal subject withing software production provide an
altogether new area for research.
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Appendix A: Using PUMA-based data for Metropolitan Level Analysis, 1970-2015

‘Critical GIS,’ in the form of intricately interwoven affinities
advocated above, can help us constructively engage not only
mainstream GIScience and the ever-proliferating intersections of
computation with space and place but also critical human
geography.
Thatcher et al. 2016, 821

A.1

Introduction

This appendix seeks to document the a method that assigns a portion of a PUMA
geography’s population to its overlapping metro area according to the US Census Bureau’s
2013 definitions. For each 10-year Census period and PUMA geography period, the
proportion of PUMA’s population living within the metro area determines the portion
of a PUMA’s population assigned to its corresponding metro area. In this calculation, the
US Census census-tract-level population for each period (for example, 1970 census-tract
populations for the 1970 dataset, and the 2010 census-tract population for the ACS 20052009 and ACS 2011–2015) determines the distribution of a PUMA’s population. The result
is a crosswalk for the IPUMS PUMA-based data and corresponding US metropolitan
areas for four US Census time periods – 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 – and two recent
American Community Survey samples – 2005-2009 and 2011–2015. The research in this
chapter focuses on the 51 US metros with 2010 US Census populations of over 1 million
residents (large metros).
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This appendix will also detail the steps taken to perform this. Longitudinal Tract
Database (LTDB) which harmonizes tract boundaries for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 into
the 2010 tract boundaries. The LTDB was chosen, rather than using the original tract
boundaries, to further assist scholars that are performing historical tract-level research in
combination with metropolitan-level research.
A.2

Setup and Data Sources

A.2.1

Longitudinal Tract Database

Scholars from Brown University, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, and Florida
State University publish the LTDB (see Logan, Xu, and Stults 2014; Logan, Stults, and
Xu 2016). The database provides multiple functions, including the capacity to create tractlevel data in 2010 boundaries with any dataset that is in 1970 or later. New functionality
allows researchers to convert 2010 data into 2000 level data. For the exercise at hand, we
seek to use population data using 2010 tract-level boundaries for the years 1970, 1980,
1990, 2000, and 2010. I downloaded LTDB population data and combined each year
into a single shapefile before importing. In this code, ltdb_albers contains the actual
tract boundaries and ltdbxy_albers contains the tracts converted to point features
(performed prior to this exercise).
A.2.2

PUMA Geographies

These are the geographies used by IPUMS USA. Note that in 1970 and 1980 these are
called County Groups, yet are commonly referred to as PUMAs. Each of these files were
downloaded from the IPUMS USA GIS Boundary Files web repository.
• 1970 metro sample County Group boundary file in puma1970.
• 1980 5% County Group boundary file in puma1980.
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• 1990 5% PUMA boundary file in puma1990.
• 2000 PUMAs – 2000 TIGER/Line Basis in puma2000.
• 2010 Decennial Census and 2012-onward ACS PUMA boundary file in puma2010.
A.2.3

Metropolitan Statistical Areas

Metropolitan shapefiles (also CBSA) were downloaded from the US Census Bureau
website. This exercise used the 2015 definition at the 1:500,000 resolution, using the
file cb_2015_us_cbsa_500k.zip. The Micropolitan Statistical Areas were removed and
only the Metropolitan Statistical Areas were used by filtering LSAD for values of M1.
A.3

Overview

The desired output of the work in this appendix is a table which provides a weighted
crosswalk between metropolitan area and each PUMA (or county group) which intersects
that metropolitan area. Five tables are generated for 2015 metropolitan area boundaries
for county groups in 1970, county groups in 1980, PUMAs 1990, PUMAs in 2000, and
PUMAs in 2010. The popshare column contains a number between greater than 0
and a maximum of 1. A value of 1 means that the entire population of the PUMA is
contained in the metropolitan area. A value of .5 means half the population of the PUMA
is contained in the metropolitan area. There are no 0 values as those are excluded. The
popshare value is calculated using population weighting and is based on the population
of the census tracts in that PUMA and MSA in the census year.
An alternative method for calculating this share would be an area weighted share. An
example, using the 2015 boundaries for Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL Metropolitan
Statistical Area and the 1970 county groups, might help illustrate how this might work.
See Figure A.1. The metropolitan area engulfs (shown in black) engulfs County Group
(CG) 3201, but only partially takes up CG 3202 and CG 3203. How might we apportion
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Figure A.1: Orlando 1970 County Groups

the population of CG to the metro area? An area weighted method would look at the
fact that the metro area that is in CG 3203 is 3,899 square kilometers (sqkm). CG 3202
is 6,715 sqkm. We would then apply a ratio of CG 3202 toward the metro area of 3,899
sqkm / 6,715 sqkm, or 0.58. For the IPUMS USA data, then, we would scale the person
weight (PERWT) of CG 3202 for CBSA 36740 (Orlando Metropolitan Statistical Area) to
0.58. This introduces a couple of problems. First, we assume that the population of CG
3203 is distributed homogenously across the country group. Second, we assume that the
population characteristics are distributed evenly across the population. Let us tackle the
first issue.
To account for the first assumption introduced in an area weighted calculation, this
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Figure A.2: Orlando 1970 County Groups with Tract Density

exercises uses a population weighting approach. If we look at the distribution of the
population using 1970 tracts in Figure A.2, we see that the the majority of the population
of CG 3202 is not within the metropolitan area, but instead on the the coast on the
eastern part of the CG. If we calculate the number of people that live within the metro
area portion CG 3202, then divide by the total population of CG 3202, we will have
a population weighted ratio. Figure A.2 shows that most of the area that is within the
metro area of CG 3202 is sparsely inhabited or uninhabited altogether. The population
of the metro portion of CG 3202 is 25,266 people. The total population of CG 3202 is
251,978 people. A population weighted ratio would then take the form of 25,266 people /
251,978 people, or 0.10.
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Comparing the two ratios, 0.10 is a huge difference compared to 0.58!
We still retain the second assumption, which is that the 0.10 portion of the population
that we might account for in the metro area is representative of the entire CG. Without
access to the microdata or introducing new errors, this assumption remains.
To generate Figure A.1, we must project our data into WGS 84. I also chose to use a
blank ggplot (blank_map).
To generate FIGURE 2, we must select the necessary counties that comprise our
county groups and project to WGS 84. Then we’ll calculate the density using fields that
were added prior to import (area_sqkm).
A.4

Analysis

A.4.1

Challenges

Two challenges were identified in the construction of the crosswalks. First, the resolution
of the PUMAs and the resolution of the census tracts are significantly different. Islands in
the key west, for example, have two different shapes: a rough boxy shape from census
tracts, and a coastline accurate shape from the PUMAs. How then do we easily assign
census tracts to their smaller geography of PUMA without accidentally assigned a census
tract to its neighboring PUMA with which it might overlap in the slightest?
Second, some tracts are outside PUMAs altogether. These are tracts that no population,
but are considered part of the PUMA regardless of their shapefile exclusion. Examples
of this are evident in bodies of water like the Delaware Bay. PUMAs are collections of
counties which extend into water and should not follow coastlines. The Delaware Bay is
split between a Delaware portion and the New Jersey portion. Tracts on the east side are
part of New Jersey PUMAs and tracts on the west side are part of Delaware PUMAs.
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To overcome these challenges, census tracts were converted to points. Each tract was
converted to its centroid point that falls inside the tract boundary. Then, cycling through
each PUMA, I assign each tract a PUMA if the tract is within that PUMA. A second loop
is run for each tract that was not assigned a PUMA which finds the nearest PUMA and
assigns a value based on the distance to the nearest PUMA. Each of the five Census years
between 1970 to 2010 were performed this way.
A.4.2

Post process MSA data

We’re only interested in MSAs with a population over 500,000 people, and we want
to exclude non-MSA residuals (where msa2015 is equal to 99999). We also assigned
zeros where there are NAs in the LTDB population data. Census 2010 tracts boundaries
sometimes overlap with to areas that were untracted in 1970 and 1980.
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Appendix B: Additional Tables and Figures

This section contains my interview protocols, figures, and tables which were not included
in the text of the dissertation.
B.1

Interview Protocol
B.1.1

Informed consent letter

(Printed on Portland State Letterhead)
July 2015
Modes of Software Production and Economic Development
This research broadly investigates the software sector of Portland, Seattle and Austin.
Of particular interest are the experiences of software workers in producing software,
the methods you’ve used and the way your work is organized. In conducting this
research, I will document the implementation and impacts of various types of software
production. You have been selected for this interview because of your involvement in
software production.
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. You may suspend or
otherwise discontinue your interview at any point, with no penalty. There are no
anticipated benefits of a direct nature for your participation in this research.
The information you provided through this interview will be used to support research
regarding software production. As such, the information you provide is confidential.
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The information you provide through this interview will be referenced in a manner that
would not allow a reader to identify you, directly or indirectly. In some cases, quotes
or statements may be used based on non-identifying descriptors, such as “a Software
Development Engineer in the Seattle region” or “a Director of User Experience in the
Austin region.”
With your permission, we would like to record our interview using a digital audio
recorder. The purpose of the recordings is to ensure the accuracy of my collection of the
information, and to allow for a more interactive conversation. However, you may request
for me to not record the interview, or certain parts of it.
If you have questions following the interview, you can reach me by email at dillonm@pdx.edu or via phone at (503) 583-2483. If you have concerns regarding the
methods used, or questions about rights as a research subject, you may contact the PSU
Human Subjects Research Review Committee: by phone at (503) 725-2227 or (877)
480-4400; by email at hsrrc@pdx.edu; or by postal mail at PSU Institutional Review
Board, Office of Research Integrity, 1600 SW 4th Ave., Market Center Building, Ste. 620,
Portland, OR 97201.
You may keep this letter for your records.
Sincerely,
Dillon Mahmoudi
B.1.2

Recruitment message

(Sent via email or social media)
Dear [name],
My name is Dillon Mahmoudi and I am a PhD Candidate at Portland State University,
and am writing you as part of my dissertation research on the various ways software
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made. I am particularly interested in how software is made in [Portland/Seattle/Austin]
and how these techniques relate to regional development.
I am writing to find out whether you would be interested and available to participate
in an interview to discuss your role in the software development process at [firm]. The
interview would last approximately 45 to 60 minutes and would cover a variety of topics
related to your current and past employment in the software sector. Your participation in
this research is voluntary and confidential.
If you are willing to participate, let me know and I will work with you to schedule a
mutually agreeable time to conduct the interview. If you have any questions, please do
not hesitate to ask me.
Regards, Dillon Mahmoudi PhD Candidate, Portland State University
B.1.3

Semi-structured interview protocol: manager

• As I mentioned via email, I’m interested in your work in software development /
software field – so I’m glad you agreed to talk today.
• How did you get into software, and then, how did you get started working at
[location]?
• I’m hoping we can start with just some overview of your team/company. Can you
tell me briefly what your team/company makes?
• I’m going to ask about your routine. Can you walk me through your typical day?
It can be today/yesterday or any day, but what happens starting from when you
wake up? Can you tell me about last week? Where you worked from? Commute
times? Who you worked with and talked to?
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• Who are your main competitors? Locally? What does the nature of competition
look like? Do you ever work with those companies?
• What kinds of organization or associations does the firm have with other companies?
What other collaborations does firm/team have with other companies? Other
workers? Do you make the firm space open to the community?
• What technologies does your product build-on? Does your product use any libraries,
other software products, or other code in your product?
• When hiring, what do you think makes a really good applicant for your team/company?
What kinds of skills?
• What is the firm’s role in developing employee skills? Community skills?
• What’s an example of innovation in industry that sticks out to you? Can you tell
me why?
• What role has the firm taken in terms of diversity?
• Thanks for your time, this has been insightful. Is there anything else you’d like to
share?
B.1.4

Semi-structured interview protocol: worker

• As I mentioned via email, I’m interested in your work in software development /
software field – so I’m glad you agreed to talk today.
• How did you get into software, and then, how did you get started working at
[location]?
• I’ve never worked in a team like that. Can you tell me about your role in everything
you’ve just described?
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• I’m going to ask about your routine. Can you walk me through your typical day?
It can be today/yesterday or any day, but what happens starting from when you
wake up? Can you tell me about last week? Where you worked from? Commute
times? Who you worked with and talked to?
• Can you tell me about your software development cycle?
• How do you track software development process, both code and tasks? What other
types of tools do you use in your job to help you make software? I’m interested
in everything you use – personally, as a team, and company-wide. Which of these
tools do you actually use and which are you supposed to use?
• How are different features or bug fixes decided on? How is the product development
decided?
• When hiring, what do you think makes a really good applicant for your team/company?
What kinds of skills?
• What do you think is the hardest job in the company? Who has the easiest job here?
Who could the company not do without?
• Do you have personal programming projects? When’s the last time you worked
on one? What was it? Who did you work on it with? Where did you work on it?
What other projects have you worked on?
• What’s an example of innovation in industry that sticks out to you? Can you tell
me why?
• Can you give me an example of an innovation that you worked on within the
company? How/were you recognized for that innovation?
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• Thanks for your time, this has been really valuable. Is there anything else you’d
like to share?
B.1.5

Semi-structured interview protocol: key informant, institutional actor

• As I mentioned via email, I’m interested in your work in software development /
software field – so I’m glad you agreed to talk today.
• How did you get into software, and then, how did you get started working at
[location]?
• I’m hoping we can start with just some overview of [organization]. Can you tell
me briefly the role of your [organization]?
• What is the competition like in software?
• What kinds of organization or associations does the firm have with other companies?
What other collaborations does firm/team have with other companies?
• Who are the main competitors to local firms? What does competition look like
locally?
• What kinds of connections do firms and workers have to universities? Other
associations?
• What software and technologies do you hear about the most from companies?
Can you give me an example? What are the most common types of software or
technologies used by companies in the region? Which ones are most important?
• I’m going to ask about your routine. Can you walk me through your typical day?
It can be today/yesterday or any day, but what happens starting from when you
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wake up? Can you tell me about last week? Where you worked from? Commute
times? Who you worked with and talked to?
• What role has the [organization] taken in terms of diversity?
• In what ways do workers enhance their skills? What role has the [organization]
taken in terms enhancing the skills of workers?
• What skills do you hear about the most from companies? Can you give me an
example? Which ones are the most important for workers? Which ones are most
important for firms?
B.2

Supplementary Figures
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Figure B.1: Software occupation share of region labor force, separated, ACS 2011-2105.
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Table B.1: Software occupations, historical segmentation, 1970 to 2015.

Managers. Managerial software labor market.
110 Computer and information systems managers. Plan, direct, or coordinate activities in such fields as
electronic data processing, information systems, systems analysis, and computer programming. Excludes
occupations listed below (eg Chief Technology Officer, Information Technology Systems Director,
Management Information Systems Director).
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2015
Inc. (mean $)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (white, nh)

103,010
30%
0.77
12%
0.84

103,407
29%
0.84
15%
0.84

104,469
29%
0.82
19%
0.82

Engineers/architect. High-skilled software labor market.
1020 Software developers, all. Research, design, develop, and test computer applications software and
operating systems-level software. Analyze user needs and develop software solutions. Design software
or customize software for client use with the aim of optimizing operational efficiency (eg Computer
Applications Engineer, Database Developer, Software Applications Engineer, Embedded Systems Software
Developer, Computer Systems Software Architect).
1970
1980
*1990
2000
2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (minority:white)

55,689
23%
0.72
5%
0.82

54,777
30%
0.73
10%
0.91

60,140
32%
0.83
11%
0.89

90,472
23%
0.81
14%
0.86

91,769
20%
0.84
14%
0.89

93,888
20%
0.81
18%
0.84

1106 Network architects. Design and implement computer and information networks, suchas LAN,
WAN, intranets, extranets, and other data communicationsnetworks. Perform network modeling, analysis,
and planning. Mayalso design network and computer security measures. May researchand recommend
network and data communications hardware andsoftware (eg Network Developer, Network Designer,
Computer Network Engineer).
1970
1980
1990
2000
*2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (minority:white)

61,373
26%
0.78
19%
0.92

61,471
25%
0.78
21%
0.96

92,477
10%
0.90
19%
0.82
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Table B.1: Software occupations, historical segmentation, 1970 to 2015 (cont’d)
Analysts/researchers. High-skilled labor market.
1005 Computer and information research scientists. Conduct research into fundamental computer
and information science as theorists, designers, or inventors. Develop solutions to problems in the field of
computer hardware and software (eg Programming Methodology Researcher, Control System Computer
Scientist, Computational Theory Scientist).
1970
1980
*1990
2000
*2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (minority:white)

71,495
14%
0.67
5%
0.83

71,735
22%
0.72
8%
0.87

71,937
30%
0.81
9%
0.86

74,843
33%
0.83
19%
0.82

74,251
30%
0.87
23%
0.82

85,920
24%
0.80
16%
0.77

1006 Computer systems analysts. Analyze science, engineering, business, and other data processing
problems to implement and improve computer systems. Analyze user requirements, procedures, and
problems to automate or improve existing systems and review computer system capabilities, workflow,
and scheduling limitations (eg Systems Architect, Applications Analyst, Information or Data Processing
Systems Analyst).
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (white, nh)

77,585
37%
0.82
26%
0.83

1007 Information security analysts. Plan, implement, upgrade, or monitor security measures for the
protection of computer networks and information. May ensure appropriate security controls are in place
and respond to computer security breaches and viruses (eg Computer or Network or Internet Security
Specialist).
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (white, nh)

85,901
23%
0.78
32%
0.85

1200 Actuaries. Analyze statistical data, such as mortality, accident, sickness, disability, and retirement
rates and construct probability tables to forecast risk and liability for payment of future benefits. May
forecast future benefits (eg Actuarial Analyst, Data Scientist, Pricing Analyst, Risk Officer).
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (white, nh)

97,080
17%
0.41
3%
0.31

86,048
25%
0.53
2%
0.59

99,680
34%
0.55
6%
0.75

121,565
36%
0.60
8%
0.63

128,110
34%
0.69
8%
0.77

129,607
36%
0.73
7%
0.70
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1220 Operations research analysts. Formulate and apply mathematical modeling and other optimizing
methods to develop and interpret information that assists management with decision making, policy
formulation, or other managerial functions. May collect and analyze data and develop decision support
software, service, or products. May develop and supply optimal time, cost, or logistics networks for
program evaluation, review, or implementation (eg Analytical Strategist, Business Analytics Director,
Business Insight Manager, Decision Analyst, Operations Research Analyst).
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (white, nh)

68,772
10%
0.67
4%
0.93

69,813
27%
0.69
9%
0.81

67,269
44%
0.75
15%
0.89

74,917
40%
0.81
15%
0.84

78,581
43%
0.79
19%
0.89

78,203
44%
0.80
27%
0.84

Administrators. Middle-tier labor market.
1060 Database administrators. Formulate and apply mathematical modeling and other optimizing
methods to develop and interpret information that assists management with decision making, policy
formulation, or other managerial functions. May collect and analyze data and develop decision support
software, service, or products. May develop and supply optimal time, cost, or logistics networks for
program evaluation, review, or implementation (eg Analytical Strategist, Business Analytics Director,
Business Insight Manager, Decision Analyst, Operations Research Analyst).
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (minority:white)

75,228
42%
0.73
18%
0.84

76,473
37%
0.73
18%
0.87

74,718
38%
0.73
24%
0.9

1105 Network and computer systems administrators. Install, configure, and support an organization’s
LAN, WAN, andInternet systems or a segment of a network system. Monitor network to ensure
network availability to all system users and may perform necessary maintenance to support network
availability. May monitor and test Web site performance to ensure Web sites operate correctly and without
interruption. May assist in network modeling, analysis,planning, and coordination between network and
data communications hardware and software (eg Wide Area Network Administrator, Network Security
Administrator, Network Coordinator).
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (minority:white)

66,480
22%
0.88
18%
0.84

69,491
19%
0.89
18%
0.87

67,094
19%
0.86
24%
0.91
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Programmers. Middle-tier labor market.
1010 Computer programmer. Create, modify, and test the code, forms, and script that allow computer
applications to run. Work from specifications drawn up by software developers or other individuals. May
assist software developers by analyzing user needs and designing software solutions. May develop and
write computer programs to store, locate, and retrieve specific documents, data, and information (eg
Systems Programmer, Computer Language Coder, Applications Programmer).
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (minority:white)

72,905
27%
0.85
15%
0.86

74,568
24%
0.90
15%
0.88

75,301
21%
0.88
17%
0.81

Coders/support. Bottom-tier labor market.
1050 Computer support specialist. Provide technical assistance to computer users. Answer questions
or resolve computer problems for clients in person or via telephone, or electronically. Analyze, test,
troubleshoot, and evaluate existing network systems, such as local area network (LAN), wide area
network(WAN), and Internet systems or a segment of a network system (eg Desktop Support Specialist,
Help Desk Technician, End-User Support Specialist, Network Technician, Network DiagnosticSupport
Specialist).
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (minority:white)

52,376
34%
0.89
24%
0.90

52,847
30%
0.89
27%
0.86

52,351
26%
0.88
34%
0.84

1030 Web developers. Design, create, and modify Web sites. Analyze user needs to implement Web site
content, graphics, performance, and capacity. May integrate Web sites with other computer applications.
May use software to convert formats and use multimedia software (eg Web Designer, Internet Developer,
Intranet Developer).
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
2015
Inc. (mean)
Pct. women
Inc. ratio (women:men)
Pct. minority
Inc. ratio (minority:white)

47,064
35%
0.86
20%
0.96
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All other computer occupations.
1107 Computer occupations, all other. All computer occupations not listed separately.
1970
1980
1990
2000
2009
Inc. (mean)
73,630
Pct. women
11%
Inc. ratio (women:men)
0.57
Pct. minority
1%
Inc. ratio (minority:white)
0.66

2015
66,755
23%
0.91
32%
0.84

Table B.1: Previous pages. (*) occupation split into one or more occupations in next period. Minority
excludes Non-Hispanic White and Non-Hispanic Asian. Income ratios compare to the referent group
in parenthesis. All incomes adjusted for inflation and in 2015 US Dollars. Author’s calculations from
data gathered from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, Genadek, et al. 2015), the Bureau of Labor Statistics Standard
Occupation Classification (Labor Statistics 2010), and Beckhusen (2016). Data from the 1970 Census,
1980 Census, 1990 Census, 2000 Census, ACS 2005-2009, and ACS 2011-2015. The IPUMS variable OCC
provides occupation according to matching Census/ACS definitions. The IPUMS variable OCC2010
provides occupation classification and historically codes occupations based on a 2010 occupation definition.
Using OCC2010, a dataset of OCC observations limited to the OCC2010 software occupations codes of
110, 1000, 1010, 1020, 1050, 1060, 1100, 1200, 1220. Software occupations in Public Administration and
Active Duty Military are not used due to historical comparability (codes 900 and over).
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